BUCHAREST DECLARATION

AND

RESOLUTIONS

ADOPTED BY THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

AT THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL SESSION

BUCHAREST, 29 JUNE – 3 JULY 2024
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PREAMBLE

We, Parliamentarians of the OSCE participating States, have met in annual session in Bucharest from 29 June to 3 July 2024 as the parliamentary dimension of the OSCE to assess developments and challenges relating to security and co-operation, in particular the role of the OSCE in the current security architecture, and we offer the following views to the OSCE Ministers.

We wish the next OSCE Ministerial Council every success and bring to its attention the following declaration and recommendations.

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY

1. Strenuously reiterating firm condemnation of the full-scale military invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine waged by the Russian Federation, with the shameful facilitation of Belarus, which took place following the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine that has, since 2014, violated Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and territorial waters,

2. Recalling that the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine demonstrates a gross and unprovoked violation of the international rules-based order and of all basic principles of international law and international commitments under the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act, as well as a flagrant violation of, inter alia, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and expressing steadfast support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its inherent right to defend itself from any external aggression, in line with article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

3. Dismayed by the severe and widespread breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as by the war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by Russian forces in Ukraine,

4. Condemning in the strongest possible terms the relentless and intentional targeting of civilians, the torturing, raping and killing of numerous people, including children, women and the elderly, as well as the forceful abduction and deportation of children to the Russian Federation,

5. Condemning in the strongest possible terms the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including heating and electricity networks, schools, hospitals, residential areas and places of worship, which has led to widespread devastation, necessitating an urgent and robust international response,

6. Highlighting that the clear pattern of action and evident intent of atrocities perpetrated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and its people appear to fulfil several, and potentially all, definitions of genocide under article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, which obliges the international community to act with immediate urgency to assist Ukraine to stop such Russian efforts,
7. Seriously concerned about the increasing numbers of displaced persons and refugees requiring humanitarian aid,

8. Concerned about the health of women and children in conflict zones, who are suffering not only the immediate threat of violence but also from long-term psychological and social consequences,

9. Recalling that conflicts exacerbate gender-based violence, with women and children being the most vulnerable to the hardships of war and war-induced migration, especially during the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

10. Welcoming the OSCE Moscow Mechanism Report on Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022 (April 2022), the report on Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed In Ukraine (1 April–25 June 2022) (July 2022) and the Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, related to the Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation (April 2023), which provide strong evidence of the extensive atrocities carried out by the Russian Federation and its military forces in the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine,

11. Underscoring the necessity of documenting and registering war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, and welcoming all international efforts, including those of the International Criminal Court, to conduct a comprehensive investigation to prosecute all violations of international humanitarian and human rights law,

12. Strongly condemning the Russian Federation’s efforts to legitimize the illegal administrative bodies that it set up within the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine in February 2022, and reiterating the non-recognition of the Russian Federation’s illegal attempts to annex the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine,

13. Decisively condemning the Russian Federation’s illegitimate so-called presidential elections held in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, which represent a severe breach of international law and an infringement of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as of all its democratic endeavours, marking another effort to assimilate these areas into the Russian Federation,

14. Greatly concerned by the Russian Federation’s irresponsible disregard for its nuclear safety and security obligations, and emphasizing the Russian Federation’s complete accountability for the worsening conditions at the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,

15. Underscoring the significance of President Zelenskyy’s comprehensive 10-point peace plan as a foundation for negotiations and a comprehensive framework aiming for the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including the return of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and the establishment of mechanisms for ensuring lasting peace and security in the region,
16. **Condemning** in the strongest terms the horrific terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas and other militant groups against civilians in Israel on 7 October 2023 and all other attacks on Israeli territory that have followed, which represent unjustifiable acts of brutality and must be unequivocally condemned by the international community, and **alarmed** by the air strikes conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran on the night of 14 April 2024, which exacerbated regional tensions and undermined efforts towards a lasting peace in the Middle East,

17. **Concerned** by the resurgence of the conflict in the Middle East, which has global implications, especially because of the potential of nuclear escalation but also as it poses the threat of terrorism, uncontrollable flow of migration, radicalization, hate speech, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia,

18. **Underlining** that the Mediterranean region faces increased security threats due to the escalation in the Middle East, as well as increased economic threats due to continuation of Houthi rebel attacks and other challenges, including increased migration flows, and stressing that the Mediterranean dimension must be further enhanced in the work of the OSCE PA and new ways must be sought to engage Mediterranean partners,

19. **Commending** the rulings of the International Court of Justice dated 26 January 2024, which provide a foundation for protecting civilians who are innocently exposed to the violence of Hamas and initiating a constructive dialogue aimed at resolving the conflict in Gaza, and welcoming the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 2728 on 25 March 2024, which calls for the unconditional release of Israeli hostages, an immediate ceasefire and the expansion of humanitarian aid flows into Gaza, which need to be supported and facilitated safely to ensure that the Palestinian people benefit from it as well,

20. **Welcoming** the “Amalthea” initiative opening a maritime route for emergency assistance from Cyprus to Gaza to deliver humanitarian assistance by sea, supported, among others, by the European Commission, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, working in co-ordination with the United Nations Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Gaza,

21. **Recalling** that the Republic of Moldova is one of the countries most affected by the unprovoked war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and welcoming the Republic of Moldova’s solidarity with Ukraine and its people, including by accommodating hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who have transited through or sought refuge in the Republic of Moldova,

22. **Recognizing** that the lack of progress in the Transdniestrian settlement process in the Republic of Moldova continues to pose a serious threat to security and stability in the region, and reaffirming the OSCE PA’s commitment to reaching a comprehensive, peaceful and lasting political settlement with full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders,
23. **Recognizing** the Black Sea region as a zone of special concern for European security and the maintenance of a peaceable, rules-based order, and **resolving** to elevate its focus on security and democracy in the Black Sea region as matters of importance for the entire OSCE region,

24. **Recognizing** the commitment of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the peace process between both countries, and **welcoming** the significant steps taken in reaching the agreement on a series of confidence-building measures in December 2023, including on the exchange of prisoners of war, as well as the April 2024 agreement by the respective commissions dedicated to the delimitation of State borders,

25. **Expressing grave concern** regarding Kremlin-supported and -aligned efforts to undermine Georgia’s fragile democracy and subvert the Georgian population’s Euro-Atlantic choice through the current Georgian Government’s enactment of antidemocratic legislation and policies, including but not limited to the adoption of the Russian-style law on transparency of foreign influence in Georgia that will undermine human rights and disproportionately restrict basic freedoms, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, and **calling on** Georgian authorities to cease attendant attacks on civil society, independent media, activists and lawful protesters, which bear all the hallmarks of an extended Russian hybrid operation, and to seek rapprochement with Georgian civil society to reduce polarization in the country,

26. **Concerned** about the growing instability of some African States, which carries the risk of triggering waves of migration and enables criminal structures of organized crime and human trafficking,

27. **Expressing** concern about the growing risk of geopolitical tensions in the Arctic and High North, which could severely affect the livelihoods of its inhabitants, the environment and the regional economy, and **convinced** that the Arctic region should remain a region of low military tension,

28. **Recognizing** the growing threat posed by cybercriminality, hybrid warfare and disinformation campaigns, and **alarmed** by the increasing frequency and sophistication of interference in elections and cyberattacks on critical infrastructures, which threaten to disrupt essential services and jeopardize democratic structures and public safety,

29. **Stressing** the need for an enhanced cyber-resilience framework in OSCE participating States to protect national security, democratic processes and economic stability from cyberthreats and disinformation,

30. **Recognizing** the necessity of shaping the global governance of technology and critical infrastructure in a manner that supports open, stable and secure use of cyberspace, while preventing the militarization and politicization of technology supply chains,

31. **Expressing concerns** regarding the growing role of the People’s Republic of China as a key source of technological inputs and trade for the Russian Federation, as well as a vector for evading international financial and trade sanctions against the Kremlin, and **further noting** the People’s Republic of China’s growing and potentially destabilizing use of influence operations and infrastructure investments in the OSCE region,
32. Concerned by the increasing restriction of media and press freedom, as well as the growing threats to, and arrest of, journalists whose work is essential for functioning democracies,

33. Reaffirming the core principles of co-operation, dialogue and mutual respect as fundamental to the mission of the OSCE, and expressing deep concern about the eroding trust in multilateral institutions and the trend of non-compliance with international rules and commitments, undermining the capacity of the OSCE to address regional security challenges effectively,

34. Noting the importance of timely and orderly appointment of the Heads of the OSCE Institutions, thereby preventing institutional challenges for the OSCE,

35. Alarmed by the sustained inability to adopt a unified budget since 2021 and recognizing the detrimental impact of the zero nominal growth policy on the OSCE’s operational capacity,

36. Acknowledging the crucial role of OSCE field operations in promoting security and co-operation and the importance of unwavering support for these operations to ensure their effectiveness and sustainability,

37. Emphasizing that security sector governance and reform is in line with the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security and provides for cross-dimensional co-operation in all three dimensions, as well as in all phases of the conflict cycle,

38. Alarmed by widespread non-compliance with OSCE commitments, particularly in the politico-military sphere, and underscoring the urgent need for enhanced accountability and adherence to established international norms and agreements,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

39. Unequivocally condemns and firmly opposes the unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression of the Russian Federation and its continued violation and breach of international law and OSCE principles;

40. Reiterates its urgent call to the Russian Federation to immediately and unconditionally stop its aggression against Ukraine and completely withdraw from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders of 1991;

41. Urges the Russian Federation to refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against Ukraine and all other sovereign States, including those with Russian populations or minorities, and demands that Belarus stop its support for the Russian Federation’s war of aggression;

42. Calls for enhanced solidarity with and consistent support for Ukraine, and emphasizes the need for sustained international aid, including military, humanitarian and financial assistance, with special attention to providing Ukraine with a sufficient and predictable level of financial support, armaments and munitions to enable rapid Ukrainian advances to secure victory, and create a robust long-term deterrence posture against further potential Russian aggression;
43. **Urges** OSCE participating States to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities responsible for, or complicit in, Russian aggression against Ukraine, and to work collaboratively to counter attempts to evade and circumvent sanctions and export restrictions on the Russian Federation;

44. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to enact legislation to allow for the assets of individuals and entities who have been sanctioned in connection with Russian aggression against Ukraine to be seized and repurposed to compensate the victims of the Russian Federation’s aggression and to support Ukrainian national reconstruction efforts;

45. **Encourages** comprehensive international efforts to document, denounce and prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian Federation during the war in Ukraine, ensuring accountability through established international legal frameworks;

46. **Urges** OSCE participating States to continue to hold the Russian Federation accountable for the ongoing severe violations of international law and OSCE commitments, and **emphasizes** the urgency of international collaboration to facilitate the de-occupation of Crimea and all other regions of Ukraine currently under temporary occupation;

47. **Expresses** its unwavering political support for the Republic of Moldova’s reaffirmed sovereign choice of European integration and for its current pro-European President and Government, who are calling for ongoing support in addressing Chisinau’s challenges to ensure a secure and democratic future;

48. **Urges** the Russian Federation to reverse its illegal occupation of, and withdraw its troops from, the temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine;

49. **Deplores** the violently imperial and colonial nature of the Russian Federation, which is on clear display in its genocidal war against Ukraine, its soft annexation of Belarus and its aggression against the Republic of Moldova, as well as in its attacks on the sovereignty and democratic choice made by the Georgian and Armenian peoples, and further **encourages** parliaments of OSCE participating States to undertake efforts in their home States to critically examine the Russian Federation’s domestic repression and external aggression as expressions of the Kremlin’s imperial legacy and colonial policies;

50. **Reiterates** its call on the Russian Federation to immediately and unconditionally release all three illegally detained OSCE officials;

51. **Recognizes** Israel’s right to defend itself against the existential threat it faces from terrorist attacks and indiscriminate bombings by the Islamic Republic of Iran, its regional proxies (such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthi movement), and other terrorist organizations;

52. **Demands** that the Russian Federation afford greater, genuine autonomy to its colonized ethnic minority and otherwise marginalized peoples who occupy the status of a permanent underclass and are more likely to be mobilized, fight and die in the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine;
53. **Calls for** the instant release of all Israeli hostages and an immediate and sustained ceasefire across the regions affected, including Gaza, the West Bank, Israel and Lebanon, to prevent further loss of life and to facilitate a peaceful resolution;

54. **Calls for** the expansion of international efforts to mediate and resolve conflicts in the Mediterranean region by utilizing diplomatic channels and international legal frameworks to foster dialogue and reconciliation on the basis of international law, and in the case of the Turkish occupation of Cyprus the relevant decision of the United Nations Security Council;

55. **Urges** the Russian Federation to resume the withdrawal of its military troops and ammunition stockpiles from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in accordance with its constitutional provisions of neutrality and in line with the relevant decisions of the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999, as well as United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/282;

56. **Recommends** enhancing co-operation between OSCE participating States in the fight against transnational organized crime, which manages all forms of illicit trafficking, including in particular that relating to illegal migratory flows in the Mediterranean, and accumulates resources that are subsequently recycled and invested in illegal economic circuits;

57. **Encourages** both Armenia and Azerbaijan to maintain their ongoing engagement in constructive bilateral negotiations aimed at concluding an agreement on peace and the establishment of inter-State relations based on the mutual recognition of each other’s territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the principle of the non-use of force, and non-interference in internal affairs, to establish good neighbourly relations, peace and security in the South Caucasus region;

58. **Welcomes** diplomatic efforts by the international community aimed at facilitating dialogue, conducted in good faith, as well as other efforts dedicated to building confidence and trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan;

59. **Reiterates** its call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian military forces from the occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia, in line with the European Union-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008;

60. **Stresses** the need to continue active engagement, in particular within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions, to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Russian Federation–Georgia conflict, in full respect of Georgia’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders;

61. **Urges** OSCE participating States to strengthen their national cyberdefences through increased investment in technology, critical infrastructure, human resources and infrastructural resilience and to advocate for the development and implementation of comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation, hybrid threats, State-sponsored propaganda and cybercriminality, focusing on prevention, response and recovery mechanisms;
62. **Encourages** the establishment of a robust international co-operation framework within the OSCE for sharing information, best practices in response to cyberincidents, and technological expertise and development of OSCE-led initiatives aimed at facilitating the exchange of technology and expertise among participating States to bolster collective cyber-resilience;

63. **Endorses** United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women and peace and security, as well as subsequent resolutions that together comprise the women and peace and security agenda, which call on United Nations Member States to ensure the full participation of women in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and **urges** all OSCE participating States that have not already done so to develop and implement national action plans on women and peace and security;

64. **Calls upon** all OSCE participating States to reaffirm their commitment to the basic principles of the OSCE, actively engaging in dialogue and co-operation to address the prevailing challenges of polarization with a view to maintaining the OSCE as a functioning organization which is vital for European security;

65. **Welcomes** the initiative of the OSCE PA to launch the Inter-Parliamentary Forum of South-East Europe with a view to strengthening parliamentary and comprehensive co-operation among countries in the Western Balkans, reaffirming the basic principles of co-operation, dialogue and mutual respect as fundamental to the OSCE, and **expresses** its full support to OSCE field operations in south-east Europe;

66. **Calls for** stringent adherence to, and enforcement of, OSCE commitments within national legislatures to promote a culture of compliance and accountability through parliamentary advocacy, legislative action and oversight;

67. **Encourages** an environment where violations of international agreements are met with prompt and effective accountability measures, strengthening the integrity of the OSCE’s security framework;

68. **Urges** OSCE participating States to comply with the Vienna Document and other key OSCE commitments on confidence- and security-building measures to prevent military escalations and enhance transparency;

69. **Calls on** OSCE executive structures to adopt a cross-dimensional, comprehensive and human rights-based approach to supporting security sector governance and reform, taking into account regional and national sensitivities and engaging all participating States, upon their request, in a transparent manner, recognizing the key principles of national ownership and accountability;

70. **Calls upon** OSCE Ministers of Foreign Affairs to personally and directly engage in working to find consensus on the appointment of the next OSCE Secretary General, the Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and **expresses** its support for competent candidates, including those with high-level political experience;
71. **Expresses** its full support for the efforts of the Maltese OSCE Chairpersonship to achieve rapid consensus on the appointment of senior OSCE officials, as well as on identifying post-2025 Chairpersonships-in-Office, ensuring stability and continuity;

72. **Recommends** that, if the appointment of senior OSCE officials does not occur owing to obstruction by any participating State, the OSCE PA President should designate senior Assembly Members to serve as focal points for those institutions that would be severely limited to act, to ensure that the OSCE family remains vocal on important developments in all countries of the OSCE, and calls upon the OSCE PA Secretary General to establish working-level relations in the OSCE Institutions to support this work.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT

73. Recalling the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, particularly those on co-operation among OSCE participating States in the economic, scientific, technological and environmental fields, which “contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole”, as well as “promote economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of life”.

74. Emphasizing the unique role of national parliaments in adopting legislation, exercising oversight, mobilizing resources, promoting public participation and enhancing cross-regional co-operation to advance economic and environmental security.

75. Recalling the OSCE PA Vancouver Declaration, which underscores the need for more energy security, green development and resolute climate action, while also raising awareness around the challenges posed by artificial intelligence (AI), digitalization and demographic trends in the OSCE region.

76. Underscoring strong support for the work of the Maltese OSCE Chairpersonship-in-Office in building critical consensus around pressing second dimension security concerns, the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities in supporting OSCE participating States to implement their economic and environmental commitments, and OSCE field operations in promoting sustainable development, environmental protection and connectivity across the OSCE region.

77. Welcoming all activities of the OSCE PA intended to foster economic and environmental security, including, but not limited to, those of the Parliamentary Support Team for Ukraine, the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Migration, as well as the relevant special representatives.

78. Recognizing that peace is a prerequisite for security, co-operation and human development, and therefore categorically condemning the Russian Federation’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military invasion of Ukraine with its disastrous humanitarian, socio-economic and environmental repercussions, which have significantly weakened security, connectivity and prosperity across the region.

79. Acknowledging in particular the severe environmental impact of the war in Ukraine, including extensive deforestation, pollution, water disruptions and heavy metal contamination in the food and water chains.

80. Gravely concerned about the deliberate destruction of critical infrastructure in Ukraine, including the Nova Kakhovka Dam, which has led to extensive disruptions in water reservoirs vital for irrigation, the displacement of thousands, and devastating effects on biodiversity.

