



GENDER BALANCE REPORT

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Gender Mainstreaming and Intersectional Analysis of Key Issues Affecting the OSCE Region: Conflict, Migration and Climate Change

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INTRODUCTION

There is a tendency to think of security as a question of military affairs, but the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security – which includes the politico-military, economic and environmental, as well as human dimensions – is a more multi-dimensional, and thus accurate, way of looking at security, and one that takes a people-centred approach. When we adopt this broader conception of security, we acknowledge that the safety and wellbeing of our citizens is as important as the security of our borders. It is with this lens that this year's gender report will examine issues of gender, youth¹, peace and security.

The report begins with a brief description of relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and a call for greater integration between the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda and the youth, peace and security (YPS) agenda. It then recognizes the importance of an intersectional analysis of policies and programs to identify different groups' needs and to ensure that we all share in the task and benefits of promoting peace, ensuring security and addressing growing threats, such as climate change. The report also elaborates on the interplay between youth, gender and other identity factors and how they interact in situations of conflict, in migratory processes and in efforts to address climate change.

This report is a call for the OSCE to challenge harmful stereotypes of youth, and instead see young people as a complex and diverse group of distinct individuals with tremendous capacity to be positive agents of change. Youth are not accurately reflected by stereotypes that reinforce perceptions of them as violent and susceptible to extremism. As demonstrated by the recent youth climate strikes, and previous youth movements such as those fighting for racial equality and civil rights, youth have often been at the forefront of important societal changes that have improved the quality of life and security of our communities.

I. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND YOUTH, PEACE AND SECURITY

On 23 April 2019, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the ninth resolution on Women, Peace and Security. The resolution makes commitments to combat sexual violence in situations of armed conflict and calls for the needs of victims of sexual violence in conflict situations to be better addressed. However, unlike previous WPS Resolutions 1889 (2009), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013), Resolution 2467 does not include references to the sexual and reproductive health needs of survivors. By excluding such references – which include safe abortion, fistula operations, emergency contraception and other necessary health services – the resolution misses “a commitment to one of the most essential and practical needs of victims.”² Some Security Council members, including the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, expressed disappointment regarding this omission, recognizing that there is an acute need for victims to have access to sexual and reproductive healthcare.³ When the UN Security Council adopts resolutions on WPS, the full needs of women and youth, as articulated by them, must be considered, including sexual and reproductive health and rights.

¹ There is no universally recognized definition of youth, but for the purposes of this report we are referring to the teen and young adult years.

² Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “[Gutting the Substance of a Security Council Resolution on Sexual Violence](#),” *Just Security*, 24 April 2019.

³ Liz Ford, “[UN waters down rape resolution to appease US's hardline abortion stance](#),” *The Guardian*, 23 April 2019.

Despite set-backs such as the exclusion of important language in UNSC Resolution 2467, the WPS agenda is well-established, with the first UNSC Resolution on this topic having been adopted in 2000. Furthermore, in 2005, the issue of children and armed conflict was addressed for the first time in UNSC Resolution 1612. It is only much more recently, in 2015, that the focus has expanded to include youth with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security.

Building upon UNSC Resolution 1325 and the subsequent resolutions on WPS, UNSC Resolution 2250 emphasizes the role of youth in promoting and maintaining peace and security.⁴ Nevertheless, observers note that, although the resolutions on WPS are recalled in Resolution 2250, “gender is not sufficiently mentioned and integrated throughout the resolution itself.”⁵ It is clear that the WPS and YPS agendas would benefit from greater integration, as outlined in further detail below.

II. GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS: NECESSARY LENSES

Our perspectives on the concept of “security” vary depending on many variables such as our stage in life, gender, race and disability. While gender mainstreaming (also known as gender-based analysis) is well-known in international policy circles, intersectionality is less so. Intersectional analysis is defined as:

the complex, cumulative way in which the effects of multiple forms of discrimination (such as racism, sexism, and classism) combine, overlap, or intersect especially in the experiences of marginalized individuals or groups.⁶

Intersectional analysis in policy and program development is a critical part of ensuring that different needs are identified, considered and acted upon and that all voices are heard when priorities are being established.

