



REPORT
ON
THE ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA
IN
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

17 DECEMBER 1995

International Secretariat
Rådhusstræde 1, DK-1466 Copenhagen K., Denmark

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	Executive Summary	1
	Conclusion	1
	General Observations	1
2.	Delegation	2
	Head of Delegation for the Russian Election Monitoring Mission	2
	Moscow Delegation	2
	St. Petersburg Delegation	3
	Voronezh Delegation	3
	Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Delegation	4
	Novosibirsk Oblast Delegation	4
	Smolensk Delegation	4
	Tver Delegation	4
3.	Program	5
4.	Parliamentary Development Since 1990	5
5.	Organization of the Elections	6
5.1	Defining Constituencies and Voter Registration	6
5.2	Nomination and Registration of Electoral Associations, Blocs and Candidates for Single-mandate Districts	7
	Electoral Associations and Blocs	7
	Federal List Candidates	7
	Single-mandate Candidates	8
5.3	Campaign Finance	8
	Electoral Funds	8
	Spending Limits and Publication	8
5.4	The Media	9
5.5	Polling Procedures and Election Day	9
	Vote Count	10
5.6	Complaint and Appeal Procedures	10
6.	Election of Deputies	11
6.1	Results of the State Duma Elections 17 December, 1995	11
	Figure 1: Distribution of Votes for the Federal Lists (225 Seats)	11
	Figure 2: Voter Turnout in Russian Polls since 1991	12
	Figure 3: Changes in the Ideological Composition of the State Duma ...	13
	Figure 4.1: Regional Votes For Left-Traditional Parties 1993 and 1995 ..	13
	Figure 4.2: Regional Votes For Reform Parties 1993 and 1995	14
	Figure 5: Factions in the New State Duma	14
7.	Observations	15
7.1.	Legal and Practical Conditions	15
7.2.	Pre-Election Campaign and the Media	16
7.3.	Observations at Polling Stations	17
7.4.	The Counting of Votes	19
8.	Recommendations	19

List of Annexes

Annex 1	OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Press Release
Annex 2	Programs of the Delegation
Annex 3	Regional Election Results (1993 and 1995)
Annex 4	Election Results (Turn Out and Seat Allotment)

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly monitored the elections to the Russian State Duma (lower house) on 17 December 1995 at the invitation of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC), Mr. Nikolai Ryabov. The Delegation, led by Sir Peter Emery, MP (UK) and Treasurer of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, consisted of 114 observers, including 85 parliamentarians from 26 OSCE countries, representatives of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), and the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In some areas, gubernatorial elections took place concurrently. Each governor and the heads of the regional legislatures will serve as members of the Federation Council (upper house)--two members from each of the 89 federal territories for a total of 178 members.

The Delegation in Moscow was extensively briefed on all aspects of the Russian elections over the three-day period of 14-16 December (see Annex 2). The briefings took place on the premises of the State Duma and included experts, government officials and party leaders.

Conclusion

The Delegation concluded that the Russian Federation overall successfully carried out its second multi-party elections in a free and fair manner.

General Observations

The 1995 parliamentary elections constitute a clear improvement from those in 1993. Electoral legislation has been both clarified and simplified, enhancing the transparency of the process. Furthermore, the pre-election campaign was more open and more active than in 1993. Through open access to the media and clearer election guidelines, all major parties had the opportunity to publicize their platform and message through a variety of campaign strategies. Due to the high costs of television advertising, the better funded parties were able to publicize their messages on television to a greater extent.

Generally, voting procedures were more organized than in 1993. While many of the same weaknesses witnessed in the last election still remained, they did not occur to the same degree. Some minor weaknesses in polling station procedures were, nevertheless, noted. For example, there were not enough officials or booths to handle surges of voters--contributing to instances of open voting. Many polling stations were illogically organized, leading to congestion of voters at peak voting times. Isolated instances of proxy voting were also witnessed.

Mobile voting boxes contributed to the strain put on local election commissions. While making it possible for those who could not travel to the polling station for one reason or another to vote, the use of the boxes required commission members to leave the polling station. In addition, the CEC informed a number of local commissions on the night before and morning of the elections about changes that needed to be made on ballots. These amendments forced commissioners to manually cross out names of candidates who had dropped out of the race, resulting in more last minute work for commissioners and confusion on behalf of voters.

In addition, the ballots were very large due to the many parties and candidates, making it much more convenient to vote on tables outside the small voting booths.

2. DELEGATION

HEAD OF DELEGATION FOR THE RUSSIAN ELECTION MONITORING MISSION:

Sir Peter Emery, MP (UK) and Treasurer of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

MOSCOW

HEAD OF DELEGATION: Sir Peter Emery, MP (UK) and Treasurer of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

DELEGATION:

Andras BARSONY, MP (Hungary) and Vice President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Erhard MEIER, MP (Austria)
Dirk VAN DER MAELEN, MP (Belgium)
Suzette VERHOEVEN, MP (Belgium)
Loris LYSSIOS, MP (Cyprus)
Jan NAVRÁTIL, MP (Czech Republic)
Jiří PAYNE, MP (Czech Republic)
Otakar VYCHODIL, MP (Czech Republic)
Eino TAMM, MP (Estonia)
Juhan AARE, MP (Estonia)
Valentin STRUKOV, MP (Estonia)
Henrik LAX, MP (Finland)
Arthur PAECHT, MP (France)
Jean DE LIPKOWSKI, MP (France)
Volker KRÖNING, MP (Germany)
Diodato BRATINA, Senator (Italy)
Cesare DUJANY, Senator-NAA (Italy)
Roberto MENIA, MP-NAA (Italy)
Ernesto STAJANO, MP (Italy)
Giulio TERRACINI, Senator (Italy)

Ivars ĶEZBERS, MP (Latvia)
Māris VITOLS, MP (Latvia)
Antanas RAČAS, MP (Lithuania)
Ričardas ŽURINSKAS, MP (Lithuania)
Jacques-Yves HENCKES, MP (Luxembourg)
Andrei DIACONU, MP (Moldova)
Martin ZIJLSTRA, MP (Netherlands)
Fridtjof Frank GUNDERSEN, MP (Norway)
Ingvald GODAL, MP (Norway)
Wojtek LAMENTOWICZ, MP (Poland)
Victor BOSTINARU, MP (Romania)
Pedro MOYA, MP (Spain)
Lars LEIJONBORG, MP (Sweden)
Tanja LINDERBORG, MP (Sweden)
Tuve SKÅNBERG, MP (Sweden)
Yvonne SANDBERG-FRIES, MP (Sweden)
Cemal OZTAYLAN, MP (Turkey)
Alice MAHON, MP-NAA (UK)
Lord Nicholas BETHEL, Peer (UK)

Observers from the International Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

R. Spencer OLIVER, Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Vitaly EVSEYEV, Deputy Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Camilla BENINCASA, Executive Secretary
Rita AVDONINA, Executive Secretary
Jeffrey CARLSON, Assistant (Communications)
Dan HINDSGAUL, Assistant (Press Relations)
Christopher SHARMAN, Assistant (Logistics)

Other Observers

Ferdinand VANTHOURNOUT, Staff (Belgium)
Eva DOSTÁLOVÁ, Staff (Czech Republic)
Anne MEYER, Staff (France)
Bernadette GAYET, Staff (France)
Benedetto ARSINI, Staff (Italy)
Marco D'AGOSTINI, Staff (Italy)
Craig OLIPHANT, International Secretariat-NAA
Michael OCHS, US Congressional Helsinki Commission