81. Stressing that such deliberate actions, when perpetrated by belligerents in armed conflicts in the knowledge that such attacks will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, qualify as war crimes according to article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
82. Determined to support Ukraine’s swift reconstruction and transition towards green energy sources as a means to boost its resilience and geopolitical independence, and stressing the importance of developing a sustainable energy strategy for Ukraine, restoring and upgrading its energy infrastructure, and integrating it with the EU’s energy grid for enhanced stability,

83. Underscoring the positive impact of trade, connectivity and economic integration on peace and stability across the OSCE region, and committing to responsible and sustainable economic development, founded on reasonable use of resources, technological innovation, and access to clean and affordable energy for all,

84. Recognizing the unique security challenges faced by landlocked OSCE participating States due to their geographical isolation, remoteness and weak transport connectivity, and recalling the urgent need for unfettered, efficient and cost-effective access to the sea for landlocked countries, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law,

85. Reiterating that unhindered access to, and affordability of, energy is a prerequisite for the socio-economic development, social justice, and well-being of societies, and therefore concerned that several areas within the OSCE region still have limited access to electricity,

86. Confirming the necessity of implementing a green transition that leaves no one behind, that is fair and beneficial for workers and consumers, and is competitive for companies and States, to promote more equitable access to natural resources, and to make economies more resilient, innovative and competitive,

87. Stressing that both promoting energy security and mitigating climate change are important objectives, convinced that diversifying energy supplies towards clean energy sources will alleviate energy dependency and thereby minimize related geopolitical tensions, and emphasizing that, in the transition process, energy must also become more accessible, resilient and affordable for all human needs,

88. Gravely concerned about the destabilizing effects of climate change, which acts as a threat multiplier with profound implications for international peace and stability, and which is increasingly disrupting weather systems, impacting national economies, costing lives, and critically affecting the livelihoods of local communities around the world, especially those in the Arctic region and High North,

89. Recognizing the complex links between climate change and conflict, and that climate change is likely to exacerbate the competition for access to natural resources and trigger mass migratory movements,

90. Determined to address the challenges posed by climate change resolutely through enhanced international co-operation and co-ordination at all levels, which takes into account its differentiated impact on different regions and individuals,

91. Taking note of the outcomes of the first “global stocktake” at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, whereby parties recognized, inter alia, that global greenhouse gas emissions need to be
cut 43 per cent by 2030, compared to 2019 levels, to limit global warming to 1.5°C, and that nations are currently not on track to meet their Paris Agreement goals.

92. **Concurring** with the conclusions of COP28 concerning the need to transition away from fossil fuels “in a just, orderly and equitable manner”, to triple global renewable energy capacity and to double energy efficiency by 2030,

93. **Emphasizing** the need to take into account the needs of women and girls, who are disproportionately affected by climate change due to various forms of socio-economic inequalities,

94. **Welcoming** the contribution of the OSCE PA at the 23rd Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols, and **underscoring** the need for robust parliamentary engagement to address climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution in the Mediterranean basin and across the OSCE region,

95. **Welcoming** the decision to establish the Regional Activity Centre on Climate Change under the Barcelona Convention in Istanbul, which will contribute to strengthening co-operation and building resilience in the Mediterranean,

96. **Concerned** about regional water scarcity and salinization of soil, especially in Central Asia, stemming from the mismanagement of water resources, and **highlighting** the need for regional co-operation on water management, especially for transboundary rivers and other shared bodies of water, and investment in advanced technology and water management practices,

97. **Welcoming** the critical contribution of science and technology in offering viable solutions to the many challenges the world is facing, and **stressing** the importance of a strong and transparent science–policy interface to better inform critical decisions needed to tackle climate change, promote sustainable development and economic growth, protect the environment and safeguard citizens’ health, and the need to foster science diplomacy,

98. **Recognizing** the vital role that technological advancements and innovation play in the mitigation and control of pollution, including pollution from microplastics and nanoplastics, such as the development of plastic waste management systems and methods for removing microplastics from bodies of water,

99. **Recognizing** the positive impact of the rapid digitalization process taking place across the OSCE, but also the risks stemming from the potential exploitation, misuse or abuse of new technologies, especially by children and youth, for instance in accessing online pornographic material or generating sexual imagery with AI,

100. **Underlining** the need to ensure that digitalization leaves no one behind and that all citizens are enabled to take active part in key political, social, economic and cultural developments within their society, including through the use of non-digital means,

101. **Welcoming** the societal and economic benefits of secure, transparent, ethical and people-centred development and use of AI and of corresponding research efforts aimed at
strengthening the competitiveness of economies, boosting good governance and addressing critical challenges faced by countries,

102. **Concerned** by the utilization of AI in a military context, with a special emphasis on lethal autonomous weapons systems, and **alarmed** by the current opacity of AI decision-making processes, which could lead to biased decision-making,

103. **Also concerned** by how AI may contribute to the spread of disinformation, through the creation of manipulative and propagandistic content, as well as realistic, yet fake, digital content, and **determined** to mitigate the potentially negative impact of AI on democracies and democratic processes, as well as to prevent the misuse of AI in facilitating human rights abuses, such as mass surveillance, discriminatory profiling, restriction of digital freedoms and infringement of privacy rights,

104. **Emphasizing** the need for multi-stakeholder, cross-border collaboration among OSCE participating States in the creation of common ethical guidelines and regulatory standards for AI development and deployment, and in continuously monitoring and assessing AI advancements to ensure their safe and beneficial use for all citizens,

105. **Welcoming** the efforts of the international community to address AI-related challenges and threats in a cohesive and coherent way, including through the regulatory efforts of the European Union and the Council of Europe,

106. **Welcoming** the contribution of the OSCE PA to foster greater knowledge around the security impact of AI, including through a Special Debate on Artificial Intelligence: A Technological Breakthrough with Security Implications in the framework of the 23rd Winter Meeting in Vienna (Austria) and by holding a dedicated OSCE PA Conference on Security in the Age of Artificial Intelligence in Lisbon (Portugal) in May 2024,

107. **Reiterating** the concern about the demographic decline experienced by many OSCE participating States, which undermines economic prosperity and the future performance of participating States’ social security systems,

108. **Underscoring** the imperative for OSCE participating States to actively co-operate to better address the complex range of challenges stemming from demographic trends, through knowledge sharing and investments in longevity medicine,

109. **Recognizing** migration as a natural human phenomenon and driving force for prosperity and socio-economic development across the OSCE region, as well as the unequal hardship that irregular migration poses for some OSCE participating States, known as “brain drain”,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

110. **Urges** the Russian Federation to immediately end its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military invasion of Ukraine, which continues to cause immense human suffering and severely hampers economic and environmental security across the region;
111. Urges OSCE participating States to adopt laws that authorize the seizure of Russian sovereign assets frozen in their jurisdictions and to partner with relevant authorities to urgently establish an international compensation mechanism to facilitate the transfer of assets to Ukraine to assist with support for the reconstruction, rebuilding and recovery needed as a result of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression;

112. Encourages OSCE participating States to contribute resources and expertise to the reconstruction process of Ukraine with the aim of promoting long-term economic resilience and geopolitical independence, including by transitioning towards green energy sources and by prioritizing reforms aimed at strengthening the rule of law, fostering transparent and inclusive government structures, and enhancing the market economy;

113. Urges OSCE participating States to recognize and prosecute, in the context of an armed conflict, deliberate belligerent actions causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment as war crimes, in accordance with article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

114. Urges OSCE participating States to promote socio-economic development and connectivity in the OSCE region with the aim of fostering regional stability and prosperity, including by empowering women and youth to play an active role at both policymaking and implementation levels;

115. Calls on OSCE participating States to strengthen the attractiveness of the OSCE region for business and industry, to combat dependency on large, single third-country suppliers, and to ensure self-sufficiency of vital products, including medical appliances and medicines, as well as to prevent de-industrialization by securing competitive energy pricing;

116. Encourages OSCE participating States to diversify access to raw and rare-earth materials, including by developing comprehensive partnerships with supplier countries in Africa aimed, inter alia, at strengthening local institutions and infrastructure;

117. Calls upon OSCE participating States to guarantee uninterrupted access to landlocked countries, thereby preventing their isolation and heightened vulnerability in the event of an environmental, economic or social emergency, and encourages the implementation of regional transit corridors, fostering improved connectivity between landlocked participating States and the transport networks of their neighbouring countries, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law;

118. Exhorts OSCE participating States to develop and implement pragmatic strategies to ensure an equitable, inclusive, effective and affordable transition to cleaner energy sources, which is key to mitigating climate change and protecting the planet;

119. Urges parliamentarians to ensure that citizens are placed at the core of the energy transition process, and that costs and benefits are distributed evenly throughout society, including through financial support mechanisms and suitable policies;

120. Calls on OSCE participating States to increase their efforts in the protection of the environment, sustainable use of natural resources, conservation and restoration of
ecosystems and biodiversity, as well as to regularly monitor the status of the environment and strengthen efforts aimed at identifying the main causes of environmental degradation, to better understand how the latter affects different public health components;

121. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to safeguard water as a strategic natural resource which is instrumental in maintaining peace and promoting security, and to strengthen cooperation on water management and wastewater treatment;

122. **Urges** national parliaments to develop effective legislation, regulations and policies aimed at reducing the production and consumption of plastic products, and promoting the recycling and responsible disposal of plastic waste;

123. **Welcomes** the Zero Waste Initiative presented by Türkiye and turned into a global movement with United Nations General Assembly resolution 77/161 entitled “Promoting zero-waste initiatives to advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, to combat climate change and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, and in particular Goal 12 on promoting sustainable consumption and production patterns based on circularity;

124. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to maintain a focus on the Arctic region and increase their engagement in addressing multiple security threats posed by climate change to Arctic communities, including indigenous people, and to the global environment;

125. **Calls on** OSCE participating States, in line with the outcomes of COP28, to transition away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner, to commit to more ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets covering all greenhouse gases aimed at capping temperature increases at 1.5°C, as set by the Paris Agreement, as well as to take decisive actions towards tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling energy efficiency improvements on a global scale by 2030;

126. **Urges** OSCE participating States to adopt ambitious, economy-wide strategies for reaching net zero emissions and to establish legislative frameworks that underpin a transparent and accountable process for ensuring emissions reductions;

127. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to listen to the concerns of the people, especially farmers, who are worried about their future and livelihood, and to ensure that energy transition and emission reductions do not cause a rise in energy prices, and that the economically challenged will not be left behind;

128. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to co-operate across borders in disaster relief, enhance common early warning systems, improve hazard mapping, increase capacity for disaster preparedness and response, and set up contingency funds to prepare for the increased frequency of climate related shocks;

129. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to harness the opportunities offered by science, digitalization and technological innovation to support the green transition, ensure inclusiveness and develop effective, coherent and well-informed responses to the interrelated economic and environmental challenges affecting the OSCE region;
130. **Invites** parliaments to consider appropriate measures aimed at safeguarding minors from potentially harmful online content, such as pornography, disinformation, hate speech and radicalizing content, and excessive exposure to new technologies and applications, such as smartphones and social media platforms, including by introducing mandatory school classes aimed at fostering resilient and responsible use of all digital appliances and pondering partial bans in institutions for minors;

131. **Exhorts** parliaments to ensure that all citizens are enabled to take active part in key political, social, economic and cultural developments within their society through equal access opportunities to, *inter alia*, information, complaint procedures and payment options, both online and offline;

132. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to keep abreast of developments in the field of new technologies, in particular AI, and ensure that citizens’ security and well-being remain at the core of all relevant efforts;

133. **Urges** OSCE participating States to establish clear quality standards and guidelines for risk management and accuracy of AI systems, especially in sensitive areas where decisions related to personnel, medical care, education, or similar, are made;

134. **Invites** governments to negotiate a new legally binding treaty regulating the use of AI in armed conflicts with a view to safeguarding the principles of humanity, distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality, and military necessity in order to protect human dignity, personal freedoms and human rights;

135. **Urges** OSCE participating States to introduce mandatory labelling for all AI-generated or manipulated content, as well as for all human interactions with AI systems;

136. **Demands** more transparency from private developers and investors on training methods and the training data used, and calls for the establishment of norms on transparency for the deployment of AI systems;

137. **Calls on** the OSCE to look more closely at the security impact of AI and promote co-operation among its participating States, and recommends the establishment of a new Ad Hoc Committee on AI within the OSCE PA and the allocation of necessary funding for such a committee in order to continuously monitor developments and propose policy measures to address emerging technological security challenges;

138. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to promote effective, sustainable and human rights-compliant migration governance, ensure comprehensive border security and address the socio-economic and environmental drivers of migration and displacement, especially war and climate change;

139. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to engage in multinational co-operation to safeguard the integrity of the international asylum system, including by preventing irregular and uncontrolled migratory flows;

140. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to alleviate the impact of the ongoing demographic transition process by promoting infrastructural changes in depopulated areas as well as adopting innovative family support measures;
141. **Calls on** parliaments of OSCE participating States to promote welfare policies and public investments that are longevity-oriented by reforming public healthcare systems, fostering age-inclusive labour markets and businesses, achieving resilient pension systems, and prioritizing research, development and accessibility of longevity-enhancing technologies and treatments;

142. **Encourages** the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment of the OSCE PA to continue raising awareness and providing an open platform to share knowledge, engage with the scientific and business community, and foster policy convergence around key economic and environmental security challenges;

143. **Calls on** the Standing Committee to review and develop a proposal by the next Annual Session on how to achieve a better gender balance within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, by countering the under-representation of women in the Assembly, in order to promote gender equality and achieve fair and equal decision-making;

144. **Encourages** the OSCE PA International Secretariat to continue engaging in goal-oriented co-operation with the OSCE executive structures in Vienna and throughout the OSCE region, as well as with other international organizations, to promote economic and environmental security in line with relevant OSCE PA resolutions.
145. **Reaffirming** all politically binding human dimension commitments adopted by OSCE participating States, starting with the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent documents, and **stressing** that safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms is imperative for security in the OSCE region,

146. **Expressing** grave concern over armed conflicts, violence, political repression, discrimination, racism and disregard for human life and human dignity, which undermine democracy and human rights in OSCE participating States,

147. **Emphasizing** the integral role of democratic institutions and the rule of law in upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms to foster stable, inclusive and peaceful societies in the OSCE region,

148. **Condemning** in the strongest terms the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the blatant violations of international humanitarian law and breaches of international human rights law,

149. **Extending** unwavering support to the people of Ukraine and **highlighting** the profound human suffering resulting from the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, particularly affecting civilians,

150. **Acknowledging** the dire situation of millions of refugees and forcibly displaced persons within and across OSCE borders, and **stressing** the obligation to ensure their safety and security, especially at-risk groups such as women and children,

151. **Recalling** OSCE commitments and previous Parliamentary Assembly resolutions in the field of migration governance and integration, in particular the Resolution on Ensuring a Coherent, Shared and Responsible Governance of Migration and Refugee Flows (2017), the Resolution on Minors on the Move: The Role of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Building an Effective Protection Framework (2018), as well as the Resolution on Effective Migration Governance Based on Promoting Inclusive Societies and Dignified Returns (2019),

152. **Recognizing** the invaluable contribution of human rights defenders to safeguarding effective and human rights-compliant asylum and migration policies,

153. **Expressing** alarm over the staggering rise of attacks against journalists, human rights activists and political opponents in the OSCE region, including harassment, physical assaults, legal pressure, targeted surveillance, arbitrary detention and deadly violence, **mourning** the loss of political prisoners Alexei Navalny, Igor Lednik, Vadzim Khrasko, Mikalai Klimovich, Ales Pushkin and Aliaksandr Kulinich, **regretting** the fact that at least 250 other people are in critical condition and have been deprived of essential medicine and care, subjected to torture and deprivation, and placed in complete isolation for more than a year, and **noting** that, according to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 15 March 2024, some violations committed against the Belarusian population could constitute crimes against humanity,
154. **Condemning** the increased frequency and number of arrests of peaceful civic activists on political grounds for exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of assembly, association and speech, and the continued detention, including incommunicado, of political prisoners in the OSCE region,

155. **Noting with grave concern** that minority populations, including ethnic, racial, religious, gender and sexual minorities, as well as vulnerable groups across the OSCE region, continue to face systemic barriers, discrimination and lack adequate protections, impeding their well-being and hindering their full and equal enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and human rights,

156. **Concerned** about the persistence within institutions of a culture that employs excessive or disproportionate force across the OSCE, and **condemning** any efforts to weaken civil society through intimidation, systematic police violence and unlawful detention,

157. **Deeply concerned** about independent media outlets facing increasing pressure, including forced closures and broadcasting bans, as well as the shutdown of human rights organizations and groups in the OSCE region,

158. **Highlighting with grave concern** the Georgian Government’s enactment of a Russian-style foreign agent law and an array of other policy measures and legislation that effectively undermine democracy, stifle independent civil society and media, codify a repressive governmental apparatus, and deliberately abrogate the Georgian Government’s responsibility to respect the clear and consistent will of the Georgian people, uphold the Georgian Constitution, and abide by the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE commitments,

159. **Noting** the dangers pertaining to the proliferation of artificial intelligence and the associated risks to media freedom and the spread of misinformation and disinformation undermining democratic processes,

160. **Alarmed** over recurring incidents of police violence, in many instances fatal, in different parts of the OSCE region, and **calling for** effective investigations of human rights violations,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

**Protecting Civilians in Armed Conflict and Respect for International Humanitarian Law**

161. **Urges** all parties in the war in Ukraine to fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure the protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure;

162. **Calls upon** the Russian Federation to immediately and unconditionally withdraw its forces and proxies from all internationally recognized territories of Ukraine which it currently occupies, in order to end the suffering of the people of Ukraine, and **deplores** the grave breaches of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by Russian Federation forces in Ukraine, including wilful killings, deliberate attacks on
civilians and civilian infrastructure, unlawful confinement, torture, rape and other sexual violence;

163. **Deplores** the degrading and inhumane treatment, including abuse, torture and summary executions, of prisoners of war by Russian Federation forces in violation of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol I;

164. **Acknowledges** the disproportionate toll of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine on internally displaced and marginalized communities, notably women and children, and **urges** heightened focus to address gender-based violence and violence targeting children;

165. **Urges** the Russian Federation to unconditionally release all illegally detained Ukrainian citizens, including three OSCE staff members, as well as those forcibly transferred or deported across internationally recognized borders of Ukraine to the Russian Federation;

166. **Welcomes** the invocation of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism by 45 OSCE participating States to “address arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Ukrainian civilians by the Russian Federation”;

167. **Deplores** conflict-related sexual violence committed by the Russian Federation’s armed forces and by affiliated armed groups against the civilian population of Ukraine, including prisoners of war;

168. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to support the establishment and strengthening of governmental and non-governmental organizations providing services to victims of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, including by ensuring that these organizations have the resources necessary to provide a full range of accessible and affordable sexual and reproductive health services;

169. **Expresses** grave concern about Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and **notes** that the forcible transfer and deportation of a population constitutes a crime against humanity, and possibly genocide, under article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;

170. **Welcomes** the investigation by the International Criminal Court into the crimes related to the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to initiate the effective and comprehensive prosecution of gross human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law committed in Ukraine;

171. **Condemns** the deterioration in the humanitarian and human rights situation in Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia occupied by the Russian Federation, as a result of violations of fundamental freedoms and human rights of people living therein, various forms of discrimination against ethnic Georgians, as well as the alteration and obliteration of Georgian features from Georgian cultural heritage monuments in both regions, as a direct consequence of the Russian Federation’s ongoing occupation and “Russification” policy;
172. **Encourages** Armenia and Azerbaijan to continue to engage in constructive dialogue and negotiate a comprehensive settlement, and in this regard **considers** it important to effectively investigate breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights violations reported in relation to the entire Karabakh conflict;