Violence and conflict are experienced differently depending on gender, age and other identity factors, meaning that our security needs are also different. For example, young women are most at risk in the private sphere, where they most often experience sexual and gender-based violence, though their risk of encountering violence in the public sphere increase in situations of armed conflict, political violence and crisis. These experiences and risks contrast with those of young men who are at greater risk in the public sphere, where they are more likely to experience violent death than in the private sphere, even in times of peace.⁷ The lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and two-spirit (LGBTQ2)⁸ community faces

⁴ Additional United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security include 1820 (2008), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015). Resolution 2419 (2018) is the second resolution on youth, peace and security.

⁵ UN Women, [Young Women in Peace and Security: At the Intersection of the YPS and WPS Agendas](#).

⁶ Merriam-Webster, “[Intersectionality](#).”

⁷ Graeme Simpson, [The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Report on Youth, Peace and Security](#), United Nations Population Fund & United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, p. 94-95.

⁸ While the term LGBT is often used at the OSCE, LGBTQ2 is being used in this report to be inclusive of a broader spectrum of identities.

particular vulnerabilities and risks of violence, discrimination and stigma in both the public and private spheres.⁹

It is increasingly recognized that gender-based analysis should not be limited to women and girls. Instead, we now know that policies and programs must also consider impacts on men and boys, as well as non-binary people (individuals who do not fit within the binary concept of man or woman), and must engage them. Focusing gender equality efforts on women and girls without consideration of the needs and experiences of men and boys has not resulted in true gender equality. To encourage greater involvement by men in the promotion of gender equality, issues affecting men and boys such as unhealthy social norms and the types of violence affecting them must be addressed so that they can see the broad-based benefits of human security, women's empowerment and gender equality.¹⁰ The unique experiences of different age groups must also be considered.

In the *Helsinki Final Act*, the participating States agreed on the objective of “ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace free from any threat to or attempt against their security.”¹¹ Gender roles are complex and ingrained at an early age. They are affected by culture, religion, economic factors, and political and social circumstances.¹² Similarly, the term “youth” refers to a broad and diverse group. Common perceptions of youth, particularly young men, as violence-prone are inaccurate, as will be outlined below. Only by challenging stereotypes and allowing people to be who they are, rather than constrained by stereotypes, can we develop truly inclusive, safe communities for all that reflect the ideals of the OSCE's founding document. The following section will elaborate on how that can be done.

A. Unhealthy and Dangerous Cultural Conceptions of Masculinity

We cannot rely on stereotypical thinking. It is important to recognize the variety of individual experiences informed by the unique challenges and experiences we each have. Discussions about gender typically focus on women and girls. Nevertheless, there is growing recognition of the negative impacts on men and boys of certain cultural conceptions of masculinity, namely that a man must be tough, unemotional, powerful, and dominant. Not only are such cultural conceptions of masculinity inaccurate; they can also be dangerous. As stated in a recent report,

Gender-based violence is closely linked to the unequal division of powers between women and men, with its causes directly stemming from the subordinated position of women in the hierarchy of family relations and social stratification.¹³

Our families are key examples and models of gender dynamics for youth, with positive and negative implications. Studies show that men who witnessed their fathers abusing their mothers are more likely to inflict abuse against their own partners later in life.¹⁴ Without intervention, the cycle of violence continues.

⁹ Simpson, p. 94.

¹⁰ OSCE, [MenEngage Expert Meeting, Vienna, Hofburg, 23-24 November 2017 Report](#), p. 3 (Summary of Keynote speaker, Director of Gender Justice and Women's Rights at Oxfam GB, Nikki van der Gaag, 's statement).

¹¹ See the Preamble to the [Helsinki Final Act](#).

¹² United Nations Population Fund, “[Engaging men & boys](#).”

¹³ United Nations Population Fund, UK Government, Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, [Masculinity Today: Men's Attitudes to Gender Stereotypes and Violence Against Women](#), 2018, p. 5.

¹⁴ White Ribbon Campaign, [Issue Brief: Engaging Men and Boys to Reduce and Prevent Gender-Based Violence](#), April 2011.