ST. PETERSBURG

HEAD OF DELEGATION: Ms. Guikje ROETHOF, MP (Netherlands), Vice-Chair of the 3rd Committee of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

DELEGATION:

Mr. André BOURGEOIS, Senator (Belgium)	Mr. Matti RYHÄNEN, MP (Finland)
Mr. Jean-Pierre DETREMMERIE, MP (Belgium)	Mr. Kimmo SASI, MP (Finland)
Mr. Jacques DEVOLDER, MP (Belgium)	Mr. Hans Dirk BIERLING, MP (Germany)
Mr. Luc GOUTRY, MP (Belgium)	Mr. Thomas KOSSÉNDEY, MP (Germany)
Mr. Roger HOTERMANS, MP (Belgium)	Mr. Hans RAIDEL, MP (Germany)
Mrs. Anne Marie LIZIN, Senator (Belgium)	Mr. Helmut RAUBER, MP (Germany)
Mr. Václav GRULICH, MP (Czech Republic)	Mr. Roberto BATTELLI, MP (Slovenia)
Mr. Zdeněk TROJAN, MP (Czech Republic)	Mr. Branko JANC, MP (Slovenia)
Ms. Satu HASSI, MP (Finland)	Mrs. Francke OHLSSON (Sweden)
Ms. Tytti ISOHOOKANA-ASUNMAA, MP (Finland)	Mrs. Karin WEGESTÅL, MP (Sweden)
Mr. Hannu KEMPPAINEN, MP (Finland)	Lord Lucas of Chilworth, NAA (UK)
Mr. Juha KORKEAOJA, MP (Finland)	Sir Dudley SMITH, MP (UK)
Ms. Outi OJALA, MP (Finland)	Mr. Victor FRAZER, Congressman (USA)

Observers from the International Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Mr. Pentti VÄÄNÄNEN, Deputy Secretary General of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
Ms. Pascale ROUSSY, Assistant (Regional Coordinator)

Other Observers

Ms. Catherine GUICHERD, NAA
Ms. Janice HELWIG, US Congressional Helsinki Commission
Mr. Jaakko HISSA, Staff (Finland)

VORONEZH

HEAD OF DELEGATION: Ms. Helle DEGN, MP (Denmark) and Vice President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

DELEGATION:

Mr. Václav ČUNDRLÉ, MP (Czech Republic)
Mr. Jan KRYČER, MP (Czech Republic)
Mr. Gert WEISSKIRCHEN, MP (Germany)
Mr. Dzsingisz GABOR, MP (Netherlands)
Mr. Axel ANDERSSON, MP (Sweden)

Observers from the International Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Mr. Eric RUDENSHIOLD, Director of Programs

Other Observers

Ms. Pia MORTENSEN, Staff (Denmark)

NIZHNY NOVGOROD OBLAST

HEAD OF DELEGATION: Mr. Francis LeBLANC, MP (Canada) and Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

DELEGATION:

Mr. Willy WIMMER, MP (Germany) and Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Mr. André GROSJEAN, MP (Belgium)

Mr. Ronald POFALLA, MP (Germany)

Ms. Björg Hope GALTUNG, MP (Norway)

Observers from the International Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Mr. Kurt ANDERSEN, General Services Officer

Ms. Susanne SCHOEDEL, Assistant (Regional Coordinator)

Other Observers

Mr. Evert MARECHAL, Belgian Embassy, Second Secretary

NOVOSIBIRSK OBLAST

DELEGATION:

Mr. Čestmír HOFHANZL, MP (Czech Republic)

Mr. Svatomír RECMAN, MP (Czech Republic)

Mr. Eskil ERLANDSSON, MP (Sweden)

Mr. Ola KARLSSON, MP (Sweden)

Mr. Tom COX, MP (UK)

Observers from the International Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Mr. Stig KJELDSEN, Assistant to the Director (Regional Coordinator)

SMOLENSK

DELEGATION:

Mr. Aurel CEPOI, MP (Moldova)

TVER

DELEGATION:

John FINERTY, US Congressional Helsinki Commission

Orest DEYCHAKIWSKY, US Congressional Helsinki Commission

3. PROGRAM

The pre-election briefing program was prepared with the assistance of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and local legislative bodies, as well as various NGOs exclusively for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and other observers under its auspices, including those from the North Atlantic Assembly. Other observers were welcome and did attend the pre-election briefings and meetings, and in some cases accompanied observer teams on polling day.

The Delegation was extensively briefed on all aspects of the Russian elections over the three day period of 14-16 December [Annex 2]. Most of the Delegates attended the first two days of briefings in Moscow before proceeding to attend an additional day of regional briefings in the area where they were to observe polling procedures, while others flew directly to these locations.

In Moscow, the Delegates were briefed by experts from seven major non-government organizations, who had been actively monitoring political and electoral developments in Russia via the media, sociological polls and other sources over an extended period of time. Meetings were then held with the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Mr. Nikolai Ryabov, who also had an extended and helpful visit with the Delegation leader. Further, the Delegation met with the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, the leadership of seven major political parties, and representatives from both state supported and independent Russian media. Delegates who monitored elections outside of Moscow also met with representatives of local and regional electoral commissions, local politicians, representatives from political parties, local media and locally based experts.

On election day, Delegates were deployed into seven cities and *oblasts* throughout Russia, visiting over 400 polling stations. In Moscow and St. Petersburg alone, 26 observer teams deployed to cover over 275 polling stations. Closing procedures and the initial count was also observed throughout the country. Following a debriefing meeting of OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observers, the preliminary findings of the Delegation were given to the press on the morning of 18 December [Annex 1].

4. PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1990.

Russia's parliamentarians played a decisive role in bringing down the remaining elements of the rapidly decaying Soviet system in 1990-1991. Several reform oriented candidates were elected in Russia's first, multi-candidate parliamentary elections in March 1990. Most of these, however, were not satisfied with the heretofore symbolic role of the R.S.F.S.R. legislature. By June 1990, democratic leader Boris Yeltsin had been elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation which paved the way for his popular election to the presidency a year later.

On 25 April 1993, Yeltsin submitted his popularity to a referendum in which 57.4% voted for Yeltsin as President of Russia and for early parliamentary elections. Debate on a new constitution became the next focus of political struggle between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. Once seen as merely a "rubber-stamp" institution, the legislature became popularly perceived as an obstacle to reform, dominated by conservatives. The executive-legislative struggle escalated until Yeltsin used tanks in 1993 to quell the unruly body. While most Russians viewed the parliament as a Soviet relic that had been obstructing economic and political reforms, they found it difficult to understand how Yeltsin could fire upon the same White House that he once defended as the bastion of democracy in Russia. After disbanding the parliament, Yeltsin postponed

promised presidential elections and set about drafting a new constitution to ensure a strong presidency.

However, Yeltsin's use of force had a negative impact on popular opinion, and resulted in a loss of faith in both the President's objectivity and in the democratic process. The numbers of voters at the polls in December 1993 dropped dramatically, but the constitution, defining a new two-chamber parliament--the Federal Assembly, consisting of the Federation Council (upper house) and the State Duma (lower house)-- was approved by 58.4% of participating voters in the December plebiscite. The Federal Assembly was also elected during this time, though a low turnout at the polls produced a skewed outcome resulting from a disproportionate representation of pensioners, members of the military and rural workers.

Russian legislators have used their limited powers to override presidential vetoes with a two-thirds majority on several occasions though, defying expectations that the State Duma would be incapacitated by factions and unable to cooperate after the 1993 elections.