173. **Acknowledges** the potential security threats and possible spillover effects emanating from the war in Gaza, and **resolutely condemns** the 7 October 2023 terrorist attacks committed by Hamas in southern Israel;

174. **Further condemns** the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas and its chief State sponsor, the Islamic Republic of Iran, for their unjustifiable and reckless disregard for innocent human life, including the continued detention of Israeli hostages, the deaths and inhumane treatment of numerous Israeli hostages, and the continued bombing of civilian areas within Israel;

175. **Recognizes** the rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza and its catastrophic repercussions on the civilian population, and **calls for** the rapid, safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian aid into Gaza, the immediate release of all hostages held in Gaza, and the establishment of a ceasefire in line with United Nations Security Council resolution 2728 (2024);

176. **Expresses** grave concern over possible war crimes and other grave violations of international humanitarian law in the hostilities in Gaza, and the preliminary finding by the International Court of Justice of a plausible case of genocide on the part of Israel;

**The Plight of Refugees, Forcibly Displaced Persons and Migrants**

177. **Encourages** increased efforts to ensure the protection and dignified treatment of refugees, forcibly displaced people and migrants in line with international obligations and OSCE commitments;

178. **Expresses** grave concern at the continued flow of refugees and migrants risking their lives to reach Europe, and **acknowledges** the European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum, which encompasses a set of regulations and policies aimed at creating fairer, efficient and more sustainable migration and asylum processes;

179. **Emphasizes** the need to combat the heinous practice of human trafficking and other forms of exploitation of migrants, refugees and forcibly displaced persons, which pose a grave threat to human security across the OSCE;

180. **Calls on** all OSCE participating States to prioritize the welfare of migrants and asylum-seekers in transit and at all stages of the reception process and to respect and implement all internationally binding obligations with the aim of upholding the full spectrum of human rights and fundamental freedoms of migrants, irrespective of their migration status;

181. **Reaffirms** that co-operation with authorities in the countries of origin and transit, as well as the outsourcing of asylum procedures to third countries, shall not result in human rights violations or lead to collective pushbacks of migrants and asylum seekers;
182. **Urges** OSCE participating States to establish and strengthen legal and regulatory frameworks for safe and lawful migration pathways for individuals seeking asylum;

183. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to strengthen international co-operation and responsibility to combat migrant smuggling and manage irregular migration respecting the human rights of all migrants and refugees;

184. **Calls for** the establishment of voluntary return mechanisms, safe pathways, and resettlement processes that ensure clear, transparent and fair treatment of irregular migrants in compliance with international human rights law;

185. **Welcomes** the steps taken by the Government of Azerbaijan to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and ethnic Armenians to the Karabakh region, and **further encourages** providing an enabling environment, including adequate security guarantees and the protection of property in accordance with international human rights norms, so that they may return to their homes or places of residence and voluntarily reintegrate into Azerbaijan;

186. **Recognizes** the humanitarian impact caused by the displacement of over 100,000 ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan to Armenia, and **calls upon** OSCE participating States to support the Government of Armenia in providing immediate humanitarian assistance to those in need;

187. **Applauds** the efforts of OSCE participating States in hosting and providing safe transit to Ukrainian refugees, and **urges** continuation of the provision of material, logistical and medical assistance to Ukrainian refugees and support to Ukrainian authorities in implementing long-term assistance programmes for internally displaced persons while maintaining access to international protection mechanisms, including temporary protection measures;

188. **Calls upon** States hosting Ukrainian refugees to maintain a flexible approach to short-term returns to Ukraine and to refrain from withdrawing temporary protection status from those who return home for short periods of time (less than three months), as such visits can help pave the way for more durable returns in the future once conditions permit;

**Fundamental Freedoms in the OSCE Region**

189. **Urges** OSCE participating States to adopt comprehensive measures in line with international obligations and OSCE commitments to ensure the safety of journalists and media workers and establish early-warning and accountability mechanisms for comprehensive investigation and prosecution of crimes committed against journalists;

190. **Urge** all OSCE participating States to subscribe to the Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and adopt domestic and multilateral measures to restrict the development, use, servicing, sale, export and transfer of this technology in order to safeguard fundamental rights and prevent its use in the perpetration or facilitation of transnational repression and other human rights violations;

191. **Strongly condemns** the persistent crackdowns against political dissidents and anti-war protesters in Belarus and the Russian Federation, and **calls for** the immediate launch of
an international, credible investigation into the circumstances of the death of the opposition leader Alexei Navalny;

192. **Urges** the OSCE, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE PA to act in concert to develop a robust election observation mission for the Georgian parliamentary elections in October 2024 with special attention to identifying potential abuses or antidemocratic tendencies that may occur well in advance of election day and undermine the democratic integrity of the vote;

193. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to fulfil their international legal obligations to safeguard the right to freedom of speech and the right to protest, and urges participating States to lift restrictions on peaceful anti-war demonstrations in support of a Gaza ceasefire and the protection of civilians in the Gaza Strip and the Middle East;

194. **Calls upon** the OSCE, including the Secretariat and Institutions, to closely examine the impacts and consequences that the conflict in the Middle East is having within the OSCE region, including related to an increase in incidents of hate speech and hate crimes, including anti-Semitic and Islamophobic acts, inter-ethnic relations and political polarization, and to develop mitigating mechanisms to address these and associated concerns;

195. **Urges** OSCE participating States, in consultation with the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, to enact measures aimed at safeguarding journalists, whistleblowers, media outlets and human rights organizations against strategic litigation designed to interfere with the right to freedom of expression and freedom of association, thereby hampering and preventing the work of independent media, human rights groups and civil society organizations;

196. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to ensure media pluralism and diversity through human rights-focused regulatory frameworks, including by means of artificial intelligence-related strategies and policies to preserve and foster media and the internet as spaces for democratic participation and representation;

197. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to develop and implement measures to combat the proliferation of disinformation and fake news on social media platforms in line with their international human rights obligations;

198. **Recognizes** that artificial intelligence can be harnessed as an effective tool to safeguard human rights and combat crimes such as human trafficking;

199. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to develop, support and enhance regulatory frameworks related to safe, secure and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems that create an enabling ecosystem at all levels, to safeguard media freedom and ensure the dissemination of accurate information in the digital age;

200. **Strongly condemns** the unprecedented suppression of independent media outlets across the OSCE region, including the practice of labelling independent media and media workers as “foreign agents” or “undesirable” in a number of participating States;
201. **Calls for** the immediate release of all illegally detained journalists and political prisoners in the OSCE region, and **stresses** OSCE participating States’ international human rights obligations as they pertain to civil and political liberties;

**Policing in Democratic Societies**

202. **Condemns** the adverse evolving situation with regard to LGBTI+ rights in the Russian Federation, where criminalizing legislation has led to hate crimes against LGBTI+ individuals and restrictions on civil space for non-governmental organizations, and **notes** with great concern that similar legislation is being considered in other parts of the OSCE region;

203. **Calls for** the establishment of robust oversight mechanisms and legal frameworks aimed at ensuring accountability for human rights abuses committed by law enforcement officials on the basis of OSCE and ODIHR recommendations on policing;

204. **Stresses** the importance of adopting policies that recognize the role of policing in fostering positive inter-ethnic relations, integrating broader efforts aimed at minority integration as set out by the guidelines of the High Commissioner on National Minorities on policing in multi-ethnic societies;

205. **Urges** OSCE participating States to integrate a gender perspective into policing, in order to provide more effective safety and access to justice, including addressing specific safety concerns of women and LGBTQI+ people;

206. **Calls on** all OSCE participating States to put in place law enforcement measures to effectively respond to cases of gender-based violence while maintaining a victim-centred approach.
RESOLUTION ON
SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THE OSCE REGION:
TEN YEARS OF ARMED AGGRESSION BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGAINST UKRAINE

1. Recalling that on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation, with the facilitation of Belarus, launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine against the backdrop of the Russian Federation’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine, which since 2014 has violated Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and territorial waters,

2. Highlighting the Russian Federation’s deliberate obstruction of the Minsk and Normandy peace processes, which involved over 200 meetings since 2014, and noting that during this time, the Russian Federation was preparing for the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022,

3. Stressing that the use of armed force against Ukraine by the Russian Federation in violation of the basic principles of international law – the territorial integrity of States, inviolability of borders, non-use of force or threat of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States – is a crime of aggression and grossly violates the Charter of the United Nations, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of 1 August 1975 and the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994,

4. Strongly condemning the attempts by the Russian Federation in February 2022 to recognize the independence of illegal entities constituting the occupation administrations of the Russian Federation established by it in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine,

5. Reiterating the non-recognition of the attempted illegal annexation by the Russian Federation of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as parts of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine,

6. Resolutely condemning the Russian Federation’s illegitimate so-called presidential elections in the temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation parts of Ukraine’s regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which constitute a blatant violation of international law and Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and are yet another illegal attempt to integrate those territories into the Russian Federation,

7. Recalling resolution 2540 (2024) of 17 April 2024 by which the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared the Russian presidential election to be illegitimate, due to the lack of free and fair conditions and the absence of genuine opposition, and consequently did not recognize Vladimir Putin as the legitimate President of the Russian Federation,

9. Welcoming the adoption by 141 of the Member States of the United Nations of General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 on aggression against Ukraine (2 March 2022), as well as the adoption of General Assembly resolutions ES-11/2 on humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine (24 March 2022), ES-11/4 on territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (12 October 2022), ES-11/5 on furtherance of remedy and reparation of aggression against Ukraine (14 November 2022) and ES-11/6 on principles of the Charter of the United Nations underlying a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine (23 February 2023), and Human Rights Council resolutions 49/1 of 4 March 2022 and 52/32 of 4 April 2023 on the situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression and S-34/1 of 12 May 2022 on the deteriorating human rights situation in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression,

10. Welcoming the European Council conclusions of 14 December 2023 on Ukraine, enlargement and reforms, which include the decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, as well as the conclusions of 21 and 22 March 2024, urging the Council to promptly adopt a negotiating framework and advance the process without delay,

11. Reiterating full support for the Peace Formula of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the only effective and realistic plan, based on the norms of international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, aimed at restoring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine and security for the whole world, commending all States that participated in the Summit on Peace in Ukraine and calling for further implementation of the Ukrainian Peace Formula,

Sevastopol, and General Assembly resolutions 73/194 of 17 December 2018, 74/17 of 9 December 2019, 75/29 of 7 December 2020 and 76/70 of 9 December 2021 on the problem of militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (Ukraine), as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov,

13. **Commending** the OSCE Moscow Mechanism missions’ reports, which provide compelling evidence of the vast atrocities committed by the Russian Federation and its armed forces during the ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, including systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, along with war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Russian authorities on Ukraine’s sovereign territory, which are unprecedented in Europe in decades and necessitate urgent action to stop the aggressor State,

14. **Gravely concerned** that the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine has already caused an alarming number of civilian casualties, and **strongly condemning** deliberate attacks by Russian armed forces against civilians and civilian infrastructure, including those involving attacks on residential areas, schools, kindergartens and medical facilities, religious sites and places of worship,

15. **Unequivocally denouncing** the systematic perpetration of premeditated civilian murders, mass atrocities, forcible deportations, numerous reported summary executions of men, women and children, sexual and gender-based violence, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary executions, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, forced population transfers, and grave violations and abuses against children, and **condemning** in the strongest possible terms the widespread allegations of rape, including gang rapes, by Russian soldiers in various regions of Ukraine, which are intended to destroy, in whole or in part, the Ukrainian people as a nation, these actions constituting crimes against humanity and acts of genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

16. **Gravely concerned** about potential acts of genocide being committed by the Russian armed forces against the Ukrainian people, with the already substantial body of evidence of genocidal intent continuing to grow, such as public statements by Russian officials, documented war crimes, and acts that could constitute crimes against humanity, and the Russian forces’ blatant disregard for the distinction between civilians and combatants strongly indicating a deliberate path towards extermination,

17. **Recalling** that sieges, the purpose of which is to starve the civilian population, are a violation of international humanitarian law,

18. **Outraged** by the forcible deportation of thousands of Ukrainian civilians to the Russian Federation, as documented by the OSCE Moscow Mechanism of 4 May 2024, including the forced displacement of Ukrainian children who are transferred to a foreign environment with the intent to eradicate their self-identification as Ukrainians,

19. **Condemning** the ongoing illegal transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation, including their unlawful adoption by Russian citizens, the forced issuance of Russian passports, and militarization, **affirming** that the actions of the Russian leadership to transfer Ukrainian children from one national group to another, including by forcibly granting them Russian citizenship, constitute a sign of genocide, and calling
for the International Criminal Court’s order to arrest Vladimir Putin and hand him over to international justice to be implemented,

20. Deeply concerned by the Russian authorities’ establishment of a system of “re-education” and digital control over children illegally taken from Ukraine to the Russian Federation since the start of the full-scale war, as well as in the occupied territories of Ukraine,

21. Gravely concerned that the Russian Federation is holding Ukrainian prisoners of war and subjecting them to torture, and noting that the International Committee of the Red Cross does not have access to the locations where they are being held,

22. Strongly condemning the systematic use sexual violence against Ukraine’s women, men and children by Russian Federation forces, and recalling that sexual violence constitutes a crime against humanity and a war crime under international law,

23. Fully recognizing the critical role of journalists in documenting war crimes and other crimes against humanity committed by the Russian Federation, and further stressing that the safety of journalists must be guaranteed at all times and that journalists and other media workers must never be targeted when covering wars and conflicts,

24. Strongly condemning the widespread use of physical and psychological violence by Russian troops against journalists, including numerous journalists being held captive and subjected to torture or killed, and also against clergy, representatives of civil society organizations, and other local activists, and further condemning the kidnappings and deportations of Ukrainian children, actions that are reminiscent of the worst crimes by the Nazi regime, now conducted by the Russian Federation with Vladimir Putin’s endorsement, leading to a warrant for his arrest in the West,

25. Gravely condemning the extensive environmental devastation caused by the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine, resulting in damage exceeding €56 billion, excluding the additional damage from the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant,

26. Recognizing the deliberate environmental destruction and ecocide carried out by Russian forces in Ukraine, which undermine international achievements in environmental protection and climate change obligations and have long-lasting, far-reaching consequences for all of Europe,

27. Highlighting the critical importance of recognizing the Russian Federation’s deliberate mass destruction of flora and fauna, poisoning of the atmosphere and water resources, and other actions that could lead to an environmental catastrophe as acts of ecocide,

28. Expressing grave concern over the growing number of civilians displaced as a result of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, noting that millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) require ongoing financial support, particularly vulnerable groups such as the elderly and persons with disabilities in urgent need of humanitarian aid, mental health services and assistance for integration into new communities, and calling on OSCE participating States and international development
actors to support Ukraine in providing adequate resources for financial support and housing programmes to address the precarious financial situation of IDPs,

29. Recognizing that the systematic actions of the Russian Federation are aimed at creating conditions designed for the gradual extermination of the Ukrainian people, including through the undermining of economic potential and security, manifested in the destruction of critical infrastructure, damage to granaries, obstruction of sowing campaigns, blockade of sea trade routes, and destruction of gas and electricity transport infrastructure,

30. Condemning the Russian Federation’s actions in temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, including banning the Ukrainian language and books in that language, destroying such books, immediately introducing Russian-language education with Russian ideological orientation, imposing Russian citizenship, militarizing education and promoting “military-patriotic” education and camps to erase Ukrainian identity,

31. Strongly condemning the ongoing systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Russian Federation as the occupying power in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, in which the most common abuses include violations of the prohibition of torture, rights to liberty and security, citizenship, fair trial, respect for private and family life, education in the native language and freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, belief, expression, assembly and association, and denouncing manifestations of intolerance and discrimination, restrictions on property rights, and the degradation of the environment and natural and cultural heritage,

32. Strongly condemning the oppression and gross violations of the rights of numerous indigenous peoples within the Russian Federation, whereby such colonized peoples are forcibly Russified, subjected to repression and discrimination, and deprived of their internationally recognized human, cultural, linguistic and economic rights and are also massively conscripted to participate in the Russian Federation’s aggressive war against Ukraine, suffering disproportionately high military losses,

33. Also condemning all the illegal so-called elections and referendums held in the Ukrainian territories temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation since 2014, namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol, and parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhaia and Kherson regions and emphasizing that conducting elections or referendums in these territories by the occupying power constitutes a clear breach of Ukrainian sovereignty and gross violations of international law,

34. Further condemning in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s seizure of nuclear facilities in Ukraine and its involvement in violent incidents involving nuclear and radioactive materials, which pose severe ongoing threats to the safety and security of these facilities and their personnel, and noting that the Russian Federation bears full responsibility for the deteriorating situation at the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,

35. Appalled by the Russian Federation’s violation of obligations regarding nuclear safety and security, constituting gross violations of core principles under the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
(resolution GC(XXIX)/RES/444) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as well as of the four IAEA Board of Governors resolutions GOV/2022/17, GOV/2022/58, GOV/2022/71 and GOV/2024/18 and the 2023 IAEA General Conference resolution GC(67)/RES/16 calling on the Russian Federation to immediately withdraw its military forces and other unauthorized personnel from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,

36. **Condemning** in the strongest possible terms the continued military support for the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine provided by Belarus, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which undermines the global non-proliferation regime,

37. **Emphasizing** the importance of ensuring uniform enforcement of and adherence to sanctions on the Russian Federation by all OSCE participating States to prevent shortcomings in the collective sanction framework, which would necessitate the further development of expertise, allocation of resources and enhancement of legal mechanisms,

38. **Reiterating** the need to increase sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation in order to achieve sustainable peace, and that these sanctions must impose significant consequences, effectively obstructing the Russian Federation’s capacity to sustain its war of aggression, including considering the introduction of secondary sanctions and further strengthening sanctions in crucial economic sectors in order to reduce the Russian Federation’s financial capacity to finance the war in Ukraine, as well as to reinforce global bans on the supply of military and dual-use goods and of civilian products used in such industries, while adopting a global approach to prevent the receipt and use of Western machinery, software and raw materials, thereby halting further weapons production in the Russian Federation,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

39. **Reaffirms** its strong support for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and all other temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, and extending to its territorial waters;

40. **Reaffirms** its resolute support for Ukraine’s right to exercise its legitimate self-defence in full conformity with article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

41. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to continue their efforts and co-operation with Ukraine, including providing military aid, to ensure the widest possible international support for the restoration of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine and Europe, and also encourages OSCE participating States to support bottom-up aid initiatives by civil society and local governments, including fundraising activities, and to co-ordinate such efforts with Ukrainian authorities;

42. **Welcomes** the creation of a register of damage for Ukraine as the first step towards an international compensation mechanism for victims of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, **underlines** the urgent need to develop a mechanism enabling the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine and **calls on** OSCE participating States to
join the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine;

43. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to redouble their collective efforts to counter the Russian Federation’s false narratives, propaganda and disinformation, recognizing that the Russian Federation remains focused on undermining democracies and societies through election meddling, manipulation of public opinion, cyberattacks, weaponization of food, energy and migration, and other tools;

44. **Welcomes** resolution 2540 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted on 17 April 2024, which underscores, *inter alia*, the involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church in promoting war crimes and calls for international recognition of its role as a tool of the Kremlin’s misleading propaganda;

45. **Firmly condemns** the forced deportation of civilian populations, particularly those who survived Russian bombing and artillery shelling in besieged cities, by the Russian Federation from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, and **calls on** OSCE Institutions and participating States to make every effort to stop this grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which constitutes a war crime and, in this regard, **fully supports** the establishment of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and **urges** OSCE participating States to join this Coalition;

46. **Stresses** the significance of locating and repatriating illegally abducted Ukrainian children from the territories of the Russian Federation and Belarus, alongside securing the release of Ukrainian prisoners of war subjected to torture;

47. **Recognizes** the systemic policy of violation of human and peoples’ rights in the Russian Federation to the detriment of its indigenous peoples as colonialist and violating the basic United Nations declarations and, building on European Parliament resolution 2024/2579 of 29 February 2024 and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution 2540/2024 of 17 April 2024, **recognizes** that decolonization of the Russian Federation is a necessary condition for sustainable peace;

48. **Recalls** the consistent and systematic policy of the Russian Federation aimed at the mass extermination of the Ukrainian population and, guided by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the norms of customary international law, **recognizes** that the actions of the Russian Federation’s armed forces and its political and military leadership during the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, as an expansion of the ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine since February 2014, constitute genocide against the Ukrainian people;

49. **Calls upon** the OSCE Chairpersonship and participating States to take exhaustive measures to address the clear, gross and continuing violations by the Russian Federation of basic norms and principles of international law and OSCE commitments, and **emphasizes** the need for enhanced international co-operation aimed at the de-occupation of Crimea and all other temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including through support for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula and the International Crimea Platform;
50. **Acknowledges** that the fraudulent presidential elections in the Russian Federation, conducted on 15–17 March 2024, were utilized by the authoritarian Kremlin regime to reinforce a culture of lawlessness, dictatorship and terror, and **stresses** that these actions undermine the legitimacy of the entire electoral system of the Russian Federation and its outcomes;

51. **Calls for** comprehensive national and international investigations into the mass atrocities committed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, manifested particularly in numerous cases of murder, abduction, violent deprivation of liberty, torture, rape, and desecration of the bodies of the killed and tortured;

52. **Welcomes** the comprehensive investigation conducted by the International Criminal Court, in co-operation with Ukraine and other international partners, into the crimes related to the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to effectively prosecute gross human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law;

53. **Underlines** the crucial importance of consolidating and co-ordinating the international community’s efforts to prevent impunity and ensure justice by holding all masterminds and perpetrators accountable for the crimes committed during the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law;

54. **Firmly condemn** the forced deportation of civilian populations from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, particularly those who survived Russian bombing and artillery shelling in cities besieged by the Russian Federation;

55. **Calls on** OSCE Institutions and participating States to make every effort to stop this grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which constitutes a war crime, and in this regard **fully supports** the establishment of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and **urges** OSCE participating States to join this Coalition;

56. **Emphasizes** the need to undertake immediate steps to stop the Russian Federation’s illegal practice of detaining Ukrainian citizens in filtration camps, subjecting them to interrogation, and applying inhuman and degrading practices;

57. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States and the OSCE Chairpersonship to promote the creation of an effective international instrument to prosecute crimes of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular, through the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine;

58. **Calls on** the Russian Federation to immediately implement the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 March 2022 ordering the Russian Federation to stop attacks and bombing of civilian objects in Ukraine, as well as the order of the International Court of Justice of 16 March 2022 in Ukraine’s case against the Russian Federation under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide that clearly and unequivocally orders the Russian Federation to cease hostilities in Ukraine, both of which are binding under international law;
59. **Underlines** the critical importance of assisting Ukrainian authorities and citizens in mitigating economic and environmental threats to security arising from the devastating consequences of the war and calls for support to Ukraine’s economic development, trade and relevant projects in energy security, water management, digitalization and virtual assets;

60. **Demands** an ambitious approach to sanctions regarding Russian liquefied natural gas, banning imports to the European Union and re-exports and trans-shipments facilitated by ports in European territory, with the objective of curtailing significant cash flows to the Russian Federation that are directed towards the financing of the war;

61. **Condemns** the escalation of malign activities and interference by the Russian Federation in the OSCE region, including irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, with targets including democratic institutions, government entities and critical infrastructure providers, alongside information manipulation and interference, including disinformation campaigns – actions that aim to falsely justify the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, shift responsibility for its global consequences and undermine international support for Ukraine – and calls upon OSCE participating States to utilize the full range of measures to prevent, deter and respond to the Russian Federation’s malicious behaviour and destabilizing activities;

62. **Calls on** the Russian Federation:

   a. to immediately and unconditionally release all civilians, including journalists, activists, representatives of local authorities and other persons, who were illegally detained by the Russian armed forces and/or Russian occupation administrations, and encourages the OSCE Secretary General and Heads of Institutions to exert pressure on the Russian Federation to ensure their immediate release;

   b. to ensure the safe return to Ukraine of all forcibly transferred and/or deported Ukrainians in order to guarantee the prompt implementation of their right to family reunification;

   c. to ensure the provision of adequate medical assistance to all political prisoners, civilian hostages and prisoners of war in Russian captivity;

   d. to provide full and unhindered access for the International Committee of the Red Cross to all Ukrainian civilian hostages and political prisoners unlawfully detained by the Russian Federation, as well as to the prisoners of war;

   e. to abide by its obligations under international humanitarian law regarding communication of full lists of all the prisoners of war who it detains;

63. **Calls on** the Russian Federation to uphold its international and OSCE commitments regarding media freedom and the safety of journalists, and to cease spreading disinformation and propaganda of war and hatred, which it uses as an instrument of hybrid warfare against Ukraine;

64. **Demands** that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally release three illegally detained OSCE staff members, and all national activists and human rights
defenders of colonized indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation and return all previously stolen OSCE Special Monitoring Mission vehicles to their legitimate owner – the OSCE;

65. **Encourages** the OSCE Secretary General and Heads of Institutions to exert pressure on the Russian Federation to ensure the immediate release of all civilians illegally detained by the Russian armed forces and/or Russian occupation administrations;

66. **Urges** the OSCE and the OSCE PA Secretaries General to remain vigilant and responsive to the findings of investigations revealing extensive infiltration by malign actors within their executive structures and **emphasizes** the importance of sustained efforts and thorough security checks to eliminate destructive influences, particularly in the light of warnings from European Union intelligence agencies – this ongoing diligence is crucial to safeguard the integrity and effectiveness of the Organization;

67. **Requests** the OSCE and the OSCE PA Secretaries General to pay attention to the results of journalist investigations, published in autumn 2023, which expose wide-scale infiltration of the Russian special services into the executive structures of both OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly, and to initiate relevant discussions and security checks to rid the Organization of the Russian destructive influence.

68. **Urges** the Russian Federation:

   a. to immediately stop its war of aggression against Ukraine, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, and to refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against Ukraine;

   b. to reverse the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine, as well as to faithfully respect the freedom of navigation in the Azov-Black Sea region, including in the Kerch Strait, in accordance with applicable international law, particularly the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea;

   c. to put an end to violations of international humanitarian and human rights law and to fully abide by its international obligations, including strict respect for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol I of 1977;

   d. to immediately and unconditionally release all individuals unjustly imprisoned in Crimea and other temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including three OSCE officials;

69. **Stresses** the need for the OSCE PA and OSCE Chairpersonship to take a resolute position on launching the process leading to exclusion of the Russian Federation in view of its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression and atrocities, which shattered not only the fundamentals of the Helsinki Final Act but also the very basics of humanity and dignity.
RESOLUTION ON

THE DETERIORATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THE TRANSdniESTRIAN REGION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

1. Recalling previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova adopted during earlier Annual Sessions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly,

2. Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all the United Nations resolutions on human rights adopted to date,

3. Underlining the need to continue to uphold the common values and principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and other landmark OSCE documents,

4. Recalling the statements of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit and the OSCE Ministerial Council over the years,

5. Recognizing that the Republic of Moldova, which faces a war of aggression in a neighbouring country and a hybrid war inside the country, characterized by destabilizing attempts from within through disinformation and propaganda attacks, remains one of the countries most affected by the consequences of the illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which continues to grossly violate international law and OSCE commitments,

6. Welcoming the granting, by the European Council in June 2022, of European Union membership candidate status to the Republic of Moldova, and the decision of the European Council, in December 2023, to open accession negotiations with the Republic of Moldova, which are important milestones for the future of the country,

7. Welcoming the unprecedented ambitious reform agenda of the Government of the Republic of Moldova, and the progress already achieved in its implementation, in particular on the fight against corruption, the advancement of needed reforms in key areas, growing transparency in public governance and improving the business climate in the country,

8. Strongly encouraging the Government of the Republic of Moldova to continue its work towards integration as a full-fledged member of the European Union and to continue to struggle to secure its place on the world map as a democracy,

9. Thanking the OSCE Institutions and the OSCE Chairpersonship for developing tailor-made support in such challenging times,

10. Recognizing that the ongoing unsolved conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter “the Transdniestrian region”) remains on the political agenda of the country and is waiting for a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution, with full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders,

35
11. **Underlining** that the Transdniestrian region remains controlled by an unrecognized regime, with an authoritarian de facto administration,

12. **Pointing out** that the situation of human rights in the Transdniestrian region continues to be alarming, with numerous violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms,

13. **Highlighting** the effective control exercised by the Russian Federation and its decisive influence over the self-proclaimed structures in Tiraspol, documented by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the responsibility of the Russian Federation for violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Transdniestrian region,

14. **Highlighting** that the unresolved status of the region has led to the strengthening of local repressive mechanisms and tools in the Transdniestrian region applied to residents, civil servants from the right bank of the Dniester/Nistru River, human rights defenders, civic and political activists, and journalists,

15. **Underlining** that the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, is presented in Tiraspol as a danger to “regional security” and is qualified as an “extremist” manifestation,

16. **Emphasizing** that fear, intolerance and persecution have become an intrinsic part of social and public interactions in the region,

17. **Pointing out** the systematic human rights abuses, numerous violations of the right to liberty and security, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, the right to education and the right to property, as well as the application of torture, degrading and inhumane treatment, and the inability of law enforcement bodies to investigate these abuses objectively and effectively,

18. **Worried** by the large number of persons deprived of liberty in the Transdniestrian region, the high number of kidnappings, illegal arrests and arbitrary detentions, poor conditions of detention, the practice of restricting access to detention facilities notified by the Bureau for Reintegration Policies and the Office of the People’s Advocate, as well as in reports issued by Freedom House, the United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor and the Promo-LEX Association,

19. **Underlining** that, in 25 out of 52 rulings of the ECtHR regarding cases related to the Transdniestrian region, the breach of the right to liberty and security was emphasized, and in 21 ECtHR rulings it was stipulated that the prohibition of torture was violated,

20. **Noting** cases of forced recruitment and ill-treatment in so-called “military units” documented by the ECtHR, and **alarmed** that young people in the Transdniestrian region are conscripted into illegal paramilitary structures,

21. **Underlining** that the separatist structures exercise tight control over the local media outlets, which are owned either directly by the region’s de facto administration or by business groups with close links to them, for the purpose of maintaining and promoting harsh informational censorship,
22. **Pointing out** that the media outlets that promote a policy against the local structures face serious restrictions, harassment, intimidation, strict surveillance and permanent pressure to comply with the abusive security patterns imposed by the Transdniestrian structures,

23. **Highlighting** that the restriction of free movement has worsened in recent years, and that there is no legal basis for blocking without reason access to the land and place of permanent residence that someone owns or legally rents,

24. **Noting** cases of persecution and intimidation in relation to Romanian-language schools (Latin-script schools) despite three rulings by the ECtHR on violation of the right to education in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

25. **Encourages** interparliamentary dialogue between OSCE participating States and parliamentary contributions to addressing protracted conflicts in the OSCE region;

26. **Stresses** that the main goal of the Transdniestrian settlement process is to achieve a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable resolution based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders, and ensuring the viability and functionality of the reintegrated State;

27. **Expresses** deep concern over the continuing deterioration of the human rights situation and fundamental freedoms in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova;

28. **Welcomes** and **fully supports** the work done by the OSCE Mission to Moldova to promote dialogue on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with its mandate, especially in the current challenging times, and to ensure a climate of safety in the perimeter of the Security Zone;

29. **Remarks** that, as a result of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the 5+2 format is not functional and Chisinau and Tiraspol are currently discussing in the 1+1 format at the level of political representatives and within the framework of sectoral working groups, with the aim of solving technical issues in the interests of people living on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River;

30. **Urges** the withdrawal of Russian military troops and ammunition stockpiles from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in accordance with its constitutional provisions of neutrality and in line with the relevant 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit decisions, as well as United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/282;

31. **Emphasizes** the importance of steady monitoring, reporting and early warning on the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Transdniestrian region, and the need for free access to the Transdniestrian region of public officials in the exercise of their duties, civil society organizations, human rights defenders and journalists;

32. **Condemns** all acts of intimidation or reprisal against individuals and groups in the Transdniestrian region, and **reaffirms** the right of everyone to unhindered access to justice before a court authorized by law and to fair treatment;
33. **Strongly requests** no restrictions on freedom of movement in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova and the removal of illegally erected posts on the perimeter of the Security Zone;

34. **Requests** continuous unrestricted access of agricultural landowners to farmlands located in the Dubasari district, along the Rabnita-Tiraspol route, and removal of the illegal payments imposed by Tiraspol upon passage through the unauthorized infrastructure of checkpoints, without any conditionalities;

35. **Appeals** for the removal of all restrictions imposed on the activities of the public authorities of the Republic of Moldova and civil society exponents and the withdrawal of the abusive so-called normative framework issued in the Transdniestrian region, which claims to fight “extremism” or criminalizes the exercise, either in Chisinau or in the framework of international bodies, of the right to an effective remedy against abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the de facto administration;

36. **Requests** the immediate and unconditional release of all those arbitrarily detained in the Transdniestrian region, including Stanislav Menzarari, Alexandru Dimov, Mihail Ermurachi, Vladimir Dudnic and Vadim Pogorletchii, and unfettered access to detention facilities for representatives of international organizations and family members;

37. **Calls for** progress regarding the return of the original premises to Romanian-language schools (Latin-script schools), free movement of teachers and students, goods and school supplies, and cessation of intimidation and persecution measures by the de facto administration, including through the illegal processing of personal data;

38. **Underlines** that, although the Russian Federation ceased to be a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September 2022, it remains bound by the unconditional obligation to execute the final judgments of the ECtHR, including those related to the Transdniestrian region;

39. **Expresses** its gravest concern over the Russian authorities’ continued failure to comply with this obligation by paying the just satisfaction awarded by the ECtHR, and **strongly insists** that the Russian authorities comply with this obligation without further delay;

40. **Reiterates** the Assembly’s commitment to support the authorities of the Republic of Moldova to ensure peace, stability and the rule of law throughout the country.
RESOLUTION ON

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

1. Emphasizing that terrorism continues to constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and unequivocally condemning all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomsoever committed, regardless of their motivation, as criminal and unjustifiable,

2. Reaffirming its solidarity with the victims and survivors of terrorism, offering its heartfelt condolences to their families and to the people and governments that have been targeted,

3. Recalling that States bear the primary responsibility for preventing and countering terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, while respecting their obligations under applicable domestic and international law, including but not limited to international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, as well as relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,

4. Stressing the central role of the United Nations in preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, and recalling relevant United Nations resolutions such as Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004),

5. Underscoring that respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are complementary to and mutually reinforce effective counter-terrorism measures, and noting the importance of respect for the rule of law so as to effectively prevent and counter terrorism,

6. Reaffirming its determination to prevent and counter terrorism through increased international co-operation and by endorsing a whole-of-society approach with the active participation of all relevant international and national actors, as well as local communities, civil society, media, business sector and youth,

7. Emphasizing the importance of international co-operation and collaboration in addressing the challenges posed by emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), to counter terrorism more effectively,

8. Recognizing the rapid advancement and widespread adoption of AI technologies globally, and acknowledging the impact of AI on various aspects of society, including security and the fight against terrorism,

9. Deeply concerned about the potential misuse of AI by terrorist organizations and other violent extremists to plan and execute criminal acts, which pose a significant threat to international peace and security,

10. Also deeply concerned by how AI can be abused to spread misinformation and conspiracy theories, including through the creation of realistic deep fake content and voice cloning technologies, targeting vulnerable groups and facilitating online polarization and radicalization that lead to violent extremism,

12. Acknowledging the potential of AI in countering terrorism, including in the prevention of terrorist acts, through, for example, advanced analysis of vast amounts of information, such as financial transactions or communication data, and identifying patterns that might be indicative of terrorist planning or recruitment efforts, while recognizing associated challenges, such as the ethical implications of AI’s autonomous decisions, algorithmic biases and human rights concerns, specifically the right to privacy.

13. Stressing that the development and use of AI must be guided by stringent ethical considerations, governed by democratic processes and be fully subject to human control and the rule of law.

14. Noting the existing efforts by OSCE participating States and international organizations to protect and promote human rights and the rule of law in the deployment of AI technologies for surveillance, monitoring and intelligence gathering to combat terrorism, for example the policy manual *Spotlight on Artificial Intelligence and Freedom of Expression* by the OSCE’s Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media.

15. Acknowledging the critical role of the business sector in the development, deployment and utilization of AI, and emphasizing the need to create long-term public–private partnerships to effectively prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

16. Stressing the critical role of parliamentarians in shaping counter-terrorism policies and legislation, and welcoming the timely efforts of the OSCE PA to shed light and raise awareness around the security implications of AI development, deployment and utilization, including through a special debate on *Artificial Intelligence: A Technological Breakthrough with Security Implications* in the framework of the 23rd Winter Meeting of the OSCE PA in Vienna (Austria), the 17th meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (CCT) on *Artificial Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism: A Double-edged Sword?*, and a dedicated OSCE PA Conference on *Security in the Age of Artificial Intelligence* in Lisbon (Portugal) in May 2024.