By contrast, men whose fathers were involved in childcare or domestic tasks have been found to be more involved in both childcare and domestic tasks themselves.¹⁵ As noted in one report:

Men's participation in traditionally feminine activities like care work is a powerful political act as well; men who are involved in care work demonstrate to the next generation of boys and girls, both in the home and in their communities, that care work should be equally shared between women and men.¹⁶

As conceptions of masculinity evolve, it has been difficult for some men to adapt, particularly those who lack education, training and economic opportunities. We can see the results in today's backlash against feminism in many societies and in the higher proportion of males who are reportedly voting for far-right parties in various OSCE countries.¹⁷ At the same time, groups such as Men Can Stop Rape which works in the United States, and the Young Men Initiative and the Be A Man! Club in the Balkans, are doing important work in promoting positive conceptions of masculinity among youth in high schools and universities.¹⁸

Young men are also facing their own unique challenges – falling behind their female counterparts, on average, in school performance, for example.¹⁹ This can lead to frustration and feelings of powerlessness. Efforts are being made to address this issue by offering books on topics that boys and young men are more likely to enjoy, allowing for more physical movement during class, and providing more breaks. Researchers are seeking to understand anti-boy bias among teachers and the potential benefit of increasing the number of male teachers.²⁰

Men, including adolescent men, are at higher risk of suicide than women. In Europe, for example, men are four times as likely as women to die by suicide.²¹ The statistics for Canada are similar, though women actually attempt suicide three to four times more often.²² Research in Mexico, the United States and the United Kingdom concluded that:

young men who felt pressured to adhere to masculine identities associated with aggression, sexual prowess, self-sufficiency and rigid gender norms had particularly high rates of suicidal ideation, were fearful of appearing vulnerable, and were more likely to participate in “risky behaviours”, as well as aggressive behaviours directed at both men and women, including sexual harassment.²³

¹⁵ G. Barker et al., [Evolving Men: Initial Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey \(IMAGES\)](#), Washington, D.C.: International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) and Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Promundo, January 2011, p. 61.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 61.

¹⁷ [“Men adrift,”](#) *The Economist* [Men adrift].

¹⁸ Simpson, p. 50; Care, [Young Men Initiative](#).

¹⁹ Daniel Voyer and Susan D. Voyer, [“Gender differences in scholastic achievement: A meta-analysis,”](#) *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 140, No. 4, July 2014.

²⁰ Men adrift.

²¹ World Health Organization, [“Suicide data,”](#) *Mental health*.

²² The Passionate Eye, [“Dying for Help.”](#)

²³ Simpson, p. 98.

Our gendered expectations of men are making them dangerous to themselves, as well as to those around them.

Both higher education levels and younger age have been identified as factors that positively influence the gender-equitable practices and attitudes of men.²⁴ According to UN Women, adolescence and young adulthood are a “critical period of opportunity to engage boys and young men in understanding why gender equality is good for everyone and recognizing their role in the empowerment of girls and young women.”²⁵ By proactively engaging youth, we can challenge gender stereotypes and break vicious cycles, allowing the next generation to be themselves, rather than feeling the pressure to conform to an unhealthy ideal of masculinity. If done right, consistently and deliberately, this essential work will reduce the violence and conflict experienced by men and boys, while also making our communities safer for women and girls and members of the LGBTQ2 community. The organizations undertaking such activities throughout the OSCE region, including the OSCE itself, should be applauded for their work.

B. Experiences and Needs of Young Women and Girls

While a greater focus on the needs of men and boys is necessary, such recognition does not mean that the issues experienced by women and girls have been resolved. Gender-based violence affects all women, and adolescent girls are at particular risk. In Canada, for example, police data indicates that adolescent girls are almost four times as likely to experience sexual violence compared to women aged 25 and over.²⁶ In a Swiss study, 22% of girls aged 15 to 17 reported having experienced sexual violence, compared to 8% of adolescent boys. Researchers in the United States found that 23% of adolescent girls surveyed had been sexually victimized in the previous year, compared to 10% of adolescent boys.²⁷ An estimated 71% of trafficked persons are women and girls, and the number increases to 96% where trafficking is for the purposes of sexual exploitation, with 25% of trafficking worldwide occurring within the OSCE region.²⁸ Young women and girls are now more vulnerable to attacks online, which can be a form of gender-based violence, causing permanent and irrevocable harm. Girls also constitute the majority of victims of online grooming of children for sexual purposes and sexual solicitation.²⁹

In acknowledgment of this reality, the Government of Canada has prioritized the elimination of online child exploitation in its Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender-Based Violence.³⁰ Technology is also being used for good. For example, an app was created by young people to map safe and unsafe areas in cities to help to prevent sexual and gender-based violence.³¹ Given the high levels of online activity by youth,

²⁴ Barker, p. 9.

²⁵ UN Women, [Engaging boys and young men in gender equality](#).