A good example is the genesis of the current election law. The President officially initiated the debate on a new election law by presenting a draft, which substantially deviated from his 1993 election decree by calling for an increase in the number of deputies elected through single-member districts from 225 to 300 of the 450 seat State Duma. The final version of the election law was signed by the President and adopted on 21 June 1995. It included more stringent signature requirements for parties to place candidates on the ballot, more provisions to increase transparency in the process, and more safeguards. For instance, the law now allows for domestic observer participation on the CEC and requires that protocols be made available to all observers in each polling station at the end of the counting process. The law still states that half of the 450 deputies are to come from federal-party lists, and requires a five percent threshold for candidates to enter the State Duma from those lists, and a 25% voter turnout.

5. ORGANIZATION OF THE ELECTIONS

The preparation and conduct of the elections was organized by the five levels of election committees: the Central Election Committee (CEC) of the Russian Federation, the election committees of the 89 federal districts, the district election committees, the territorial election committees (*raion*, city and other) and the polling station election committees. With a mandate to oversee the electoral process, the CEC was composed of 15 members--five appointed each by the State Duma, the Federation Council and the President. All electoral associations and blocs with a federal list were allowed to nominate one member with the right to a non-binding vote.

The CEC accredited nearly 900 international observers and over 60,000 domestic observers for the 17 December elections. By far, the most active of the domestic observers was the Communist Party.

5.1 DEFINING CONSTITUENCIES AND VOTER REGISTRATION

According to the law, 225 single-mandate electoral districts were established by the CEC and published in Spring of 1995. The law limited the population variance of the most and least populous districts to no more than 10%, but as much as 15% for remote districts or districts with difficult accessibility.

Local administrators were responsible for compiling voter lists based on eligibility and residence, making one copy available for each polling station and

one for the territorial election committee. Provisions existed to allow voters to be added even on election day by the polling station election committee if the proper identification and proof of residence were produced.

Citizens were also allowed to complain about problems with voter lists to polling station committees. In cases where complaints were not resolved, appeals could be made to higher election committees or to the courts. Appeals made three days prior to the election required immediate action by the committee or court.

5.2 NOMINATION AND REGISTRATION OF ELECTORAL ASSOCIATIONS, BLOCS AND CANDIDATES FOR SINGLE-MANDATE DISTRICTS

To be put on the ballot, parties were required to collect 200,000 signatures by 22 October 1995, with no more than seven percent of them coming from any one of the 89 districts of the Federation. In 1993, parties had to present at least 100,000 signatures with no more 15% coming from one district. Even with the increased threshold, 43 parties and blocs qualified for registration. However, many parties hired professional signature collectors to meet the requirements. In addition, parties were allowed to use signatures collected in support of individual candidates running in single-mandate districts as part of their total; however, few took advantage of this.

Some blocs were initially disqualified, most notably Yabloko and Derzhava, because they did not adhere strictly to procedural guidelines. The Democratic Russia and Free Trade Unions party, lead by Galina Starovoitova, was rejected by the CEC because they missed the deadline for turning in signatures. This ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court, but the CEC then denied the party having Ms. Starovoitova head their federal list of candidates because she was running in single-mandate district even though this practice is explicitly allowed in the election law. Without Ms. Starovoitova, the party decided to withdraw its registration. Except for this case, the overall registration process ran smoothly

Electoral Associations and Blocs

The election law foresaw the creation of electoral blocs by at least two electoral associations for the period of the conduct of elections to the State Duma. Electoral blocs had to register with the CEC by submitting documents confirming their decision to unite. Subsequently, the CEC was required to announce its decision on registration within five days.

According to the election law, an electoral association is an all-Russian public association, whose charter provides for participation in elections to bodies of state power. Electoral associations had to be registered by the Ministry of Justice no later than 16 June 1995. By the deadline, 269 parties, electoral associations and blocs comprising 5,646 candidates, had registered.

Federal List Candidates

The nomination of candidates on federal lists started after President Yeltsin signed the decree officially setting the date of the election day on 14 July 1995. Candidates had to be nominated by secret ballot at meetings of electoral associations/blocs. Parties, electoral associations and blocs were limited to 270 candidates. When determining the order of candidates on the list, the association or bloc could split the list (partly or in full) into regional groups (by district or groups of districts) of candidates. The number of candidates at the top of the list who were not tied to any specific region (i.e. national candidates) could not exceed 12. Furthermore, parties were not allowed to submit a federal list with all

candidates from the same district, and the districts of each regional group of candidates had to be stated. In addition, candidates could not be included in more than one regional group and could only appear on the federal list once. However, the law allowed candidates to appear on both a federal list and on a single-mandate list.

Single-mandate Candidates

Candidates in single-member districts could be nominated in one of two ways: either by the electoral associations or blocs, or by the voters directly. The federal lists as well as the parties' and voters' lists of candidates for single-member districts had to be certified by the CEC. Candidates in single-member districts nominated by an association, bloc or individual voters, had to collect signatures from at least one percent of the total number of registered voters in their district, usually about 5,000. Almost 2,700 candidates registered to run in single-mandate districts, of which over 1,000 were independents.

5.3 CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Compared to the 1993 Presidential decree on Elections, the provisions for the 1995 elections were very detailed, making possible public control over campaign financing. The law allowed parties and candidates to finance their election campaign from three sources, funds allocated by electoral committees, own funds and donations.

Electoral Funds

Electoral funds for this round of elections had to be put into designated campaign accounts. The source of the funds and limits on the amounts are set by law. Electoral associations and blocs could not exceed 100,000 minimum salaries (approx. \$1,300,000 USD) of the association's funds allocated to their campaign account. Individual candidates could not exceed 1,000 minimum salaries (approx. \$13,000 USD) of private funds allocated to their campaign account. In case parties allocated funds to their own candidates, the upper limit was 1,500 minimum salaries (approx. \$19,500 USD).

Individuals could not donate more than 20 minimum salaries (approx. \$260 USD) to a candidate, or 30 (approx. \$390 USD) minimum salaries to an electoral association or bloc. Legal entities could not donate more than 200 minimum salaries (approx. \$2,600 USD) to a candidate, or more than 2,000 minimum salaries (approx. \$26,000 USD) to an electoral association or bloc.

Also, the sources of voluntary donations were restricted. Foreign states, organizations or citizens, international or governmental organizations, religious associations, and military institutions were not allowed to give financial support to parties and candidates.

Spending Limits and Publication

In total, candidates could not spend more than 10,000 minimum salaries (approx. \$130,000 USD), electoral associations and blocs not more than 250,000 minimum salaries (approx. \$3,250,000 USD).

Electoral committees were obliged to publish the amounts and sources of political funds for each party and candidate. To secure the transparency of campaign financing, every candidate or electoral association was required to file a financial report detailing the amounts and sources of election funds raised and of all expenses borne within 30 days after the election. Electoral committees have 45

days from the time the report was submitted to make it public.

5.4 THE MEDIA

Legislation governing the media has become more detailed since 1993. Separate legislation existed covering mass media regulations and the use of state electronic and print media (outlets receiving at least 25% of their budget from state or government sources) by participants in the elections. Government media used exclusively to publish official statements and material was prohibited from publishing campaign materials.