17. Commending the commitment of the OSCE PA-CCT to explore trends, share lessons learned and promote policy convergence on counter-terrorism matters, as exemplified during the official visit conducted in Türkiye on 5–7 May 2024, the 16th, 17th and 18th meetings of the CCT held, respectively, in Yerevan (Armenia), Vienna (Austria) and Bucharest (Romania), as well as during the chairing of the 4th and 5th meetings of the Coordination Mechanism of Parliamentary Assemblies on Countering Terrorism, and the co-organizing of the 2nd and 3rd policy dialogues on the role of youth in preventing radicalization and on the protection of soft targets and religious sites, held in Vienna (Austria) and Istanbul (Türkiye), respectively.
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

18. **Urges** OSCE participating States to enhance their national legal frameworks to regulate the development, deployment and use of AI technologies to prevent their misuse by terrorists and violent extremists, while ensuring respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, privacy rights and data protection standards, in line with relevant United Nations and European Union (EU) standards, such as the recently adopted EU AI Act;

19. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to enact, or strengthen existing, legislation that criminalizes the development, distribution or use of AI for terrorist purposes, including the dissemination of terrorist propaganda, recruitment, financing, and coordination of terrorist activities;

20. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to establish robust oversight mechanisms, including independent regulatory bodies, to monitor the development and deployment of AI technologies, based on different levels of risk, such as the ones introduced by the EU AI Act, with a particular focus on identifying and mitigating potential threats associated with their misuse for radicalization and terrorist purposes;

21. **Recommends** that OSCE participating States should promote research and development of AI-based tools and techniques for detecting, monitoring and countering terrorist activities, while ensuring transparency, accountability and adherence to human rights and ethical standards in the design and implementation of such technologies, including their use by law enforcement;

22. **Urges** OSCE participating States to introduce mandatory labelling for all AI-generated or -manipulated content, as well as for all human interactions with AI systems, aiming to empower users to identify information manipulation, discern the origins of genuine digital content, differentiate it from content generated or altered by artificial intelligence, and enhance media and information literacy;

23. **Urges** OSCE participating States to invest in public education and conduct targeted awareness-raising campaigns, especially among youth, to promote media literacy and enhance societal resilience against online polarization and radicalization leading to violent extremism;

24. **Calls on** governments to develop effective public–private partnerships to prevent and counter the misuse of AI for terrorist purposes, including with the aim of enforcing greater transparency standards on private developers and investors in relation to AI training methods and the training data used;

25. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to strengthen international co-operation and information-sharing to combat threats posed by AI-enabled terrorism and violent extremism, including through strategic partnerships with the business sector and civil society;

26. **Encourages** governments and parliaments to exchange best practices, lessons learned and technical expertise in regulating and using AI technologies for counterterrorism purposes.
centred around respect for human rights and the rule of law through existing multilateral forums, such as the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly;

27. **Decides** that the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, with the support of the International Secretariat, shall remain seized of this matter and support the implementation of this resolution as appropriate.
RESOLUTION ON
COUNTERING THE PROLIFERATION OF DRUGS, PARTICULARLY
FENTANYL AND OTHER SYNTHETIC OPIOIDS, AS WELL AS MAFIAS AND
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN TRAFFICKING THEM

1. Mindful of the mounting global threat to human health posed by the proliferation of drugs
and especially fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, which are responsible for a major
health emergency in the United States of America as a result of the devastating
consequences of the abuse of these substances; namely, instant and insidious addiction,
the deaths of thousands of people, and the destabilization of entire communities,

2. Given the huge profits generated by the criminal activities associated with the ever-
increasing proliferation of these new substances that have attracted additional interest on
the part of transnational criminal organizations, which also exploit the dark web and other
digital platforms to expand their illegal trafficking,

3. Reaffirming the importance of co-operation and international efforts to clamp down on
illicit production and trafficking and on the criminal networks running the illegal trade
in fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, on top of the already existing criminal activities
involved in drug trafficking,

4. Welcoming the international measures designed to counter the proliferation of drugs,
including the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, soon to
become the European Union Drugs Agency, as well as the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime Synthetic Drug Strategy 2021–2025, as well as the United Nations
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988,
Decision 5/05 of the OSCE Ministerial Council on Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs,
adopted on 6 December 2005, Decision 1048 on the OSCE Concept for Combating the
Threat of Illicit Drugs and the Diversion of Chemical Precursors, adopted by the OSCE
Permanent Council on 26 July 2012, and the conclusions of the OSCE conferences to
counter illicit drug trafficking and related organized crime, in order to stop the
proliferation of illicit drugs and diversion of the chemical precursors,

5. Also considering the importance of national actions, supported by the international
framework of reference, including the national prevention plan against the abuse of
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, recently adopted by the Italian Government to
prevent the proliferation of these substances in Italy and to raise the awareness of the
general public, especially the younger generations, of the danger of consuming them,

6. Emphasizing the urgent need to counter the mafias and criminal organizations that profit
from the illicit trade in fentanyl and other synthetic opioids by adopting a systemic
approach, such as the one promoted by the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug
Threats initiative led by the United States of America, and the study and analyses carried
out by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, soon to become
the European Union Drugs Agency,
7. Noting the G7 Leaders’ Statement on synthetic drugs threats of 29 April 2024, with particular reference to fentanyl,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

8. Urges OSCE participating States to enhance cross-border co-operation and the exchange of experiences within the OSCE in order to counter and dismantle the criminal organizations engaged in drug trafficking, and in particular in the illicit production and distribution of fentanyl and synthetic opioids, including the chemical precursors used to produce them;

9. Calls upon OSCE participating States to strengthen their legislation and law enforcement measures to target all the parties responsible for illicitly producing, trafficking, and distributing these new substances, and the corresponding laundering of their proceeds, in addition to the already known illicit practices related to drug trafficking;

10. Encourages OSCE participating States to invest in public health schemes and national plans to prevent and combat drug use, in particular the illicit use of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, by raising public awareness of the dangers of drug use and by providing effective medical treatments, and health care and support services for people who have succumbed to addiction;

11. Recommends the establishment or reinforcement of national and international task forces dedicated to combating criminal activities linked to trafficking, including online trafficking, particularly of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, while simultaneously raising training standards of law enforcement officers on these substances and their risks, such as those posed by unintentional contact;

12. Calls on OSCE participating States to strengthen their border surveillance measures to intercept illicit drug shipments and trafficking, especially those organized via the dark web and other digital platforms, in particular of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, by using innovative technological solutions and adopting forensic techniques to improve the detection of these substances;

13. Welcomes the initiatives taken by several countries, such as those of the Italian Government, and encourages OSCE participating States to exchange best practices, expertise and intelligence in order to step up international co-operation;

14. Supports the efforts of the OSCE PA Special Representative on Combating Organized Crime aimed at raising the visibility of issues relating to drug use and trafficking and related criminal activities, by promoting multilateral information exchange including through meetings and visits aimed at increasing co-operation between OSCE participating States, international organizations and relevant actors, in order to protect public health, promote the rule of law, combat crime and any mafia, and safeguard the security of citizens;

15. Calls on the OSCE Secretariat to expand its international co-operation network in order to strengthen its systems for monitoring and analysing the proliferation of drugs, especially the illicit use of fentanyl and the related activities of mafias and criminal organizations, and to encourage the sharing of relevant experiences between the
participating States and the development of joint training projects to counter these criminal phenomena and activities;

16. **Resolves** to remain actively involved in analysing and combating criminal phenomena and activities related to drug trafficking, particularly fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, and to explore the most appropriate regulatory actions to prevent their further proliferation, while safeguarding public health and security in OSCE participating States.
RESOLUTION ON

CONDEMNING THE WEAPONIZATION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT ZONES

1. Expressing strong concern about the widespread weaponization of sexual violence in various conflict zones,

2. Recognizing the seriousness of sexual assault also being used as a tactic to humiliate and degrade women and communities, and to destabilize societies during armed conflicts,

3. Considering United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 and 2467, *inter alia*, which recognize sexual violence as a tactic of war and a tool of international terrorism, urging States to implement action plans in this respect,

4. Expressing strong concern about the particular vulnerability of women to sexual violence in conflict situations, as wartime rape is linked to broader issues of gender discrimination,

5. Recalling the commitments and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Istanbul Summit Declaration, and other relevant OSCE documents that promote peace, security, and respect for human rights, as well as other international co-operation efforts such as United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict,

6. Emphasizing the importance of international co-operation to counter the widespread use of sexual violence in conflict through the prosecution of perpetrators and to strengthen mechanisms to protect, support and assist the victims of wartime rape,

7. Taking note of the recent Ljubljana-The Hague Convention, signed by more than 30 States in February 2024, which promotes mutual co-operation among States, not only in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes, but also in providing prompt and appropriate remedies for victims of the most serious crimes, in order to significantly reduce the impunity of perpetrators and support victims,

8. Underlining the importance of countering sexual violence through conflict prevention, peace-building, and the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

9. Condemns unreservedly all forms of sexual violence against women and their use as a weapon of war, including the documented crimes committed in Ukraine, Israel, Rwanda and elsewhere with the aim of humiliating and terrorizing entire communities;

10. Deplores conflict-related sexual violence committed by the Russian Federation’s armed forces and by affiliated armed groups against the civilian population of Ukraine, including prisoners of war;

11. Welcomes and encourages all initiatives by OSCE participating States to counter widespread use of sexual violence as a tactic of war, including through the definition of shared rules and the promotion of co-operation initiatives aimed at identifying the perpetrators of sexual violence and ensuring justice and redress for victims;
12. **Encourages** OSCE Institutions and structures, such as the Gender Section and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, to advance co-operation initiatives to prevent and respond to sexual violence in war zones, including through the promotion of skills development programmes, the establishment of a comprehensive support and protection system for victims, and by ensuring their meaningful participation in decision-making processes;

13. **Urges** all parties involved in armed conflicts to immediately cease all acts of sexual violence, facilitate safe and unhindered access to humanitarian assistance, and ensure the protection of civilians, notably women and girls, from all forms of violence and exploitation;

14. **Underlines** the need to enhance monitoring and reporting systems to better understand the magnitude and devastating effects of sexual violence in conflict zones, in order to provide effective recommendations for further action, if necessary;

15. **Calls** on the OSCE and its participating States to adopt a gender-sensitive and survivor-centred approach when responding to sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict contexts, including by advocating for safe, ethical and survivor-centred monitoring and reporting of conflict-related sexual violence and by supporting the provision of medical, psychosocial, economic and legal aid services that are tailored to the specific needs of survivors;

16. **Reiterates** its commitment to countering sexual violence against women and exploring further avenues to enhance international co-operation in this respect.
RESOLUTION ON
BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AGAINST AGGRESSION

1. **Highlighting** the need to uphold its common obligations and principles under the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents,

2. **Noting** the role that the OSCE plays as a normative pillar of the European security architecture and as a principal forum for monitoring those commitments among participating States,

3. **Recognizing** the limitations of the OSCE’s ability to enforce that normative framework, given the Organization’s structural constraints that continue to emphasize consensus among a membership that includes aggressor states and their proxies, namely and principally the Russian Federation,

4. **Condemning**, in the strongest possible terms, the Russian Federation’s continued genocidal war of aggression against the sovereign State of Ukraine, which it has waged in an unceasing and uncompromising fashion in clear, gross and uncorrected violation of all of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act,

5. **Urgently denouncing** the Russian Federation’s evidently genocidal intent and pattern of action against the Ukrainian nation and its peoples, as defined in article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which the Russian Federation is a party,

6. **Further condemning** the Russian Federation’s broader campaign of aggression as evidenced in its soft annexation of Belarus, the maintenance of an illegal garrison in the Republic of Moldova’s territory of Transdniestria, continued military occupation of Georgian territory alongside attacks on the Georgian people’s democratic and pro-Western foreign policy choice, and a broader campaign of disinformation and malign activities intended to sow discord and destabilize peace and democratic processes throughout the OSCE space,

7. **Also taking note** of the Russian Federation’s unreconstructed imperial political identity, which actively contributes to its current and longstanding legacy of aggression against Ukraine and its neighbours, and also of the ways in which it victimizes and preys upon ethnic minorities and other marginalized populations within the borders of the Russian Federation as a permanent underclass who are most likely to be mobilized, fight and die in Moscow’s imperial and genocidal war against Ukraine,

8. **Recalling** the common decision of the OSCE PA in the Vancouver Declaration on the “fundamental importance of a European security architecture that protects all the free peoples of Europe and which cannot be subverted, undermined or made inert by the Russian Federation or other would-be perpetrators of naked aggression and malign influence”,

9. **Further noting**, in the same Vancouver Declaration, the joint position of the OSCE PA regarding “the Russian Federation’s inherent inability to be both a steward of European
security and its most active threat, and stressing the urgent need for a restored and viable European security architecture that is comprehensive and protects all States, especially those at greatest threat from Russian aggression”,

10. Reflecting that the Russian Federation’s campaigns of aggression against OSCE participating States have focused primarily on those countries that lack credible and reliable security guarantees that could deter or defeat Russian military threats, principally including Ukraine but also the Republic of Moldova and Georgia,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

11. Urges the OSCE and its participating States to adopt measures that address Russian exploitation of gaps in security enforcement mechanisms to undermine the broader normative security architecture, including the OSCE itself, and that highlight the evident relationship between internal repression and external aggression as well as the wider application of the Moscow Mechanism on the Human Dimension to establish violations of international humanitarian law, including as a result of deliberate and indiscriminate attacks by the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian civilian population and Ukrainian civilian infrastructure;

12. Calls upon the OSCE and its participating States to reconsider security architecture from a comprehensive lens to support States that are entitled to the safety and protections as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of the United Nations but which lack the security guarantees to fully enforce them, including principally Ukraine but also potentially other “grey zone” States such as the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia;

13. Directs the President of the Assembly to establish such mechanisms as may be suitable to further discuss and elaborate upon the importance of a comprehensive security architecture, and to advocate for the development of a viable policy framework to that effect;

14. Calls upon the OSCE, as the largest regional security organization with a mandate to work for stability, peace and democracy, to play an important role in the implementation of the Peace Formula put forward by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine;

15. Recommends that the President of the Assembly appoint a special representative or adviser to co-ordinate between the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, its membership, the OSCE and other parties as relevant or justifiable to highlight, advocate for and recommend policy interventions in furtherance of a strong, viable and comprehensive security architecture.
RESOLUTION ON

STRENGTHENING SUPPORT TO UKRAINE

1. **Recalling** that the conflict in Ukraine began in 2014, with the invasion of Crimea by the Russian Federation in complete violation of international law,

2. **Recalling** that, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation began military aggression against Ukraine under the pretext of a “special military operation” in pursuit of an alleged denazification process, with complete disregard for international law and for the Russian Federation’s obligations, to which it subscribed voluntarily, in the context of the OSCE,

3. **Recalling** that, on 30 September 2022, the President of the Russian Federation, with complete disregard for the principles and rules of international law, formally annexed four territories in the east and south of Ukraine,

4. **Underscoring** that around 20 per cent of the territory of Ukraine is occupied by the Russian Federation,

5. **Recalling** that numerous States have issued several sets of individual and economic sanctions in response to this military aggression,

6. **Recalling** that, owing to the proven deportations of children organized by the Russian Federation, on 17 March 2023 the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights of the Russian Federation, who were presumed “to bear criminal responsibility” for the illegal deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children,

7. **Deploring** and strongly **condemning** the refusal of Russian leaders to stop their war of aggression, accept a ceasefire and engage in peace talks,

8. **Welcoming** the conclusion, on 24 April 2024, of an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation for the handover of 48 children “displaced by war”,

9. **Reaffirming** that the true motivation for this aggression is the aggressor’s rejection of the further development of democracy, personal freedoms and the rule of law, both generally and in Ukraine in particular,

10. **Deploring** the increasing number of dead (military and civilian), injured, disappeared and displaced persons, and children deported as a result of this conflict, in which more than 10 million people have been displaced and hundreds of thousands have been killed or wounded,

11. **Strongly condemning** the capture and holding as hostages of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, among them at least 30 civilian journalists, including Vladyslav Yesipenko, Dmytro Khlyliuk, Iryna Danylovych, Amet Suleymanov, Viktoria Roshchyna and Iryna Levchenko, who have been detained with no details about their status, health or place of imprisonment,
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

12. **Invites** OSCE participating States to conclude bilateral security agreements with Ukraine, modelled on those signed by the United Kingdom and Germany, or the one signed by France on 16 February 2024, to remain in place for 10 years and valid until Ukraine becomes a member of NATO;

13. **Invites** OSCE participating States to strengthen co-operation with Ukraine in respect of security (in particular strategic communication, tackling foreign interference and manipulation of information, cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructure, intelligence and counterintelligence, and the fight against serious crime), in respect of the military and defence industry, and also in the civilian context (humanitarian assistance, support for Ukraine’s reform programme, rehabilitation, and reconstruction for Ukraine, compensation and sanctions);

14. **Invites** OSCE participating States to call on the authorities of the Russian Federation to immediately and unconditionally release all civilian hostages in conformity with the provisions of international law;

15. **Invites** OSCE participating States to commit to providing extra military assistance to Ukraine in 2024;

16. **Invites** OSCE participating States that have not already done so to join the “Artillery for Ukraine” coalition, led jointly by France and the United States of America, which aims to bring together member countries to help equip Ukraine, in the short and long terms, with an artillery strength adapted to meet the needs of its counteroffensive and of its future army, and welcomes the ammunition initiative launched by Czechia in co-operation with partners to purchase large-calibre ammunition for Ukraine.
RESOLUTION ON

ADDRESSING THE MULTIFACETED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER SCARCITY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION THROUGH ENHANCED REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND PARLIAMENTARY DIALOGUE

1. Recognizing the multifaceted impacts of climate change on the countries of Central Asia and in particular the catastrophic consequences of the drying up of the Aral Sea,

2. Noting the interconnectedness between climate change, water scarcity and various socio-economic as well as governance challenges, understanding that climate variations can amplify competition for access to natural resources, particularly in a region marked by considerable population growth,

3. Welcoming the approval of the Green Agenda regional programme for Central Asia aimed at fostering sustainable development, adopted during the Fourth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of Central Asian States in July 2022, and supporting the upcoming Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, due to take place in Astana on 9 August 2024, for further deepening regional co-operation, and strengthening the atmosphere of friendship, trust and good-neighbourliness, including in the area of climate change actions and rational use of water and energy resources,

4. Welcoming the stance of the Central Asian nations in addressing critical climate issues on a global scale, embracing a collaborative approach, as seen at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28), and expressing appreciation for their efforts to enhance collective participation in climate policy negotiations, advocating for joint measures to reduce emissions, achieve carbon neutrality, and secure access to climate financing for the Central Asian region,

5. Further welcoming the results of the Meeting of the OSCE Secretary General and Environment Ministers of Central Asian States, held on 4 March 2024, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan,

6. Highlighting the worrying shrinking of the cryosphere of Central Asia due to global warming over recent decades, including the diminishing ice sheets, glaciers and snow cover, and emphasizing the pressing necessity to enhance awareness and encourage sustainable efforts to safeguard glaciers which play a crucial role in the availability of water resources throughout the year,

7. Acknowledging the heightened vulnerability of mountain ecosystems to the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather, deforestation, and land degradation, which hinder their regeneration ability and undermine the livelihoods of local populations,

8. Emphasizing the importance of capitalizing on the opportunities presented by the International Year of Glaciers’ Preservation in 2025 to advance initiatives and partnerships aimed at glacier preservation,