²⁶ Statistics Canada, [Police-reported violence against girls and young women in Canada, 2017](#), 17 December 2018.

²⁷ UNICEF, [Hidden in Plain Sight: A statistical analysis of violence against children](#), September 2014, p. 80-81.

²⁸ OSCE, [“Gender dynamics of human trafficking explored at OSCE/ODIHR event in Warsaw,”](#) 19 September 2018; OSCE, [“Efforts to combat trafficking, including of children, must focus on both effects and roots of this crime, OSCE officials say on world anti-trafficking day,”](#) 30 July 2018.

²⁹ International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children, [Online Grooming of Children for Sexual Purposes: Model Legislation & Global Review](#), 1st ed., 2017, p. 2.

³⁰ Status of Women Canada, [Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender-Based Violence](#).

³¹ Simpson, p.49.

understanding how to prevent harm online and promote safety is a key and evolving area of interest where the OSCE can be engaged, including by consulting directly with affected youth.

Another challenge facing young women and girls is that traditional gender roles continue to influence girls and boys in their educational and career choices, constraining the advancement of women in society. Young women and girls are less likely than young men and boys to enrol in science, technology, engineering or math (STEM), which are the careers of the 21st century. Instead, young women and girls dominate in such traditional fields as education and nursing, which lead to careers with earnings that are lower than those in many fields dominated by men.³² Women are starting to surpass men in areas such as law and medicine in many countries, which is promising, though they do not always receive equal pay to their male counterparts in these fields.³³ If we do not actively counter conceptions about gender from a young age, we are limiting the career possibilities of young women and girls; constraining their opportunities to hold leadership positions in STEM fields and their income-earning opportunities; and affecting their country's global competitiveness. The absence of women in senior positions, in turn, discourages more women from becoming professionals in the STEM areas. It is, in short, a vicious cycle of inequality.

At the same time, despite these very real challenges, it is important to emphasize that women and girls are not only disempowered victims. They are active, vibrant individuals with their own voices who are involved in countless efforts to make the world a safer, better and more prosperous place. Many women who spoke up as part of the #MeToo movement discussed formative experiences that happened in their youth, including Tarana Burke, the founder of the movement, who was sexually assaulted as a child and as a teen. That movement has been a wake-up call and a rallying cry, triggering meaningful change as well as accountability for some perpetrators, while making others think twice before degrading, harassing or assaulting a woman. Young women have demonstrated their ability to lead social change; and going forward. Their energy, talent, resilience and ideas need to be more effectively channelled into the peace and security sphere.

Realizing that objective will require significant changes in our societies and in how governments and international organizations approach public policy. Because “youth” is often synonymous with male youth, and “women’s issues” tend to focus on the opinions of older women, young women experience a “double discrimination” where their experiences, voices and needs are not adequately addressed in either the YPS or WPS agendas. In addition, young women do not receive the funding required for them to engage in this work on peace and security.³⁴

C. Experiences of LGBTQ2 Youth

While much of this report focuses on the different experiences of young men and women, or boys and girls, there is increasing recognition in many societies that gender is a spectrum.³⁵ From a very young age, children learn both explicit and implicit gender norms specific to their culture and may comment on other

³² United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], [Cracking the code: Girls' and women's education in science, technology, engineering and mathematics \(STEM\)](#), 2017.

³³ See, for example, regarding Canada: André Picard, [“The feminization of medicine: does it matter?”](#) *The Globe and Mail*, 30 January 2018; Abigail Rowe, [“The Parity Paradox,”](#) *Best Lawyers*, 25 June 2018.

³⁴ UN Women, [Young Women in Peace and Security: At the Intersection of the YPS and WPS Agendas](#), p. 8.

³⁵ Genderspectrum, [“Understanding Gender.”](#)

children's choices of clothing, toys and activities if they do not conform to such norms. Such behaviour can make the school experience very challenging for LGBTQ2 youth particularly. Societal disapproval, as well as criminalization in some countries, has significant impacts on the well-being and safety of LGBTQ2 communities.