Electoral associations, blocs and candidates for deputy were entitled to free time slots determined by lot on both federal and regional state television and radio (TRCs) from November 15 to December 15, 1995. State television and radio each allotted one hour of broadcast time daily on the federal level for this purpose. In some cases, election debates ("round tables") between candidates were permitted to replace individual time slots on a local level. Air time could also be purchased on state TRCs, the amount of which was not allowed to exceed the amount of free air time given. Similar provisions also existed allowing candidates to receive free time slots in the state owned print media. State media sources were required to grant paid slots based on equal conditions for all candidates, associations or blocs. While 35 of 43 parties purchased advertising on TV, it was not financially possible for many parties to do this extensively. For instance, it reportedly cost between about \$10,000 and \$30,000/per minute on Russian Public TV (ORT), depending on time of day.

The extensive cost of advertising in the media and reports of blocs exceeding spending limits led the European Media Institute (EMI) to check the amount of advertising used against the prices paid. They determined that in some cases blocs significantly exceeded spending limits, but that there appeared to be a general consensus among the parties not to raise the issue.

Those wishing to use the free or paid services of the state TRCs or state owned print media were required to notify the relevant TRCs or editor of the relevant periodical or station within three days of registration. While failure to meet this requirement caused some candidates to be denied air time on state TRCs, there were reports that the three day period was extended in many local cases. Any refusal to grant free air time or free print space could be appealed to relevant election commissions or the courts. In addition, provisions to create transparency in the process existed, which included letting legal and journalistic experts participate in groups created by the electoral commissions to assist in monitoring the electoral process. A widespread increase of private and subsequently, independent media sources, also increased transparency, though there were still some reports of pressure being put on local non-state media by local authorities.

5.5 POLLING PROCEDURES AND ELECTION DAY

Absentee voting took place 15 days prior to the elections at territorial election committees on vessels that were to be at sea on election day and at polar stations and other remote regions or regions difficult to access. In addition, voters who were due to be absent from their residence on election day were able to vote 15 to four days early at territorial election commissions and up to three days prior to the election at the election commission of their polling station.

With few exceptions, polling stations opened at 8 a.m. local time and closed at 10 p.m. The election committees were to have sealed the ballot boxes after inspection, which took place in presence of voters and observers. Absentee votes

had to be put in the boxes before the actual voting procedure began.

Voters received two ballots, one for the federal list and one for the single-mandate candidates in their district. The federal list contained the names and symbols of each party, as well as the names of the three top candidates. The single-mandate ballot listed candidates' names and party affiliation, if appropriate. In some cases voters received additional ballots for the election of governor or mayor taking place at the same time.

When receiving the ballots voters presented their passport or another form of identification and signed the voter list. In order to prevent multiple voting, an identification number was entered on the list by election officials. Voters who were not able to sign the list, or to fill in the ballots, were allowed to ask for assistance. Voters were also allowed to request a new ballot in case mistakes were made. In one observed instance, an elderly woman exchanged her ballot three times because of mistakes.

Voting premises were equipped with either booths or special places or rooms for voting by secret ballot. For the most part, all stations had booths, although usually only two--rarely enough for the number of voters. Furthermore, the election committees were instructed to install special stands with unbiased information materials on candidates or parties and samples of completed ballots. They were placed in, or in front of, the polling stations. There were some complaints about the neutrality of these informational materials.

Vote Count

Any observers present at the time of the poll closing were allowed to witness the counting of votes. After closing, local commission members determined the results in separate protocols for each ballot. In addition, the protocols were to be filled out in triplicate, with one copy being made available to observers present. Election officials in most polling stations showed signs of fatigue during the counting process. In a few isolated instances, domestic observers actually assisted in the counting of votes. The results were to be immediately forwarded to the respective territorial election committees. Then, within three days the territorial election boards were to hand the results over to the district election committees, which then calculated the results and determined which candidate was elected in each single-member district. No later than seven days after the election the CEC had to receive the results for the single-member constituencies and for the federal lists. There were some delays in the process because not all districts were linked with the CEC by computer. (Even so, the CEC published the final election outcome before the deadline of 8 January 1996 stated in the election law.)

5.6 COMPLAINT AND APPEAL PROCEDURES

Election committees on all levels were provided with different responsibilities for resolving complaints. Local election committees could only adjudicate complaints regarding direct violations of the election law. Every other complaint at each level had to be resolved by the next higher level or in a court of law. Complaints against the CEC had to be received by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The appellate process ran smoothly for the most part. Some exceptions were noted in the section on party registration.

6. ELECTION OF DEPUTIES

As in 1993, parties and blocs had to overcome a five-percent threshold in order to be elected through the federal lists. For the election results to be valid, voter turn-out again had to be at least 25%.

According to Article 65 of the Election Law, the results in polling stations and on single-mandate district level have to be published by the respective district election committee in the local media no later than one month after election day. In the same period, the CEC is responsible for publishing the voting results in all 225 districts in the mass media. This provision contained in the election law is a significant change to 1993, when the results on polling stations were not published but entrusted to special working groups in the administration, which then calculated the results. Due to the impossibility of public control over the processing of results, concerns were raised on the possibility of fraud.

6.1 RESULTS OF THE STATE DUMA ELECTIONS 17 DECEMBER, 1995

Almost half the votes on the Federal Lists did not translate into seats





Figure 1: Distribution of Votes for the Federal Lists (225 Seats)

Although relatively more difficult to qualify for running in the 1995 elections as compared to 1993, a total of 43 political parties (electoral associations and blocs) contested the elections. This high number of parties is perhaps indicative of high-profile political leaders using parties as a vehicle for their own candidacies and that these personalities, rather than parties, still play a large role in Russia's system of "personalized politics." The mixed electoral system made it possible for leaders of smaller political parties to gain a Duma seat by running as individuals in single-mandate districts even though their parties failed to pass the five-percent threshold. Thus, while only four of the 43 parties passed the five-percent threshold, another 18 parties secured representation through candidates elected in single-mandate districts [See Annex 4].

As shown in Figure 1, almost 50% of the votes cast for parties and blocs on

the Federal List were not translated into seats since these parties received less than five percent of the vote. Therefore, the four winning parties ended up with twice as many seats in the new State Duma than their percentage of the overall vote accounted for.

Democratic Development: downward trend in voter turnout has reversed.



Statistics: Sobyenin, A.A., Sukhovolsky, V.G., *Demokratya, ogranichenaya falsifikatsiyami. Vyборы y referendumy v Rossii v 1991-1993*, Moscow 1995, pp. 216 and the Central Election Commission, 29 December 1995.


Figure 2: Voter Turnout in Russian Polls since 1991

Voter turnout for the elections was higher than predicted. According to CEC figures, a total of 64.38% of the eligible voters participated on 17 December. This was considerably higher than the 54.81% turnout in 1993, and it appears that the downward trend in turnout since the presidential elections may be reversing. Before the elections many observers of Russian politics, in particular within the media, had been very pessimistic, stating that the Russian people were fed up with politics and invariably predicted a very low turnout in the December elections. This view was not borne out by Delegation voter interviews, rather voters felt a sense of purpose and gave definite reasons for voting--a distinct change from 1993.

Apart from doing well in the proportional elections for the federal lists, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation also emerged as the overall winner in single-mandate districts. The Communist Party now has 157 out of the 450 seats in the new State Duma (35%). While failing to pass the threshold for the federal lists, the Agrarian Party, a close ally to the Communist Party, came out second in the single-mandate districts, winning 20 seats. Figure 3 shows that the "left" side of the new Duma was considerably strengthened by the 1995 parliamentary elections, primarily at the expense of "reformers" and "non-affiliated" candidates.

Concurrent with the gains made by the Communist parties, the reform parties (See Legend below) lost 38 out of the 100 seats they hold in the old legislature. Looking at the party vote in the regions covered by the Delegation, this pattern appears consistent throughout Russia (See Figure 4).