9. Welcoming the initiative by the Government of Uzbekistan to organize the Samarkand International Climate Forum in Uzbekistan in 2024, the initiative of the Government of
Tajikistan to host an international conference focusing on glacier preservation in Dushanbe in 2025 and the initiative by the Government of Kyrgyzstan to host the second Global Mountain Summit in Bishkek in 2027,

10. **Further welcoming** the global initiative of France and Kazakhstan to convene the One Water Summit in 2024 to enhance the implementation of innovative methods for measuring, managing and using water to adapt to the new water cycle and conserve resources,

11. **Further welcoming** Kazakhstan’s initiative to host a Regional Climate Summit in 2026 under UN auspices and to launch the Project Office for Central Asia on climate change and green energy in Almaty, with the objective of enhancing the collective regional approach to addressing climate change,

12. **Recognizing** the need to foster systematic and inclusive scientific research and diplomatic dialogue on climate security matters, to effectively address the challenges posed by climate-induced conflicts and resource competition,

13. **Highlighting** the significant opportunities and potential which science diplomacy offer in important forward-looking fields, such as renewable technology, green hydrogen, climate-neutral energy provision, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence, to support sustainable innovations for social welfare and prosperity,

14. **Welcoming** the initiative of Turkmenistan to host the Regional Centre for Climate Technology for Central Asia in Ashgabat,

15. **Recognizing** the role of the Central Asian University of Environmental Studies and Climate Change, recently established in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, as a catalyst for promoting environmental awareness and action, by serving as a hub for knowledge exchange, capacity-building and advocacy in the field of environmental studies and climate change mitigation,

16. **Acknowledging** the vital need for diversifying the energy supplies of Central Asian countries and expanding clean energy sources to achieve carbon neutrality, mitigate climate change, and enhance the accessibility, affordability, and resilience of energy systems,

17. **Further drawing attention** to the growing water crisis in Central Asia, recognizing the interconnectedness of water, ecosystems, energy, food security, and nutrition; understanding that water is essential for health, well-being, and human advancement, and acknowledging the crucial role of water in fostering sustainable development and in efforts to eliminate poverty and hunger,

18. **Emphasizing** that the human-made Aral Sea crisis is exacerbating the effects of climate change, including by contributing to rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, and altered precipitation patterns, which have accelerated water depletion and intensified desertification in the region, rendering remaining water resources unsuitable for sustaining livelihoods and exacerbating socio-economic hardships for local communities,
19. **Recalling** the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its 75th session on 18 May 2021, which declared the Aral Sea region a zone of ecological innovations and technologies, underscoring the imperative to address the environmental challenges facing the region through innovation and collaboration, and supporting the activities of the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea as a regional organization and the action programme to assist the countries of the Aral Sea basin as well as the Regional Environmental Programme for Sustainable Development in Central Asia,

20. **Further recalling** resolutions on Cooperation between the United Nations and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its 72nd and 73rd Sessions on 12 April 2018 and 29 May 2019, as well as the resolution on consideration of the modalities for the establishment of the United Nations special programme for the Aral Sea basin adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific at its 79th session in Bangkok, Thailand,

21. **Appreciating** the role played by regional organizations and mechanisms such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea, and the Executive Committee operating within its framework, the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination and the Interstate Commission on Sustainable Development, in facilitating multilateral cooperation and technical expertise exchange among Central Asian states, including the implementation of the fourth Aral Sea Basin Programme and the Regional Environmental Protection Programme for Sustainable Development in Central Asia,

22. **Appreciating** the work of the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities and OSCE field operations in Central Asia in strengthening national and regional capacities to address the challenges caused by climate change, and ensure good environmental governance, disaster risk reduction, and effective water management, as well as to address vulnerabilities and improve resilience in communities in the Central Asian border regions with Afghanistan in the field of water resource management and energy security implemented in the framework of the OSCE Response to the Implications of Afghanistan for the OSCE Region,

23. **Acknowledging** the importance of the reasonable and sustainable use of transboundary water resources by all riparian states to achieve sustainable development and to address their socio-economic needs,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

24. **Recognizes** the urgent need for comprehensive action to address and mitigate both the direct and indirect impacts of the climate crisis;

25. **Expresses** its determination to co-operatively and coherently address the security challenges in Central Asia posed by climate change, in line with the OSCE PA Parliamentary Plea for Resolute Climate Action adopted in 2021, focusing, *inter alia*, on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, developing effective adaptation strategies, mobilizing the necessary financial resources, and fostering international collaboration;
26. Urges OSCE participating States to maintain a focus on Central Asia and to recognize
the impacts that the climate crisis has on local communities and the planet, with
consequences for the wider political and socio-economic situation in the region;

27. Highlights the significance of recent milestones, including the reaffirmation of shared
goals during the fifth Consultative Meeting of Heads of State of Central Asia in Dushanbe
in September 2023, which emphasized the expansion of economic relations and
strengthened co-operation on environmental issues among all nations;

28. Exhorts Central Asian participating States to further develop ambitious strategies for the
clean energy transition, while keeping in mind the needs of less privileged people and
other local circumstances in order to ensure a more equitable, just, inclusive, effective
and affordable transition to cleaner energy sources;

29. Stresses the importance of enhancing regional co-operation, including in the
parliamentary dimension, and establishing robust regional mechanisms to effectively
address climate change, water issues, and environmental degradation in the Central Asian
region;

30. Emphasizes the importance of raising awareness and promoting education at all levels,
including through formal and informal channels, to foster a deeper understanding among
the populations of the region of the causes and consequences of climate change and their
responsibility towards future generations, and to encourage sustainable practices among
individuals, communities, and institutions;

31. Urges Central Asian States to ensure that independent civil society can freely conduct
research on environmental issues, can participate in relevant decision-making processes,
and can advocate to hold governments accountable for their domestic and international
commitments related to environmental standards;

32. Encourages Central Asian States to support a community-based approach in adapting to
climate change, which should be focused on local communities’ priorities, needs,
knowledge and capacities, including the differentiated needs of women and men as well
as the elderly and children, low-income groups, minority communities and people with
disabilities, thus empowering people to better plan for and cope with the impact of
climate change;

33. Encourages the enhancement of exchange programmes focused on best practices in
water-saving technologies, advocating for a robust dialogue both within Central Asia and
more broadly across the OSCE region, in particular through the International Fund for
saving the Aral Sea and the Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia in Almaty,
Kazakhstan;

34. Welcomes the initiative of Kyrgyzstan to establish a Central Asian regional centre for
energy-efficient and resource-saving technologies implementation in Bishkek, aiming to
promote the efficient use of water and energy resources in the Central Asian region as a
whole;

35. Emphasizes the crucial role of OSCE parliamentarians in spearheading initiatives to
mitigate the impacts of climate change and address water scarcity, through legislative
development, policy implementation, parliamentary oversight and fostering international co-operation;

36. **Calls on OSCE participating States to support governments of Central Asian countries in enhancing their early warning systems, improving hazard mapping, increasing capacity for disaster preparedness and response, and setting up contingency funding plans to prepare for the increased frequency of climate-related shocks;**

37. **Recognizes the need to enhance the participation of women and youth in decision-making and conflict prevention, and encourages initiatives such as the OSCE network for women in water management in Central Asia and Afghanistan, which underscores the value of including diverse perspectives in water-related diplomacy;**

38. **Encourages local governments, non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, the private sector and other relevant stakeholders to collaborate in developing and implementing comprehensive education, including in primary and secondary schools, and transparency initiatives tailored to the specific needs and challenges of the Central Asian region, with a focus on building capacity, fostering innovation, and promoting long-term sustainability;**

39. **Calls for urgent and concerted action to address the water issues exemplified by the Aral Sea crises, including comprehensive mitigation and adaptation measures to address the environmental, humanitarian, and socio-economic challenges facing the region, including through supporting the United Nations Multi-Partner Human Security Trust Fund for the Aral Sea region;**

40. **Calls for OSCE participating States to support initiatives in Central Asia aiming at the promotion of sustainable water management practices, restoring ecosystems, enhancing disaster preparedness and response mechanisms, and providing support for affected communities to build resilience and secure livelihoods in the face of ongoing environmental changes;**

41. **Urges the OSCE participating States, international financial institutions, the private sector, investors, donors, and other pertinent stakeholders to sustain efforts in mobilizing resources and offering capacity-building support and assistance to tackle effective, water-saving and climate-resilient infrastructure for the people as well as the environmental challenges in Central Asia.**
RESOLUTION ON
YOUTH PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MULTILATERALISM, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

1. **Recalling** the youth-related commitments made in the Helsinki Final Act, as well as OSCE Ministerial Council declarations No. 3/14 (Basel), No. 5/15 (Belgrade), and No. 3/18 (Milan); the youth-related resolutions of the OSCE PA, including the 2018 Resolution on A Shared Priority: Fostering Peace and Security through Enabling Young People to Reach Their Full Potential, the 2019 Resolution on the Integration of Gender and Youth Perspectives in Efforts to Combat Climate Change, and the 2022 Resolution on Effective Youth Engagement Towards Secure, Inclusive and Democratic Societies, as well as United Nations Security Council resolutions 2250, 2419 and 2535 on youth, peace and security,

2. **Reaffirming** the significant role that young people play in addressing global challenges, especially on issues related to climate change, peaceful conflict resolution, and the reduction of growing socioeconomic inequalities,

3. **Welcoming** the initiative of the OSCE PA Network of Young Parliamentarians to organize consultative workshops with young people to discuss current global security challenges, the future of international relations, multilateralism, and sustainable development,

4. **Expressing appreciation** to the parliaments of Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Italy, and Norway for the organization and facilitation of consultative workshops on youth perspectives that contributed to this resolution,

5. **Taking note** of the multiple conclusions and recommendations to the OSCE PA drawn at the consultative workshops with young people, hosted by the OSCE PA Network of Young Parliamentarians,

6. **Noting** with great concern the ongoing degradation of multilateralism and democratic values, the lack of trust in international institutions, and the increase in nationalist politics threatening international co-operation,

7. **Highlighting** the increasing number of armed conflicts and geopolitical tensions throughout the OSCE region and beyond that not only pose a direct threat to global peace and stability but also lead to serious humanitarian crises, impacting the youth and future generations in the long term,

8. **Alarmed** by the fact that international institutions are increasingly hampered by geopolitical tensions and rivalry, authoritarian populism, political polarization, hardening of public debates, inconsistent international policies and inadequate funding,

9. **Further alarmed** by increasing economic inequality in the world, driven by power imbalances, widespread corruption, power abuse, unequal resource distribution, and demographic differences,
10. **Recognizing** the profound impact that technological change, especially digitalization, has on all areas of life, making it easier for young people to take part in public debate, and offering a wide range of opportunities and challenges,

11. **Underlining** the importance of addressing online echo chambers, hate speech, and the misuse of rapidly developing artificial intelligence (AI) for misinformation, creation of deepfakes, influence operations and political manipulations that threaten the integrity of information, including on social media,

12. **Concerned** by the lack of progress in addressing rapidly growing climate change and by the disproportionate impact of climate change on young people and their future,

13. **Drawing attention** to democratic backsliding observed around the world, and the declining trust and confidence in democratic institutions, and emphasizing the need for youth perspectives on democracy and the engagement of young people in reinforcing democratic structures and protecting human rights,

14. **Observing** the almost complete absence of young people in decision-making positions of international institutions as well as in global political summits, and disturbed by the existing barriers that hinder youth participation in multilateral affairs such as limited representation, lack of funding dedicated to youth initiatives, and empty spaces in decision-making processes,

15. **Noting** a persistent generational and gender imbalance in leadership at the global level,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

16. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to strengthen international co-operation and dialogue to resolve geopolitical tensions, to reinforce multilateral institutions, build trust and ensure that multilateral action translates into concrete improvements in the daily lives of citizens, enabling them to experience the value of international co-operation;

17. **Further calls upon** OSCE participating States to increase international co-operation funding, including in the area of peace and security, and to support innovative and effective approaches to conflict resolution, as well as rapid and effective humanitarian action to alleviate the suffering of conflict-affected populations and promote long-term stability;

18. **Stresses** the importance of recommitting to international arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament to strengthen conditions for a peaceful global future;

19. **Urges** the OSCE participating States to promote greater representation of youth both at the national level and in the context of international institutions, providing a safe, enabling, and empowering environment for young persons’ greater involvement in decision-making processes at all levels to contribute to the creation of more peaceful, just, and inclusive societies, by appointing youth delegates to relevant national and international fora and providing employment opportunities for young people through paid internships and accessible entry-level posts;
20. **Encourages** parliaments of OSCE participating States to provide, within their respective national frameworks, effective ways for young people to participate in activities that drive and support the parliamentary and legislative processes, in particular through youth expert panels and youth parliaments;

21. **Further encourages** the OSCE participating States and international institutions to strengthen democratic legislation and protect freedom of speech, while intensifying their interaction and dialogue with civil society and the private sector, stressing the need for early involvement, to develop virtuous synergies with concrete external impacts;

22. **Calls upon** the OSCE participating States to step up a regular dialogue platform with civil society and the private sector, to develop virtuous synergies with a tangible external impact;

23. **Appeals** to the OSCE participating States to provide financial and logistical support to youth organizations and networks, strengthening their capacity to contribute effectively to multilateral initiatives and OSCE activities;

24. **Urges** the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and its leadership to expand the scope of interaction and co-operation with countries and international organizations beyond the OSCE area for more inclusive dialogue about the global security, in particular through engagement in statutory meetings;

25. **Invites** the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and similar election monitoring organizations to collect youth perspectives and input on the election processes in its participating States, such as through the engagement of youth organizations and young interlocutors in briefings during election observation missions;

26. **Demands** the OSCE participating States to use renewable energy sources with lower environmental impacts and promote sustainable practices across all areas, such as in agriculture and transportation, and **asks** the OSCE executive structures to strengthen their early warning capacity to help anticipate, prevent and mitigate the security risks posed by climate change;

27. **Encourages** the OSCE participating States to promote higher environmental standards in food production, particularly in meat production, and to support international initiatives and agreements aimed at halting rainforest destruction, promoting sustainable practices in agriculture and forestry, and using non-polluting materials in the construction industry and green architecture;

28. **Stresses** the importance of combating corruption and ensuring transparency in all international economic activities, emphasizing the importance of the rule of law, and political participation as crucial elements for prosperity and stability;

29. **Recommends** that OSCE participating States invest in high-quality educational programmes that equip young people with the necessary skills and knowledge to thrive in a globalized world, particularly on issues of international relations, sustainable development, and emerging technologies;
30. **Further recommends** that the OSCE participating States integrate democratic values education into national curricula to foster a culture of responsible citizenship and active engagement of young people;

31. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to integrate digital literacy with a focus on AI into national curricula, ensuring training on AI for educators and the sharing of best practices, while urging the disclosure of source codes for generative AI to uphold ethical standards and traceability, promoting environmentally friendly AI applications, and addressing associated ethical and legal concerns;

32. **Calls** on the OSCE participating States to discuss a labelling requirement or ban on deepfakes to mitigate their negative effects, especially with regard to the spread of disinformation, promote the protection of privacy and data protection, as well as to encourage the use of new technologies and digital education to counter disinformation and the dissemination of fake news among young people;

33. **Recommends** the establishment within the OSCE PA of regular reporting mechanisms to monitor progress in implementing this resolution, with a specific focus on youth participation in OSCE activities and the implementation of youth-related resolutions adopted by the OSCE PA;

34. **Encourages** the OSCE executive bodies to further strengthen the communication of the Organization’s mandate and activities, to increase the public knowledge level and the interaction with youth and other citizens;

35. **Further encourages** the establishment of an informal working group in the OSCE PA on youth, peace and security to strengthen national progress and implementation of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda, foster collaboration and peer support among parliamentarians to promote effective youth participation in peacebuilding processes at the national level, and to facilitate learning and exchange of best practices among parliamentarians.
RESOLUTION ON
PREVENTING CORRUPTION FROM BEING USED AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL

1. Recognizing that corruption fuels conflict, both by diminishing the effectiveness of national institutions and by generating popular grievances which in effect contribute to erosion of the rule of law and to undermining the legitimacy of the State,

2. Cognizant that corruption can enable malign actors in one country to exert illegitimate influence over another State, sow insecurity and instability, and undermine government institutions,

3. Recognizing the urgent need to address grand corruption and State capture, which undermine democratic institutions, erode public trust and perpetuate inequality,

4. Noting that grand corruption refers to corrupt practices involving senior government officials, political leaders or influential individuals who engage in large-scale embezzlement, bribery or abuse of power for personal enrichment,

5. Noting that State capture describes situations where private interests exert undue influence over State institutions, policies and decision-making processes, leading to the erosion of democratic governance and the subversion of public interest,

6. Aware of the fact that when grand corruption and State capture happen, high-level officials may also use control over legislative and regulatory powers to legalize their activities and to weaken oversight and enforcement functions,

7. Aware that, typically, those involved in grand corruption benefit from impunity by interfering directly with the justice system and that, by using the levers of State control, they may also suppress independent efforts by civil society and the media to investigate and expose corruption,

8. Noting that grand corruption is caused by the failure of political, economic and judicial systems to provide robust, independent oversight and accountability, and recognizing the role of national parliaments in this regard,

9. Cognizant that the link between corrupt practices and strategic dependence also suggests that key sectors such as defence, security and energy could be at a greater risk of interference to control States’ decisions,

10. Aware that, when corruption is used as a foreign policy tool, it is not aimed at economic benefit but rather relies on a willingness to forgo economic gains in favour of influence, favourable political outcomes and an ability to spread political norms and practices,

11. Expressing concern that corruption could become a tool of hybrid warfare, alongside disinformation and cyberattacks,

12. Cognizant that electoral campaign contributions could be traded for political influence or promises of decisions favourable to individuals,
13. **Noting** that corruption and illicit enrichment in positions of State power have led to power-grabbing and the perpetuation of kleptocrats in power,

14. **Recognizing** that the majority of grand corruption cases include the use of anonymous shell companies to secretly move financial assets,

15. **Underlining** the need for effective anticorruption mechanisms in emergencies and during crises,

16. **Alarmed** by reports concerning corruption in a scheme involving financial and military aid, which siphoned away some of the provided resources into the black market for weapons,

17. **Recalling** that corruption is closely related to activities such as money laundering, tax evasion and illicit trade,

18. **Expressing concern** that some arms transfers are being trafficked to the black market,

19. **Aware** of the fact that Malta is prosecuting a former Prime Minister and other former high-level officials on corruption charges, and **commending** the decisiveness of the competent Maltese authorities in this regard,

20. **Emphasizing** the importance of international co-operation and collective action to combat these grave threats to global stability and development,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

21. **Stresses** the urgent need for the United Nations, the European Union and other donor organizations or countries to establish rigorous mechanisms for oversight of assistance packages, grants and loans and to perform due diligence on recipient governments and organizations, in order to avoid providing military or financial resources to corrupt and kleptocratic authorities and organizations controlled by them and their associates;