"Left" Side of the State Duma Strengthened



PARTY GROUPINGS	
Left-traditionalists (81/187 Seats) Communist parties sharing nostalgia for the Soviet past; call for better living standards and state control over the economy	Reform (100/62 Seats) Liberal parties; promote democracy, rule of law and free market economy
Center-left (50/14 Seats) Western style Social-Democratic parties; emphasize social issues over economic liberalism	Right-traditionalists (64/52 Seats) Radical nationalist/patriotic parties; want to secure ethnic Russian domination within an enlarged Russian superpower
Center-right (19/57 Seats) Centrist parties; stress the need for stability, moderate reforms and experienced leadership	Non-affiliated (130/78 Seats) Independent deputies elected through single mandate districts
Statistics: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. The ideological groupings are inspired by Andrei Zhukov, "Reshuffles Will Not Change Duma's Essence," Prism, Vol. 1(25), 1 December 1995.	

Figure 3: Changes in the Ideological Composition of the State Duma

Communist Parties Gain Support in All Areas Visited by the Delegation




Figure 4.1: Regional Votes For Left-Traditional Parties 1993 and 1995

Reform Parties Lose Support





Figure 4.2: Regional Votes For Reform Parties 1993 and 1995

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also show that despite losing some support, the "reform" parties still have their stronghold in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and that "left-traditional" parties have increased their following outside these metropolitan areas. The latter is exemplified by results in both Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk and Voronezh. Here, "reform" parties did better than "left-traditional" parties in 1993, but in the 1995 polls Communist parties easily passed the "reform" party vote.

Duma Deputies Establish Factions on Their First Sitting



Faction Leaders in the 1996 State Duma

Gennady Zyuganov (Communist Party)
Sergei Belyaev (Our Home is Russia)
Vladimir Zhirinovksy (Liberal Democratic Party)
Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko)

Ramazan Abdulatipov, Artur Chilingarov
(Russian Regions)
Nikolai Ryzhkov (Popular Power)
Nikolai Kharitonov (Agrarian Party)

Figure 5: Factions in the New State Duma (in number of seats)

The new State Duma convened on 16 January, whereupon 415 out of 450 deputies divided themselves into seven different factions (Figure 5). These factions do not wholly correspond with the distribution of seats for parties (18 parties are represented in the State Duma--See Annex 4), since several deputies have decided to join broader factions, in order to facilitate a basis for coalition-building and decision-making in the new legislature.

7. OBSERVATIONS

References to the 1993 elections relate to observations made by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at that time.

7.1. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONDITIONS

- a) The Delegation was generally impressed with the work undertaken by the Central Election Commission (CEC) to ensure free and fair elections. Concerns have been raised about some of the decisions during the party and candidate registration process. Most concerns were dealt with by the courts, however, the case of Democratic Russia was an exception. Furthermore, other problems that arose appear to have been quickly and satisfactorily resolved through efficient lines of communication between the various levels of election committees.
- b) The manner of appointment and composition of the CEC seems to have provided an impartial panel for the administration of elections. However, some CEC decisions were subsequently over-ruled by the courts.
- c) The election law allows one representative from each of the 43 electoral associations and blocs to sit on the CEC. According to the law, these representatives were allowed to participate and make recommendations through non-binding votes, which added to the safeguards against fraud, and seems to have increased the overall transparency of the process.
- d) There appeared to be effective judicial review of CEC decisions. The right to appeal to the Supreme Court was successfully employed by several parties, who were initially banned for failing to properly register. These parties were reinstated by the CEC, after the Court upheld their appeals. Unlike the 1993 elections, apparently no parties or candidates were barred from taking part in the elections for political reasons.
- e) The CEC informed prospective candidates and parties, the electorate and election officials on legal and practical aspects of the December 1995 elections and the Delegation finds that the CEC did an excellent job relative to the 1993 elections.
- f) Exit polls indicated that voters generally were more informed about political parties and candidates than in 1993, and generally understood proper registration and voting procedures.
- g) Election officials seemed better informed and administered the elections in a more efficient manner than in 1993. However, some problems witnessed in 1993 were still recurring, namely group voting, open voting, and to a limited extent, proxy voting. In some cases, election officials seemed confused about

proper voting procedures for citizens not registered in a particular polling place, but who had just moved into a district.

- h) Observers had difficulty in obtaining addresses of polling sites in the Moscow area. Local election commissioners refused to cooperate and would only give the address of the regional commissions in the outlying areas. This caused some difficulty in the deployment of observers.

7.2. PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE MEDIA

- a) Compared to the 1993 pre-election campaign, parties and candidates were better prepared and more organized in 1995. The political parties had more resources and time to prepare for the elections, and to develop individual strategies designed to attract voter support.
- b) Several parties engaged professional signature collectors in order to achieve the required 200,000 signatures for registration (100,000 in 1993). In regard to the registration process several factors were brought to the attention of the Delegation. Reportedly, in some instances the hiring of signature collectors amounted to little more than payment for signatures (*e.g.* some signatures were not collected, but rather forged from voter registries, phone books, etc.).
- c) While campaign media coverage in the State media (these outlets receiving at least 25% of their budget from state or government sources) generally improved in its treatment of parties and candidates as compared to 1993, it did appear somewhat biased in favor of pro-government parties. The political parties took advantage of the free time slots they were offered on State media. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observers found that regulations providing candidates and parties with free air time were followed.
- d) National as well as regional newspapers, radio stations and television companies offered a wide range of information on candidates and parties contesting the elections.
- e) Most of the private, independent print media seemed to support specific parties and candidates. Rarely was such partisan support openly stated to the audience. However, the European Media Institute's (EMI) media monitoring project found that the plethora of news sources now characterizing the Russian media landscape, even though diminished from 1993, still offers enough conflicting points of view to give a somewhat balanced treatment of the campaign. Rather, the main issue pertains to the ability of journalists and editors to cover a political campaign in a more critical and professional manner.
- f) Funds to pay for space and time for campaign advertisements were limited by the CEC to a fixed maximum expenditure. EMI, taking into account the normal prices on time slots on television, radio and space in the printed press, estimated that several parties and candidates spent more money on their campaigns than they were formally allowed to.

- g) While the Delegation registered some complaints from smaller parties that the high prices for commercial television slots gave well-funded parties an unfair advantage, actual election results told a more complex story. The parties which spent the most on television adds did not do as well as expected, whereas the winning Communist Party refrained totally from television advertising (apart from their free time slots).

7.3. OBSERVATIONS AT POLLING STATIONS

- a) National observers nominated by parties or candidates were present in most polling stations visited by the Delegation. However, most parties unfortunately refrained from taking full advantage of their right to send party representatives to polling stations. Communist Party observers far outnumbered all others in polling stations visited by the Delegation.
- b) Polling stations generally suffered from poor layout. They were not set up and organized logically by officials to allow voters to follow a single path from registration/identification and ballot issuance to the voting booths, then to the ballot box, and finally to the exit. In addition, some polling stations were too small or ill-shaped for voting purposes (*e.g.* polling stations in corridors and hallways).
- c) The Delegation witnessed widespread open voting (marking of ballots outside the designated voting booths), a practice which is in direct violation with the election law. Several reasons why voters felt encouraged to vote openly were identified:
- Polling stations seemed ill-equipped to handle large numbers of voters during the peak voting times, causing overcrowding and, subsequently, open voting. Moreover, while voting booths were provided at all polling stations, there were not enough booths in most of the visited polling stations to handle the rush hours.
 - Many voting booths were too small and provided insufficient space to handle and mark the ballot papers, which were confusingly large due to the high number of parties and blocs. This was particularly the case at those polling stations where the voter had more than the ordinary two ballot papers because gubernatorial and/or mayoral elections were held concurrently. Furthermore, many voting booths were poorly lit so voters had difficulty reading and marking the ballots.
 - Polling stations seemed to be generally under-staffed. The election commissions, especially when two or more members were out supervising mobile ballot boxes, were over-worked and too small to effectively and efficiently carry out the task they were given.
 - Although less prevalent than in 1993, group voting (in most cases family units) was also observed at many polling stations. This practice, which is normal throughout the former Soviet Union, is mostly due to poor voter education.

Only in two polling stations were election officials observed to have effectively prevented open voting. But while open voting undoubtedly constitutes a major procedural flaw of the elections, the Delegation found that this practice did not substantively change the free nature of the voting process. While not encouraged by election officials, voters were given the opportunity to vote in secret and tended to vote in the open as a matter of expediency.

- d) Some polling stations did not have enough ballots for the voters (apparently due to an unexpectedly high voter turn-out), but ballot shortages were usually remedied quickly. The shortages were likely due to the practice began in 1993 of delivering fewer ballots than registered voters, anticipating lower voter turn outs. Unlike in 1993, voters who made mistakes requested and received new ballots.
- e) Some isolated instances of proxy voting also occurred on election day, but the level of this practice appears to have dramatically declined since the 1993 elections. However, the absentee voting period was not observed by the Delegation.
- f) In some cases, polling commissioners were seen advising elderly people on whom to vote for, apparently upon request of the voter. In one case, this advice was given by one of the party observers.
- g) Generally, the new voting procedure of marking the ballot in favor of candidates, instead of crossing out all names against, seemed to operate smoothly. Voters seemed informed of the change and sample ballots were posted in most polling stations.
- h) Some polling stations opened prior to the official opening time, apparently because the commissions were ready and voters were present ahead of time. In another instance, a polling station stopped handing out ballots ten minutes prior to the official closing time, so that some voters were prevented from voting.
- i) Distribution and posting of campaign materials was witnessed in several polling stations. However, this did not seem to be widespread, was quickly remedied when pointed out, and seemed to have little effect on the overall outcome of the elections.
- j) In some polling stations, the ballot boxes were poorly guarded. However, most were sealed and attended in a satisfactory manner.
- k) In Smolensk, an observer from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Delegation was temporarily detained and alleged that he was prevented by election officials from carrying out his mission.

7.4. THE COUNTING OF VOTES

During the 1993 parliamentary elections the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly was highly critical of the slow counting and tabulation of votes, as well as the lack of public access to the complete results. In meetings with the CEC leadership, the Assembly's Secretary General stressed the importance of more transparency in the 1995 elections. This was also a main focus of other international observer groups working in conjunction with the Assembly. One of the most important issues was to secure the right for national as well as international observers to be allowed to monitor the counting and tabulation of votes at all levels. At a briefing with CEC Chairman Nikolai Ryabov just prior to election day, the Delegation was assured that Article 65 of the Election Law (stipulating the publication of the complete results within three months of election day) would be respected and that observers would be allowed to monitor the counting process at all levels.


- a) The initial vote count conducted by the local polling commission members was in some cases hampered by minor counting mistakes. The election officials, while tired and over-worked in most cases, generally seemed very enthusiastic in their efforts to follow correct procedures regarding the vote count. Counting mistakes were generally attributed to the long working hours put in by the polling commission members. However, in many observed polling stations, there was no system or effort to double-check vote counts. If there was objection, officials would count votes again.
- b) Because of under-staffing, some election commissions accepted the help of national observers in the counting process--a violation of the election law. Furthermore, in places where gubernatorial and/or mayoral elections took place, the counting process was complicated by the fact that all ballots were put into the same boxes.
- c) No irregularities in the vote counting and aggregation of votes at the CEC were observed.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

- a) A deadline should be set for amending the ballot and removing candidates who drop out at the last minute so that manual corrections to the ballot are not necessary.
- b) The election law sets a maximum expenditure for campaigns which should be enforced. Violators should be fined enough to deter the practice, or a better enforcement procedure needs to be implemented.
- c) Further steps should be taken to ensure a more impartial coverage of elections by the State media.
- d) Local election commissions should be of a size and should work hours such that they are able to carry out their responsibilities efficiently and effectively. Relying on domestic observers to help with the counting process violates the election law and casts doubt on the integrity of the process.
- e) The CEC should continue to educate local election officials regarding proper procedures, including the opening and closing of polling stations at the

designated times, the rules concerning campaign materials at polling sites and the rights and responsibilities of domestic observers.

- f) Instructions should be available so that domestic observers, particularly those affiliated with candidates and political parties, understand fully their rights and duties, including proper behavior in polling stations. Furthermore, they should be encouraged to participate more extensively than was the case with most party representatives in the 1995 elections.
- g) Election officials should take steps to ensure secrecy of the vote and require voters, as stated in the election law "to fill in their ballot forms inside a specially designed ballot booth with no other persons allowed to be present."
- h) Election booths should be constructed in such a way to provide more space and sufficient light for voters easily to handle, read and mark large ballots, and thereby encourage their use. Steps such as handing out ballots to only as many voters as there are open voting booths should also be considered.
- i) While the Delegation finds that the deadlines set in the election law for publishing final and complete election results are a step forward compared with the 1993 elections, effort should be made to further reduce the time between polling day and when official results are made public. This would allay concerns of possible tampering. In this regard, computer networks linking polling commissions to the CEC should be completed.
- j) The large number of blocs and electoral associations running in the elections appeared to cause some confusion both among voters (making their choice between 43 different parties, and marking the very large ballot) and among the media (which had to give free time slots to all parties). Some observers suggested that this might be prevented by amending the legal provisions stipulating requirements for qualifying to run in the elections, e.g. by requiring more signatures to be collected from a higher number of constituencies.
- k) Further, the process of collecting signatures should be more carefully overseen to reduce the possibility of fraud, and the procedures for verification of signature lists should be improved.
- l) Local election officials should take care to open and close polls at the designated time, and ensure that the sealing of the ballot boxes is completed in order to allow voting to begin on time.



Sir Peter Emery, MP, Head of Delegation

ANNEX 1 PRESS RELEASE

MOSCOW, December 18, 1995

Parliamentary Elections in the Russian Federation

A Delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly monitored the elections to the Russian State Duma on 17 December at the invitation of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Mr. Nikolai Ryabov.

The delegation congratulates the Russian Federation for having successfully carried out these second multi-party elections in an overall free and fair manner.

Consisting of 114 observers, the Delegation, led by Sir Peter Emery, MP (UK) and Treasurer of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, included parliamentarians from twenty-six OSCE countries. After two days of high-level briefings in Moscow, the delegation deployed into seven groups, observing the elections in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Smolensk, Tver and Voronezh. Over 400 polling stations were visited by members of the delegation on election day.

These 1995 parliamentary elections constitute a clear improvement from those in 1993. Electoral legislation has been made clearer and more simple, thus enhancing the transparency of the process. The increased popular participation in all aspects of the election process is a positive sign of a healthy democratic development in Russia. Further, the pre-election campaign was visibly freer and more fair than the last time around.

Some participants noted, however, minor weaknesses in the vote counting procedures at polling station level. There were not enough officials to handle the mid-day surges of voters, thus encouraging open voting, and the same officials who had worked a fourteen hour day had to count the votes well into the night without relief.