22. **Calls on** international donors to develop a strong holistic risk management system to prevent development aid from contributing to corruption in recipient countries, for example, by linking budget support to clear anti-corruption objectives;

23. **Underlines** the need to ensure high standards of transparency and accountability concerning projects financed under international assistance programmes;

24. **Stresses** the need to monitor foreign-funded projects so that recipient country authorities would be held accountable if foreign funds are not used appropriately, and the need to involve local civil society organizations and human rights defenders in monitoring the implementation of contracts;

25. **Encourages** the strengthening of legal frameworks and particularly **encourages** OSCE participating States to enact and enforce robust anti-corruption laws that criminalize grand corruption and State capture;
26. **Underlines** the role of specialized anti-corruption agencies with adequate resources and independence to investigate and prosecute cases;

27. **Urges** national parliaments to enact legislation to create or strengthen existing beneficial ownership registers in line with Financial Action Task Force recommendations 24 and 25, ensure that relevant stakeholders and public authorities have access to the registers, and include mechanisms that ensure the information in the register is complete, collected in a timely manner and verified;

28. **Urges** competent authorities to use information in beneficial ownership registers to prevent the abuse of legal entities for money laundering, financing of terrorism, and concealment of conflicts of interest in public procurement or contracts with the State;

29. **Highlights** the role of international co-operation in facilitating mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties, to ensure that corrupt individuals cannot escape justice by seeking refuge in other countries;

30. **Urges** States to establish mechanisms to trace, freeze and repatriate illicitly acquired wealth to affected countries;

31. **Urges** national parliaments to promote transparency and accountability safeguards, particularly in public procurement processes, implement asset declaration systems for public officials and their families, establish whistleblower protection mechanisms and verify that they actually work in practice, and empower civil society organizations to monitor and report on grand corruption and State capture;

32. **Calls on** the OSCE PA and the OSCE to remain vigilant on possible developments impacting the anti-corruption framework in OSCE participating States, and to continue supporting anti-corruption institutions with a proven track record of independence and impartiality;

33. **Calls on** the OSCE executive structures to contribute, in co-operation with other relevant organizations in this field, to reaching a global definition of grand corruption.
RESOLUTION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS

1. **Considering** that in international armed conflicts the environmental impact, in terms of both intentional and collateral damage, is increasingly proving to be serious, long-lasting and above all irreversible, not least as a result of the increased and widespread destructive potential of the weapon systems available,

2. **Considering** that the devastating environmental damage since the Second World War has made the international community increasingly aware of the need for greater protection of the environment and ecosystems in the event of international armed conflicts, resulting in the conclusion of two significant international treaties on this matter: the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of 1976,

3. **Considering**, moreover, that pursuant to article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is also a war crime to intentionally launch an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated, but that the ICC can only prosecute the conduct of natural persons and not other legal entities,

4. **Recalling** that, in 2021, the Independent Expert Panel of Stop Ecocide International coined a specific legal definition of ecocide, namely “unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts”,

5. **Deeming**, moreover, that ecocide, especially in the case of environmental disasters relating to war scenarios, is an extremely topical issue, especially in the light of two major ongoing geopolitical earthquakes – the war in Ukraine and the crisis in the Red Sea – which are having a massive impact on the main OSCE countries,

6. **Noting** that, according to data released by the European Commission, the environment and environmental infrastructure in Ukraine is suffering severe war damage in excess of €52 billion, and that Ukraine is currently the most heavily mined country in the world,

7. **Taking into account** the fact that, as stated in paragraph 2.1.4. of the 27 April 2023 opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the right to a healthy environment in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, “Russia’s actions appear to amount to ecocide, based on a definition proposed by legal experts and published in June 2021”,

8. **Also considering** that paragraph 2.1.6. of the above-mentioned opinion states that “The environmental damage caused by the war includes ecosystem degradation, air and water pollution, and contamination of arable and pasture fields”,

9. **Noting**, moreover, that the most serious danger derives from the fact that Ukraine, with its 15 nuclear reactors, is the second most nuclearized country in Europe, and mindful of
the Vancouver Declaration, in which the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly expressed deep concern regarding the irresponsible conduct of the Russian Federation by targeting several nuclear power plants in Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, raising the risk of an unprecedented nuclear disaster, and condemned the destruction by the Russian Federation of the Nova Kakhovka Dam on the Dnipro River, which devastated its precious natural environment, as a crime of ecocide,

10. Recalling that, on 7 December 2022, the United Nations General Assembly approved resolution 77/104 setting out principles on the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts, in which principle 9 specifies that “An internationally wrongful act of a State, in relation to an armed conflict, that causes damage to the environment entails the international responsibility of that State, which is under an obligation to make full reparation for such damage, including damage to the environment in and of itself”.

11. Welcoming the fact that, on 23 November 2022, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers established the Committee of Experts on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, which is tasked with drafting a new Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, that the Committee will be required to produce a draft Convention to replace the previous European Convention (ETS No. 172), and that the new legal instrument could offer the possibility of codifying the crime of ecocide within the broad area of the Council of Europe,

12. Recalling that a study co-funded by the EU Justice Programme proposes to regulate the crime of ecocide in EU law either by using the amendments to EU Directive 2008/99 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, or by submitting a proposal for an EU Council decision providing for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, established in 2017, to prosecute the crime of ecocide,

13. Welcoming the fact that, on 27 February 2024, the European Parliament and the Council approved a new directive on environmental crime, which, while not explicitly criminalizing ecocide, introduces an important update to the existing system of sanctions contained in Directive 2008/99/EC by introducing new violations, tightening penalties and generally improving the effectiveness of environmental investigations and procedures,

14. Noting more generally a growing demand for legal protection of biodiversity and ecosystems, primarily by introducing international penalties for actions damaging the environment, while seeking solutions to the existing gaps in international law regarding environmental damage caused in international armed conflicts,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

15. Urges OSCE participating States to renew their commitment to combating environmental crimes in international armed conflicts and, in particular, to strengthen existing international instruments at their disposal, first and foremost the ICC Statute;

16. Encourages OSCE participating States to consider whether it might be appropriate to institute forms of synergistic collaboration with the Council of Europe’s work on a new international Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, in
order to establish as soon as possible a comprehensive international legal framework with strong safeguards and including specific codification of the crime of ecocide;

17. Urges OSCE participating States to argue for the recognition of ecocide as an international crime and, in particular, the prosecution of all possible perpetrators of environmental crimes in international armed conflicts;

18. Requests, in particular, OSCE participating States that are members of the European Union to:

   a. see whether it might be appropriate to explicitly create the crime of ecocide by means of an EU Directive, in order to further support and strengthening existing environmental protections within the EU and in all the EU Member States;

   b. swiftly transpose the above-mentioned Directive of 27 February 2024 on environmental crime;

19. Urges OSCE participating States to explore and enforce innovative instruments, including non-legislative measures, to strengthen specific environmental protections relating to theatres of war.
RESOLUTION ON
ENDING THE SCOURGE OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE OSCE REGION

1. Horrified by the murder by Hamas of approximately 1,200 Israelis on 7 October 2023 based solely on the perception that they were Jewish, and categorically condemning terrorism and extremist violence regardless of motivation,

2. Alarmed by the surge in anti-Semitic attacks and rhetoric across the OSCE region, which have increased more than three hundred percent in some areas as compared with the previous year, according to civil society reports,

3. Condemning the concurrent rise of anti-Muslim hate across the OSCE region, and recognizing that all forms of intolerance and hate disproportionately affect Jews, Muslims, members of other ethnic and religious minority groups, racial groups, or other vulnerable populations,

4. Troubled by the spread of conspiracy theories, disinformation, and anti-Semitic tropes, particularly but not exclusively via social media, which can erode trust in democratic processes and institutions, foster extremism, and lead to violence,

5. Recalling past OSCE commitments, including the 2004 Berlin Declaration, in which all OSCE participating States recognized anti-Semitism as a threat not only to Jews, but also to democracy, human rights, and the security of the OSCE region and beyond, and the OSCE PA Luxembourg Declaration, which recognized various forms of intolerance, including anti-Semitism, as threats to societies and contrary to the fundamental belief in the equality of all people,

6. Recognizing the important roles that the OSCE and the OSCE PA can play in combating anti-Semitism and intolerance in all of its forms, and in protecting the rights of national minorities, further recognizing that doing so is a shared responsibility, and affirming the special obligation of parliamentarians to act in the face of injustice,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

7. Recommends that OSCE participating States provide the OSCE with the appropriate resources, including extrabudgetary resources, to continue its work developing tools and implementing programmes which combat anti-Semitism, and to promote tolerance and non-discrimination;

8. Calls upon OSCE participating States to develop and implement national action plans, establish interagency co-ordination groups, name special envoys, or to develop similar structures, if they have not already done so, in order to mobilize resources and strengthen efforts to counter anti-Semitism, thereby addressing both the symptoms and root causes of anti-Semitism through education and solidarity;

9. Urges OSCE participating States to increase investments in education and Holocaust remembrance as fundamental steps towards eliminating anti-Jewish hatred within societies;
10. **Rejects** all instrumentalization of anti-Semitism to achieve political ends, and noting that President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin’s attempts to use anti-Semitic lies and distortion of the Holocaust to justify his genocidal war against Ukraine is particularly egregious as it detracts from genuine efforts to counter anti-Semitism;

11. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to support Jewish communities in their efforts to provide security for synagogues, schools, community centres, and other sites; cultivate broad-based and inter-faith coalitions, promote dialogue, and share best practices with the goal of eradicating anti-Semitism both online and offline;

12. **Encourages** the OSCE, OSCE PA, and the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office to enshrine the best practices of naming personal and special representatives on Combating Anti-Semitism and Intolerance, and convening an annual, high-level conference on combating anti-Semitism as instrumental to achieving the goal of ending the scourge of anti-Semitism in the OSCE region and beyond;

13. **Embraces** the special obligation of parliamentarians to use the platforms that their offices provide to develop education, law enforcement, and policy initiatives which combat anti-Semitism, and teach future generations the painful lessons of the Holocaust.
RESOLUTION ON
NAVIGATING CONTEMPORARY JOURNALISM AND GENDER-RELATED
CHALLENGES

1. **Underscoring** the importance of journalism for democracy as a foundation of freedom of expression, and thus of political enlightenment, safeguarded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, most recently, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

2. **Highlighting** that journalism, to the extent it is fulfilling an institutional function such as transparency or functioning as a countervailing power to the State apparatus, should be viewed as a public good,

3. **Recognizing** the institutional role of journalism in complementing or even substituting functions of institutions of public administration and the judiciary, such as securing transparency, access to valuable and trustworthy information, investigation of criminal cases and cases of public interest (violation of human rights, corruption, uncovering of networks of criminal organizations),

4. **Stressing** the importance of the aforementioned treaties for establishing a safe environment for the unhindered work of journalists despite the concerns about potential abuse of the general clauses introducing exemptions to freedom of expression,

5. **Recalling** that a free and independent press, both online and offline, is a cornerstone of democracy and democratic society in that it ensures well-founded reporting and protects against disinformation, fake news and cover-ups,

6. **Pointing out** that in regimes where democratic institutions, freedom of the press and freedom of expression are not firmly consolidated, people investigating public affairs in a way that is not favourable to the respective regimes are not considered journalists, even though they are,

7. **Expressing** its full gratitude to all journalists and media workers, particularly courageous female journalists, who carry out their daily work to provide well-founded political information and complete clarification under adverse circumstances of, often gender-specific, discrimination, discrediting, State repression, violence, persecution or even war,

8. **Aware** of the additional dangers female journalists face at work and that a considerable and growing proportion of violations is taking place online, for the combating of which a close co-operation with the big tech companies is necessary,

9. **Strongly criticizing** practices of objectification of female journalists, virtual lynching, misappropriation of a journalist’s image for sexual purposes, leading to a shift of focus from the work presented to the appearance/physical traits of the journalists, and thus discouraging women from reporting on issues that could render them targets (self-censorship),
Expressing concern about disinformation, fake news, and cover-ups using social media, artificial intelligence (AI) or even cyberwarfare, as well as media restrictions, including intimidation of independent media and blocking of websites,

Cautioning against the potential instrumentalization of the status of being a journalist to secure or refuse favourable treatment when that should not be the case,

Acknowledging the dynamic situation of the media landscape and how it has changed, especially since the expansion of the Internet, search engines and social media,

Aware of the de facto redefinition of the term journalist taking place, particularly in view of the distribution channels that social media has unlocked; namely, not only formally recognized journalists belonging to unions, but also “community media workers and citizen journalists and others who may be using new media as a means of reaching their audiences” (United Nations Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of Impunity, 2012),

Condemning the fact that in democracies people who are acting in bad faith, spreading disinformation, fake news or hate speech can shield themselves behind the right to freedom of expression and claim protection because of their status as a journalist,

Conscious of the sweeping changes in the business model of the news media industry, particularly in terms of revenue generation in that the establishment of de facto monopoly platforms for the search and distribution of media and information marks a shift towards a system that is producing income based on popularity and click-baiting and is generally driven by quantitative rather than qualitative performance,

Critical of the aforementioned practice by tech giants, reversing the positive effects of qualitative journalism (dialogue, exchange of perspectives, transparency, synthesis, pluralism, social cohesion) and instrumentalizing information into a purely monetary business,

Warning against the impact of the new media business model on society and the body politics such as polarization, manipulation, disinformation, spread of hate speech, fragmentation of society, and homogenization of channelled information,

Emphasizing that the production of information has become increasingly fragmented, resulting in precarious working conditions and poor-quality journalism in that journalists are commonly employed on an ad hoc basis to deliver a specific article rather than to produce a consistent body of research, and warning that in cases of financial insecurity, journalists might compromise the quality of their work, resulting in a product that is inadequate for proper information and opinion building,

Highlighting the risks of possible restrictions of the right to freedom of expression on the Internet,

Condemning incidences of violence against journalists orchestrated or tolerated by the State, in that prosecution of journalists by State actors has been steadily rising over recent years, and furthermore, condemning deliberate or indeliberate negligence as far as the
investigation of assaults, attempted murders, intimidation, harassment, blackmailing and strategic lawsuits against public participation,

21. **Gravely concerned** by the defamation, bigotry, harassment, and sexual and gender-based violence against many female journalists, especially through online platforms, which is paralysing their work and driving them out of the field, and calls for serious investigation and harder punishment,

22. **Strongly referring** to the suggestions made by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in the publication on guidelines for monitoring online violence against female journalists, while acknowledging the importance of classification for the analysis of the situation,

23. **Drawing attention** to companies in possession of useful data which can be systematically analysed to paint a clear picture of the violations committed, in that these companies oversee the collection of relative data and often also operate the platforms on which the crimes are committed,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

24. **Demands** the immediate release of arbitrarily detained and abusively imprisoned journalists;

25. **Urges** the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media to promote a culture of remembrance, commemorating the journalists who have been assassinated and preserving the memory of Anna Politkovskaya, Daphne Caruana Galizia and Marie Colvin, to name just a few;

26. **Calls for** a stronger multilateral co-operation between the OSCE, the OSCE PA, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and civil society in order to achieve better monitoring and evaluation of violations against journalists, with a special focus on gender-related issues;

27. **Welcomes** a closer co-operation between the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and major technology companies on monitoring online and offline violence, overcoming bureaucracy, achieving immediate change at a cyberspace-international level, and notes that the European Union’s environmental, social and governance regulations are a great legal instrument to achieve corporate social responsibility;

28. **Welcomes** any attempt at the national or international level to further restrict general clauses introducing exemptions to freedom of expression to achieve legal certainty, especially with respect to journalists and the unimpeded exercise of their profession;

29. **Emphasizes** that clauses such as national security, territorial integrity, public safety, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, protection of the reputation or rights of others, prevention of the disclosure of confidential information, maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, should not be invoked as they might easily be instrumentalized;
30. **Calls for** a close monitoring and evaluation of changes in the system of law of the OSCE participating States, in that media law, penal law (national security, defamation), and ad hoc disinformation laws are often instrumentalized to silence opposing voices, surveil journalists, financially and judiciously exhaust journalists and exclude them from information collected by public authorities (and publicly funded entities);

31. **Welcomes** special treatment of journalists at the national level to secure safety for them and their families in terms of procedural law (witness protection, more resources and transparency for the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against journalists) and penal law, and that a closer look at measures enhancing the security of female journalists in terms of prevention and punishment is vital;

32. **Urges** big tech companies to foster transparency regarding the algorithms used by their news distribution and search engine platforms, and to subject these algorithms to regulation in order to mitigate polarization and ensure the protection of children, women, LGBTQ+ persons, and other vulnerable groups;

33. **Recommends** the appointment of contact persons trained in gender sensitive problems for threats and attacks in media companies, who accompany and support journalists, including freelancers, affected until their safety is restored, and that all necessary steps, such as legal support, personal protection and psychological support, should be initiated;

34. **Suggests** a fast-track process for the issuance of humanitarian visas to immediately secure the physical integrity of persecuted journalists, and views the special treatment of asylum requests submitted by exiled journalists positively;

35. **Endorses** legal and financial aid to journalists and any attempt to shield them behind international institutions aiming to achieve their respective goals in that this is contributing to the consolidation of checks and balances in the system of power, with international support;

36. **Strongly encourages** editorial offices to provide security personnel for assignments that could pose danger to journalists, especially female journalists;

37. **Denounces** violence aimed towards female journalists and warmly **welcomes** the cooperation of big tech firms to achieve a real-time overview of the situation and the best possible results, bypassing time-consuming bureaucratic processes;

38. **Welcomes** the efforts of States, international organizations, and institutions to reverse current trends in the business model of journalism, setting an example for a return to journalism with qualitative attributes that serve democracy and the common good, by subsidizing journalism and endorsing media pluralism;

39. **Demands** an increased presence of female journalists in senior jobs and an end to the problem of underrepresentation in higher visibility positions;

40. **Calls for** initiatives that achieve equal pay among female and male journalists, better labour rights for women, and improved compatibility of work and family planning, and
to that end, welcomes stronger regulations on maternity protection, parental leave, and childcare;

41. Calls on big tech companies to make information that they collect on people open and freely available in aggregated form, and further calls on them to reverse the noted trend of reducing transparency and monetizing people’s personal information;

42. Suggests that journalists receive gender-sensitive training and participate in workshops on how to deal with hate messages and threats;

43. Encourages the implementation of summer school programmes for female journalists and female researchers on these topics, special prizes for journalistic research and conferences to assure a culture of remembrance and systematic confrontation with questions of gender inequality in the field of journalism.
RESOLUTION ON
STRENGTHENING SAFE AND REGULAR PATHWAYS FOR MIGRATION

1. Recalling international agreements relating to migration, especially the United Nations New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,

2. Underlining the need to co-operate on the governance of international migration as set out in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in line with target 10.7 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which offers a range of options for action that can be implemented based on existing migration realities and the capacities of each State,

3. Recalling that the right to asylum, including the principle of non-refoulement, is a fundamental right under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,

4. Evoking the Convention’s definition of a “refugee” as any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”,

5. Highlighting that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the New York Declaration, United Nations Member States have already affirmed that all migrants hold the same universal rights and fundamental freedoms as refugees, even though their treatment is governed by separate legal frameworks, and have declared that they will protect the safety, dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all refugees and migrants, regardless of their legal or migratory status,

6. Emphasizing the importance of recognizing the diversity of causes of flight and forced migration, such as war, conflict, violence, terrorism, political persecution, discrimination based on gender, identity, religion and ethnicity, human trafficking, human smuggling, hunger, natural disasters and climate change,

7. Underlining the gravity of further causes of migration, such as socio-economic drivers in countries of origin, in particular poverty, unemployment and a lack of economic opportunities, as well as pull factors in receiving countries, such as the purposes of education and labour opportunities,

8. Stressing the catastrophic conditions experienced on migration routes, for example in the Mediterranean Sea or the English Channel, or in many hotspots and informal refugee camps, and in detention camps in Libya, in particular,

9. Condemning the political destabilization through the instrumentalization of migration as practised by the Russian Federation and Belarus, for example, in the Baltic Region and on the Finnish border,
10. **Deeply concerned** about the instrumentalization of food supply chains, especially for grain distribution, which forces governments in the global south to take on debt in order to afford market prices, causing shortages, higher prices and political destabilization, and which ultimately enhances migration flows,

11. **Welcoming** the adoption of the mandatory solidarity mechanism to strengthen the distribution mechanism for asylum-seekers as an example of the responsibility sharing that is part of the European Union (EU) Pact on Migration and Asylum,

12. **Commending** the efforts of voluntary civic engagement to assist migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons on the move as well as in receiving States with services such as first aid treatment, humanitarian care, counselling on asylum procedures, psychosocial counselling, or integration programmes,

13. **Acknowledging** the substantial efforts of the main receiving countries, in particular countries hosting migrants and refugees from their geographical regions, such as Türkiye, which is hosting over 3 million refugees from Syria, and the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Germany and Czechia and others who, together, are hosting nearly 6 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe alone and over 6.4 million globally, and also acknowledging the efforts of EU Member States of first entry, such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and Malta, or other countries in the Southern Neighbourhood, such as Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

14. **Strongly urges** OSCE participating States to develop an integrated, sustainable, coherent and human rights-compliant approach to migration governance in accordance with international legal commitments in the area of migration;

15. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to draw upon the expertise of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to improve their migration governance;

16. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to provide a long-term response to the causes of flight and irregular migration through conflict prevention and security provision, and to continue trying to engage in constructive dialogue with partners, counter-terrorism efforts, fighting organized crime and preventing corruption and money laundering, as well as fostering political stability and the rule of law; due attention should also be paid to combating migrant smuggling and trafficking as transnational crimes of particular gravity; dismantling smuggling networks should be among OSCE participating States’ priorities;

17. **Urges** OSCE participating States to expand development expenditures to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and thereby fight the root causes of migration and strengthen partnerships with countries of origin and transit on a level playing field;

18. **Underlines** the need for OSCE participating States to deepen international co-operation with countries of origin and transit on economic growth in order to strengthen labour markets, social equality, and fair and secure supply chains, as well as food and water security;
19. **Strongly urges** OSCE participating States to strengthen international sustainable development co-operation with countries of origin and transit on environmental protection and the fight against climate change, to prevent natural disasters as well as to secure access to clean drinking water or to protect fertile farm land;

20. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to co-operate with countries of origin and transit on socio-political development fostering health and safety protection in the workplace, anti-discrimination, gender equality, LGBTQ+ and women’s rights, economic empowerment of women, the fight against domestic violence, equal educational opportunities and healthcare provision, including birth control, sexual and reproductive health, and vaccinations;

21. **Strongly recommends** expanding information and contact centres in countries of origin and transit to inform people on the move about regulations on protection and on labour migration;

22. **Calls for** the guarantee of safe and dignified return, relocation or resettlement of (internally) displaced persons, refugees and migrants, in line with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of the United Nations, and the resolutions of the OSCE and OSCE PA, through the conclusion of readmission and repatriation agreements and the promotion of sustainable reintegration programmes, drawing upon the resettlement programmes of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

23. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to support countries in the Mediterranean region who are already facing the consequences of the war in Gaza and the heightened instability in the Middle East;

24. **Condemns** the terrorist activities of Hamas, in particular sexualized violence, **calls for** the immediate release of the hostages kidnapped by Hamas and an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and **strongly recommends** that OSCE participating States should support humanitarian relief efforts in Gaza;

25. **Urges** OSCE participating States to take steps, with countries of origin and transit, to promote safe and regular migration by concluding agreements in the areas of economic and labour migration and simplification of (humanitarian) visas, while encouraging the adoption of domestic refugee and migration legislative frameworks and stronger monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of international law in third countries;

26. **Recommends** that OSCE participating States empower the diaspora through improved channels for remittances, know-how and project engagement in countries of origin;

27. **Asks** OSCE participating States to consider taking actions to reduce the risks of a “brain drain” in countries of origin, which increase with the simplification of skilled labour migration to receiving States, particularly in the health care sector;

28. **Requests** OSCE participating States to continue to provide legal and financial support for the essential work of civil society, volunteers, and aid and rescue governmental and non-governmental organizations, and **underlines** that they should not be criminalized;
29. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to strengthen co-operation on the improvement of border protection through digital enhancement of registration, identity verification, monitoring, and consular services to protect their external borders from the threat of criminal networks, particularly terrorist groups such as the Islamic State, at the borders of the Central Asian OSCE participating States;

30. **Calls for** resolute action against international criminal networks that exploit the refugee and migrant crisis, in particular criminality associated with smuggling networks;

31. **Asks** OSCE participating States to refrain from and prevent push-back activities, in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement;

32. **Urges** OSCE participating States to expand safe and regular migration pathways through improving the work and co-operation of institutions such as INTERPOL and EU institutions, such as Europol, Frontex, Eurodac and the European Union Agency for Asylum;

33. **Emphasizes** the need for specialized training of border officials, law enforcement officials, judges, prosecutors, immigration and other relevant officials, with the aim of promoting critical issues such as gender and culture sensitivity or the misuse of the internet and other information and communication technologies for the purposes of human trafficking and related crimes, drawing on the OSCE Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings;

34. **Encourages** stronger engagement of OSCE participating States with the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia), in co-operation with the OSCE PA Mediterranean Forum, as well as with the OSCE Asian Partners for Co-operation (Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea and Thailand);

35. **Underlines** the necessity of reinforcing human rights safeguards when implementing the latest reforms of the Common European Asylum System as part of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, and stronger monitoring of compliance with EU legislation on migration and asylum;

36. **Requests** OSCE participating States to pay attention to the concerns of migration and human rights organizations regarding the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, such as the increased risk of human rights violations, detention and containment at EU borders, more difficult access to asylum, as well responsibility shifting to third countries;

37. **Urges** OSCE participating States to respect the human rights and human dignity of refugees and migrants and to reconsider the implications of the trend towards concluding agreements with third countries to outsource asylum claim processing, especially as these countries often do not meet the criteria of safe countries, while acknowledging the need to provide some relief for the countries of first arrival from the constant pressures of irregular migration;
38. **Calls for** expansion of the legislative framework for regular migration by promoting efficient bureaucracy, access to advice and legal services, and a fair asylum procedure, preventing the abuse of asylum systems, providing health checks, vaccination and effective screening, and fostering family reunification;

39. **Encourages** OSCE participating States to implement and monitor the OSCE’s Women, Peace and Security agenda (United Nations Security Council resolution 1325) and place a special focus, in their migration governance, on vulnerable groups such as women, girls, unaccompanied or separated minors, people with disabilities and the LGBTQ+ community, who face severe risks of sexual and gender-based violence, family separation, mental health repercussions and exploitation;

40. **Asks** OSCE participating States to further develop integration programmes for mutual engagement of both receiving countries and migrants, understood as an investment in the future which will help to meet shortages on the labour markets owing to demographic change, including through education, vocational training and language courses, facilitating access to housing, child and health care, especially sexual and reproductive health, with a special emphasis on women and families;

41. **Urges** OSCE participating States to adopt comprehensive programmes to combat xenophobia, gender and identity-based discrimination, racism and anti-Semitism, as well as populism against migrants, refugees and national minorities within their societies, with the aim of promoting sustainable integration;

42. **Calls upon** OSCE participating States to take into account the central role played by cities, towns and municipalities in promoting sustainable integration, capacity-building of administrations and good governance;

43. **Recommends** the expansion of economic and labour migration schemes, simplification for skilled migrants of certification, visa and naturalization, international exchange of students and scientists, and increased funding for academic scholarship and mentoring programmes, drawing upon the recently adopted German Skilled Immigration Act as an example of good practice;

44. **Proposes** that the OSCE PA organizes a high-level conference on the topic of safe and regular pathways for migration and develops a corresponding action plan to ensure effective follow-up.
RESOLUTION ON
STRENGTHENING ACTIONS TO PREVENT HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND
PROTECTING SURVIVORS TO PREVENT RETRAFFICKING

1. Alarmed that over 28 million people across the world continue to be enslaved in forced labour and/or sex trafficking, generating US$236 billion in illegal profits in the private economy worldwide per year, and that forced commercial sexual exploitation accounts for more than two-thirds (73 per cent) of those illegal profits,

2. Recalling that article 6 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime calls on States parties to take measures to provide survivors with appropriate housing, counselling, and information, in particular regarding their legal rights, as well as employment, educational and training opportunities,

3. Acknowledging that those who survive trafficking are often left in vulnerable circumstances for years afterwards, which often include unstable and inadequate housing, poor mental health and marginalization, all of which can make them more susceptible to retrafficking,

4. Noting that housing instability and homelessness can increase the risk of a person being trafficked and that having safe and stable housing helps protect survivors from being in dangerous environments that can lead to revictimization,

5. Recognizing that women and girls are particularly vulnerable to trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, forced marriage and other forms of exploitation, and that any efforts to prevent human trafficking and to support survivors of human trafficking must be gender- and age-sensitive to effectively respond to the risks faced by women and girls and to their specific needs,

6. Recognizing that protection services for survivors of human trafficking are critical for healing, empowerment, and prevention of retrafficking through programmes that provide housing, mental health care, workforce development, and life-skills training,

7. Emphasizing that education programmes involving schools, survivor leaders, students, parents, and anti-trafficking organizations can help prevent trafficking in children,

8. Welcoming the work and expertise of survivor leaders and non-governmental organizations in programmes to provide support and resources to victims,

9. Concerned about new and overlooked types of human trafficking, including trafficking for the purposes of organ harvesting, and trafficking for forced criminality in scam centres,

10. Concerned that Ukrainian women and children fleeing the Russian Federation’s illegal war on Ukraine continue to be vulnerable to human trafficking, especially when seeking housing and employment as refugees,
11. **Emphasizing** the need to train law enforcement officers to recognise and investigate human trafficking, including Internet crimes against children, and applying an age-appropriate and trauma-informed approach when interacting with potential victims of human trafficking.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

12. Calls on OSCE participating States to develop or strengthen programmes to provide children, teachers, and parents with knowledge and skills to prevent and recognize human trafficking, taking an age-appropriate, gender-sensitive, linguistically accessible, and survivor- and trauma-informed approach;

13. **Urges** OSCE participating States to strengthen, or if needed, develop programmes to provide survivors of human trafficking with safe and stable housing, including by:

   a. prioritizing budget allocation for trafficking prevention-specific housing resources and grants, particularly to increase access to long-term housing assistance for vulnerable populations, especially trafficking survivors, refugees, and those transitioning out of the child welfare system;

   b. streamlining housing assistance applications, eligibility, screening, and intake processes to make it easier for trafficking survivors and vulnerable populations to navigate housing assistance systems;

   c. providing training for housing programme staff on survivors’ rights and housing barriers, including how to address issues related to criminal records or bad or no credit histories;

   d. strengthening co-ordination among trafficking prevention and support providers to prioritize housing and address homelessness;

   e. including survivor experts in programme design and policymaking;

14. Calls on OSCE participating States to provide wrap-around social services for survivors’ healing and empowerment and to prevent vulnerability to retrafficking, through education, training, and professional development, including:

   a. linguistically accessible mental health trauma specialists;

   b. life-skill training programmes, including management of personal finances, self-care, and parenting classes;

   c. literacy and language courses;

   d. scholarships and assistance for enrolment in college or technical schools, as well as job-related skills training;

   e. assistance with expungement of criminal records when such records are for non-violent crimes that were committed as a consequence of the eligible individual’s trafficking;
f. assistance with credit repair;

g. assistance with obtaining childcare, transportation, and victim compensation;

15. **Urges** OSCE participating States to make full use of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Handbook on National Referral Mechanisms to strengthen capacities to identify victims of trafficking and ensure their protection;

16. **Urges** OSCE participating States to ensure their anti-trafficking legislation has effective provisions and punishments specific to trafficking for the purpose of organ harvesting;

17. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to investigate and prosecute trafficking for forced criminality in scam centres;

18. **Urges** OSCE participating States hosting Ukrainian refugees to strengthen programmes to assist them with mental health care, safe and stable housing, and employment to decrease their potential vulnerability to becoming targets of human trafficking; and

19. **Calls on** OSCE participating States, especially those hosting Ukrainian refugees, to train law enforcement officers on recognizing and investigating human trafficking, including internet crimes against children, and applying an age-appropriate and trauma-informed approach when interacting with a potential victim of human trafficking.
RESOLUTION ON
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN FOSTERING DEMOCRATIC AND INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES

1. Reiterating the commitment of OSCE participating States to uphold the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, such as respect for human rights, respect for fundamental freedoms, including freedom of association, and the fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law,

2. Reaffirming OSCE commitments relevant to creating and maintaining civic space, including the Istanbul Document, in which OSCE participating States committed to enhancing the ability of non-governmental organizations to fully contribute to supporting the continued development of civil society and enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,

3. Guided by the OSCE PA Vancouver Declaration and its resolution on the role of national parliaments in enhancing the participation of civil society in decision-making processes, and the Luxemburg Declaration and its resolution on the role of civil society in realizing the aims and aspirations of the OSCE,

4. Underscoring United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions 24/21, 27/31, 32/31, 38/12 and 53/13 which affirm the importance of promoting and protecting civic space,

5. Recalling the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, to which all OSCE participating States have committed, in particular Goal 16, which seeks to promote peaceful and inclusive societies by ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making,

6. Observing with concern that democratic progress has declined or stagnated in some parts of the world, including within the OSCE region, and noting that this democratic decline affects freedom of association, including the extent to which civil society organizations can operate freely,

7. Emphasizing that democratic decline and the shrinking space for civil society are interrelated,

8. Affirming that civil society organizations have a right to participate in public debate regardless of whether their position is critical of positions adopted by public authorities,

9. Concerned by the emergence of government-organized non-governmental organizations designed to support ruling governments while presenting themselves as independent, and convinced that such organizations undermine a diverse civil society, including by depriving independent civil society organizations of public funding,

10. Emphasizing that the ability of civil society organizations to seek, obtain and use financial resources from a variety of sources is essential to the existence of a diverse civil society,
11. **Disturbed** by the use, including by some OSCE participating States, of policies designed to deter civil society organizations from operating, and noting that these policies often contain vague provisions that provide broad discretion to public authorities and with which failure to comply carries disproportionate penalties, which can create a chilling effect on civil society,

12. **Expressing** concern about some OSCE participating States adopting legislation and administrative measures relating to national security and counter-terrorism and subsequently misusing such legislation and measures to hinder the work of civil society,

13. **Witnessing** with grave concern the rise of so-called anti-gender governments, which attempt to obstruct the activities of civil society organizations engaged in promoting the rights of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons by shrinking the space necessary for these organizations to operate,

14. **Alarmed** that, in some OSCE participating States, persons and organizations engaged in promoting the rights of women and LGBTI persons frequently face online and offline harassment, threats, attacks, surveillance and hate campaigns,

15. **Underscoring** that human rights defenders working to advance gender equality face disproportionate rates of violence and discrimination,

16. **Troubled** by the Russian Federation’s intensified repression of independent journalists, representatives of civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and individuals and organizations engaged in promoting the rights of women and LGBTI persons, and observing that this repression has had a disproportionately devastating effect on the lives and freedoms of LGBTI persons,

17. **Recalling** the OSCE Moscow Mechanism Report on the serious threat to the OSCE human dimension in Belarus since 5 November 2020, which notes that at least one quarter of civil society organizations in Belarus have stopped operating since 5 November 2020, recommends that all legislation restricting the formation and operation of independent civil society organizations in Belarus be repealed, and calls on the international community to help representatives of Belarusian civil society organizations, human rights defenders, and journalists in exile to sustain their activities abroad,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

18. **Underscores** the fundamental role of civil society organizations in the promotion of human rights, including the rights of women and LGBTI persons, democracy and the rule of law, and in the provision of services to women and LGBTI persons such as sexual and reproductive health services and support to survivors of gender-based violence;

19. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to ensure that their domestic legal environment enables civil society organizations to participate meaningfully in their society’s political, economic, social and cultural life;

20. **Asks** all OSCE participating States that have not already done so to sign, ratify and implement the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against
women, which provides that all parties must recognize, encourage and support the work of civil society organizations active in combating violence against women and establish effective co-operation with these organizations;

21. **Urges** OSCE participating States to guarantee that domestic legislation, policies and practices enable civil society organizations to engage in meaningful dialogue with public authorities regarding the development of laws and policies relating to gender issues, and ensure that such dialogue be structured, predictable and inclusive;

22. **Recommends** that parliamentarians of OSCE participating States improve their understanding of the gendered impacts of legislation, and that parliaments establish and formalize relationships with independent civil society organizations working on gender issues and draw on their expertise when deliberating legislation;

23. **Condemns** unjustified restrictions on the funding of civil society organizations – in particular women’s rights and human rights organizations – adopted by certain OSCE participating States, including restrictions designed to criminalize foreign funding and create burdensome administrative procedures to access permissible sources of funding;

24. **Calls on** OSCE participating States to ensure that civil society organizations can engage in fundraising activities, whether working on gender issues or other issues, and can access diverse sources of funding, including private and foreign funding, without undue restrictions;

25. **Recommends** that the OSCE put in place a system to monitor threats to civic space in OSCE participating States by developing a civic space index based on existing frameworks for measuring civic space;

26. **Invites** the OSCE to assist participating States in ensuring that civic education and human rights education are included in their curricula at all levels of education, and recognizes that civic and human rights education help develop a democratic political culture, foster inclusive societies and increase civic participation;

27. **Encourages** the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), as part of its election observation missions, to continue to involve civil society organizations, to monitor the ability of civil society to operate freely before and during elections and to pay particular attention to the impacts of election-related legislation on a country’s civic space;

28. **Welcomes** the work of ODIHR to support OSCE participating States in implementing commitments relating to gender equality, including by facilitating dialogue and co-operation among civil society organizations, as well as between civil society and participating States, in promoting gender-mainstreaming.