Some procedural flaws, at least by Western standards, continued to be observed in some areas, including open voting and in some isolated instances, proxy voting. Other problems have been reported in the regions not covered by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

OSCE parliamentarians who participated in the Assembly's 1993 monitoring project noted major improvements in the election process, particularly the ability to oversee all facets of the counting of votes at all levels from polling station up to the Central Election Commission.

A comprehensive report will soon be available from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's International Secretariat in Copenhagen.

ANNEX 2 PROGRAMS OF THE DELEGATION

MOSCOW, RUSSIA

14 DECEMBER

- 9:00 Organizational meeting of the Delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
- 9:10 - 11:00 Briefing: Experts Panels
- Representatives of National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Canada-Russia Parliamentary Program (C-R PP) will discuss the political aspects of the elections, followed by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), who will discuss legal, institutional and procedural reforms of the election law dating from 1993.
- The second panel will include representatives of Internews, the European Media Institute (EMI) and the Russian American Press and Information Center (RAPIC) who will discuss media issues related to the election campaign.
- 11:00 - 11:40 Meeting with Mr. Ivan P. Rybkin, Speaker of the Duma, Leader of the *Ivan Rybkin's Bloc*, Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
- 12:00 - 13:00 Meeting with Mr. Nikolai Ryabov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (on the premises of the CEC; transportation will be provided from the State Duma to the CEC)
- 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch Break
- 15:00 - 15:30 Meeting with Ms. Alevtina F. Fedulova, Leader of the *Women of Russia Bloc*
- 15:30 - 16:00 Meeting with Representatives of the State TV and Radio
- 16:00 - 17:00 Meeting with Mr. Sergei Y. Glaziev, one of the Leaders of the *Congress of Russian Communities*
- 18:00 - 19:30 Reception at the British Embassy (Transportation is being provided from and to the Savoy Hotel)

15 DECEMBER

- 9:20 - 10:00 Meeting with Mr. Victor L. Sheinis, one of the Leaders of the *Yabloco Bloc*
- 10:00 - 11:00 Meeting with Mr. Gennady A. Zyuganov, Leader of the *Communist Party of the Russian Federation*
- 11:00 - 12:00 Meeting with Mr. A. P. Yurkov, Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Rossyiskaya Gaseta*
- 12:00 - 13:00 Lunch Break
- 13:15 - 13:40 Meeting with Mr. Sergei Belyaev, Campaign Manager for *Our Home is Russia* and Minister for Privatization
- 13:45 - 14:30 Meeting with Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
- 15:00 - 16:00 Meeting with Mr. Tumanov, Chairman of the Constitutional Court (on the premises of the Constitutional Court)

Evening Delegates will depart by train to
St. Petersburg
(train # 2, depart at 23.55)
Nizhny Novgorod
(train # 38, depart at 23.30)
Voronezh
(train # 25, depart at 20.10)

16 DECEMBER

- 12:00 - 13:00 Meeting with Mr. Yegor T. Gaidar, Leader of the *Russia's Democratic Choice - United Democrats*
- 13:00 - 14:00 Meeting with Mr. Vasily S. Lipitsky, one of the Leaders of the *Social-Democrats*
- 14:00 Lunch Break

No meetings are foreseen for the afternoon.

17 DECEMBER - ELECTION DAY

- 7:30 Deployment of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly observers
- 8:00 Polls open (Delegates will be deployed before this time to ensure observation of the opening procedures)
- Lunch Break
- Redeployment of observers
- Dinner Break
- 22:00 Polls close (Delegates must be in polling stations before they close to observe the vote count).

18 DECEMBER 1995

- Morning Delegates will return by train from
Nizhny Novgorod
(train # 37, arrive at 06.15)
St. Petersburg
(train # 1, arrive at 08.25)
Voronezh.
(train # 26, arrive at 07.57)
- 10:00 Meeting of the Delegation members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
- 11:00 Press Conference

ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA

14 - 15 DECEMBER

Arrival of some Delegates by Plane

16 DECEMBER

- 8:25 Arrival of the Delegation by over-night train from Moscow
- 10:00 Meeting with Mr. A. B. Garusov, Chairman of the Electoral Commission of the City of St. Petersburg
- 11:00 Meeting with representatives of the media ("Chas Pik", ITAR-TASS, "Izvestia", "Nezavisimaya Gazeta", "Moskovsky Komsolets")
- 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch
- 14:30 Meeting with the local Chairman of *Our Home is Russia*
- 15:30 Meeting with the local Chairman of the *Communist Party of the Russian Federation*, Mr. A. S. Olkhovsky
- 16:30 Meeting with two local leaders of *Yabloko*, among them Mr. Moyseyev
- 17:30 Meeting with the local Chairman of the *Social Democratic Party*, Mr. Diakov

17 DECEMBER - ELECTION DAY

7:30 - 22:30	Visits to Polling Stations, monitoring the opening and the closing of Polling Stations as well as parts of the count
23:00	Meeting of the Delegation at Hotel Astoria
23:55	Departure of the Delegates to Moscow by over-night train

18 - 19 DECEMBER

Departure of some Delegates

VORONEZH, RUSSIA

16 DECEMBER

9:05	Arrival by train
9:05-9:20	Pick-up at Train Station: Voronezh 1
9:20-9:30	To Hotel "Don"
9:30-10:30	Check-in
10:30-11:30	Breakfast
11:30-12:30	Meeting with the Chairman Regional Election Elections Commission <i>Vladimir Vasilevich Kalitvin</i>
12:30-13:30	Meeting with the Head of the Regional Duma and the Regional Administration
13:30-14:00	Return to Hotel
14:00-15:00	Lunch
15:00-17:00	Meeting with Representative of Electoral Blocks and Associations including: <i>Our home is Russia, Yabloko, Block Rybkin, Communist Party and others. As well as members of the Mass Media</i>
17:00-18:00	Visit of the Electoral Commission from district no. 75 (<i>Levoberezhny Okrug</i>)
18:00	Return to Hotel
18:20-19:00	Free
19:00	Dinner

17 DECEMBER

The Delegation will be divided into 2 initial groups for the monitoring of polling stations. After those in the group have left to return to Moscow, a third group (those who are spending the night in Voronezh) will form to watch the closing of a polling station and the counting of ballots.

For All Groups:

8:30-9:00	Breakfast
-----------	-----------

Group 1:

9:00	Leave Hotel
9:00-11:00	Travel to Pavlovsk
11:00-14:00	Meeting with Electoral Commission no.76 (<i>Pavlovsky Okrug</i>), and visits to polling stations with in the Pavlovsky Okrug
14:00-16:00	Return to Voronezh

Group 2

9:00	Leave Hotel
9:50-15:00	Meeting with Electoral Commission no. 77, (<i>Pravoberezhny Okrug</i>), and observations at polling stations in the Ramon District.

Group 3 (To watch the closing of polling stations and the counting of ballots)

8-9:30	Monitor polling station in Voronezh
9:30-?	Observing the ballot count at a polling station (in the district dministration building)

18 DECEMBER

(For those who have spent the night)

10:30-11:00	Breakfast
11:30-12:30	Discussion of the preliminary results of the elections
12:30-14:00	Free
14:00-15:00	Lunch
15:00-16:00	Last meeting with the Electoral Commission
16:30-17:00	Dinner
17:00	Leave for the Train Station
17:50-	Leave on train for Moscow

NIZHNY NOVGOROD OBLAST, RUSSIA

15 DECEMBER

22.10 Arrival of the German Members of the Delegation in Nizhny Novgorod by plane

16 DECEMBER

07.30 Arrival of the Delegation in Nizhny Novgorod by train

10.00 - 10.30 Meeting with Yury I. Lebedev, First Deputy Head of the administration of the Nizhny Novgorod Region

10.40 - 11.20 Meeting with Anatoly A. Kozeradsky, Chairman of the Legislative Assembly of the Nizhny Novgorod Region

11.40 - 12.20 Meeting with Anatoly I. Nekrasov, Chairman of the Election Commission of the Nizhny Novgorod Region

12.40 - 14.10 Lunch

14.30 - 16.30 Separate meetings with Vladimir P. Arabov, Nikolai A. Benedikvtov, Vladimir P. Kirienko of the *Communist Party of the Russian Federation* (KPFR), and Viktor N. Belyakov of *Our Home is Russia*

16.30 - 17.00 Meeting with representatives of the Media

17.30 - 18.00 Meeting with representatives of the National Democratic Institute (NDI): Debbie Leonard, Sheila O'Connell, Nancy O'Neill

20.30 Dinner

17 DECEMBER - ELECTION DAY

7:30 Visits to Polling Stations, including the opening procedures

18.30 Departure of the German Members of the Delegation to Moscow by plane

20.00 Meeting of the Delegation

22.20 Departure of the Delegation for Moscow by train

NOVOSIBIRSK OBLAST, RUSSIA

15 DECEMBER

6:00 Arrival of Delegation

11:00 - 12:15 Meeting with representative of Zael'tsovski Regional Electoral Commission, Mr. Yuriy Michailovich Kondrat'ev, and the Chairman of District Electoral Commission, Mr. Valentin Avanovich Kamnev

13:00 - 14:30 Meeting with representative of the electoral bloc Borderline Generation, Mr. Nikolay Fedotov

15:00 - 15:30 Meeting with Mr. V. N. Kisselev, Acting Head of the Novosibirsk Region

16:00 - 16:50 Meeting with Mr. Anatoly Pavlovich Sichov, Chairman of Novosibirsk Regional Council of Deputies

17:15 - 18:45 Meeting with Dr. Uwe Neubauer, German General Consul to Novosibirsk

16 DECEMBER

12:30 - 14:00 Meeting with representatives of the Social Democratic Party, Mr. Victor Kozodoy and Mr. Anatol Stepanov

14:45 - 15:00 Visit to Polling Station, observing the procedures of absentee voting

15:15 - 16:00 Meeting with representative of "Yabloko", Mr. Olegovich Malkov

16:00 - 17:45 Meeting with representative of "Mir" local TV station, Mr. Sannikov Michial Semjenovich

17 DECEMBER

7:40 - 00:30 Visits to Polling Stations, monitoring the opening and the closing of Polling Stations as well as parts of the count

18 DECEMBER

5:30 Departure of the Delegation

SMOLENSK AND TVER, RUSSIA

14 - 16 DECEMBER

Participated in the Moscow Program

17 DECEMBER

7:40 - 00:30 Visits to Polling Stations, monitoring the opening and the closing of Polling Stations as well as parts of the count

ANNEX 3 REGIONAL ELECTION RESULTS (1993 AND 1995)

	Moscow City		St. Petersburg City		Nizhny Novgorod Region		Voronezh Region		Novosibirsk Region	
	1993	1995	1993	1995	1993	1995	1993	1995	1993	1995
Left-traditionalists										
Communist Party of the RF	11.2	17.0	7.7	(17.0)	17.9	27.7	24.1	37.7	17.1	31.1
Agrarian Party	9.9	14.8	6.9	13.2	10.0	18.7	13.2	26.8	9.7	21.1
Power to the People	1.3	0.3	0.8	n.a.	7.9	3.1	10.9	4.3	7.4	5.0
Communists-Working Russia-For the SU		0.7		n.a.		1.5		1.9		1.4
		1.2		3.8		4.4		5.7		3.6
Center-left										
Women of Russia	13.1	9.4	14.7	(9.2)	16.5	10.5	9.6	9.8	13.3	10.0
Party of Workers' Self-government	3.9	2.4	4.5	2.7	8.4	5.1	5.4	2.9	6.6	4.5
Ivan-Rybkin-Bloc		4.4		6.5		2.5		2.8		4.3
Trade Unions and Industrialists		0.9		n.a.		1.1		3.2		0.4
Union of Labor										
Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms		1.7		n.a.		1.8		0.9		0.8
Civic Union	6.5		8.1		3.8		2.2		4.0	
Russia's Future-New Names	2.0		1.6		2.8		1.3		1.6	
	0.7		0.5		1.5		0.7		1.1	
Center-right										
Our Home is Russia	5.8	19.3	3.4	(12.8)	4.9	10.8	3.6	7.1	4.8	7.6
Party of Russian Unity and Concord		19.1		12.8		10.5		6.9		7.1
	5.8	0.2	3.4	n.a.	4.9	0.3	3.6	0.2	4.8	0.5
Reform										
Yabloko	47.0	31.7	47.0	(28.0)	28.6	17.0	24.5	10.2	26.9	13.2
Democratic Choice of Russia/Russia's Choice	10.8	14.9	19.1	16.0	10.5	10.6	7.1	4.4	10.4	5.7
Forward Russia										
Pamfilova-Bloc	31.2	11.5	24.3	12.0	12.0	3.0	10.8	1.8	10.3	2.2
Democratic Party of Russia		3.4		n.a.		1.3		2.1		2.7
		1.9		n.a.		2.1		1.9		2.6
	5.0		3.6		6.1		6.6		6.2	
Right-Traditionalists										
LDPR	11.5	4.4	16.3	(3.4)	17.2	13.9	27.8	15.3	21.8	18.7
Stanislav Govorukhin-Bloc	11.5	2.5	16.3	3.4	17.2	12.1	27.8	14.4	21.8	17.9
		1.9		n.a.		1.8		0.9		0.8

ANNEX 4 ELECTION RESULTS (Turn Out and Seat Allotment)

Parties/Electoral Associations	Single-Member Districts	Federal Lists		Total Number of Seats
	Seats	Seats	Percent	
Communist Party of the Russian Federation	58	99	22.30	157
LDPR	1	50	11.18	51
Our Home is Russia	10	45	10.13	55
Yabloko	14	31	6.89	45
Parties below the 5% threshold				
Agrarian Party	20	-	3.78	20
Power to the People	9	-	1.61	9
Democratic Choice of Russia-United Democrats	9	-	3.86	9
Congress of Russian Communities	5	-	4.31	5
Women of Russia	3	-	4.61	3
Forward, Russia!	3	-	1.94	3
Ivan Rybkin-Bloc	3	-	1.11	3
Pamfilova-Gurov-Lysenko (the Republican Party of Russia)	2	-	1.60	2
Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union	1	-	4.53	1
Party of Workers' Self-Government	1	-	3.98	1
Trade Unions and Industrialists Union of Labor	1	-	1.55	1
Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin	1	-	0.99	1
My Fatherland	1	-	0.72	1
Common Cause Movement	1	-	0.68	1
Transformation of the Fatherland	1	-	0.49	1
Party of Russian Unity and Concord	1	-	0.36	1
Party of Economic Freedom	1	-	0.13	1
"89" (89 Regions of Russia)	1	-	0.06	1
Independent Candidates	78	-	-	78
Against all federal lists	-	-	2.77	-
Total	225	225	-	450
Voter Turnout in Percent: 64.38				