Adolescence can be a very difficult time for LGBTQ2 individuals because they are not yet financially independent and can face very negative, sometimes violent, reactions from their families and communities to their identities. An American survey of transgender individuals in 2015 found that 10% of respondents experienced violence from family members because of their gender identity or expression, 8% were thrown out of their house, and 10% ran away from home. School can also be unsafe. The same survey of transgender Americans found that 54% of respondents had been verbally harassed at school, and 24% were physically attacked. Many encountered unsupportive school personnel as well.³⁶ Another American study over the 2014-2015 period found that, while 18.8% of heterosexual students were bullied on school property, the figure was 34.2% for gay, lesbian and bisexual students. Those same students also experienced much higher rates of physical and sexual dating violence.³⁷

The impact of the mistreatment, harassment and violent experienced by members of the LGBTQ2 community is huge, with 40% of respondents to the transgender survey mentioned above having attempted suicide at some point in their lives, which is nearly nine times the national average.³⁸ Another study found that 22% to 43% of transgender people in Europe, Canada and the United States report having attempted suicide.³⁹ LGBTQ2 youth in Canada are four times more likely to attempt suicide than their heterosexual peers.⁴⁰ Statistics are likely similar or worse in many OSCE participating States.

These statistics demonstrate how dangerous transphobia and homophobia can be for those who diverge from the traditional gender binary and heteronormativity. A study in the Canadian province of Ontario found that social support, reduced transphobia, personal identification documentation matching one's gender, and completed medical transition when requested all reduced the risk of suicide for transgender individuals.⁴¹ The implications are clear: if we are to uphold our responsibility to ensure the emotional wellbeing and safety of the LGBTQ2 community, dedicated support is required, as are efforts to counter any and all forms of discrimination. This includes measures to prohibit conversion therapy, which has been done in a number of jurisdictions.⁴²

³⁶ National Center for Transgender Equality, [The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey: Executive Summary](#), Updated December 2017, p. 6 and 9.

³⁷ Laura Kann et al., "[Sexual Identity, Sex of Sexual Contacts, and Health-Related Behaviors Among Students in Grades 9–12 — United States and Selected Sites, 2015](#)," *Surveillance Summaries*, Vol. 65, No. 9, August 2016.

³⁸ National Center for Transgender Equality, p. 8.

³⁹ TransPulse, [Intervenable Factors Associated with Suicide Risk in Transgender Persons: A Respondent Driven Sampling Study in Ontario, Canada](#), 1 June 2015.

⁴⁰ Egale, [What You Should Know About LGBTQ Youth Suicide in Canada](#).

⁴¹ TransPulse.

⁴² For example, the province of Ontario, in Canada, has done so. The Canadian Press, "[Conversion therapy has no place in Ontario: Kathleen Wynne](#)," *CBC.ca*, 2 April 2015.

D. Stereotypes about Youth

The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Report on Youth, Peace and Security (The Missing Peace) is a comprehensive report that was requested as part of UNSC Resolution 2250. In the extensive consultations with 4,230 young people undertaken as part of the production of that report, youth from diverse countries and settings often said that the media focuses excessively on violence when discussing youth, without providing equivalent attention to peacebuilding efforts by youth. This imbalance, they argued, perpetuates stereotypes that frame youth as inherently violent and therefore a problem that needs to be solved, rather than as assets for the promotion of peace. Youth were particularly frustrated about this stereotyping because most young people are not actually involved in violence. The assumption that all young men and women are at risk of joining violent extremist groups is based on stereotypes and was found to be stigmatizing and contributing to the prevalence of security-focused approaches to youth, rather than preventative policies. This assumption has, in turn, generated mistrust in authorities, including police, which may actually fuel extremism rather than prevent it. It also overlooks the reality that youth are often the primary targets and victims of extremist groups.⁴³

The Missing Peace underlined that youth want to be engaged in policy debates about security and conflict. While “youth issues” are often considered to be limited to topics such as sports, arts, leisure and technology, youth have demonstrated that they are interested in, and affected by, much more. Assumptions about youth interests have significant impacts on their ability to participate and have their voices and perspectives recognized.⁴⁴ Yet, history provides many examples where youth were at the forefront of important societal changes and where they faced, rather than perpetrated, violence, including during the civil rights movement for racial equality and the fight for LGBTQ2 rights.⁴⁵

There are many more recent examples of youth being at the forefront of important social changes, such as the youth currently engaged in climate strikes as discussed further below, youth leadership during the 2011 Arab Spring and youth advocacy for gun reform in the United States after the Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in Parkland, Florida, in February 2018. There are also many lesser-known youth peacebuilding and social cohesion projects. Just a few mentioned in *The Missing Peace* are the Nansen Dialogue Network in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, peer-to-peer projects in Kyrgyzstan, initiatives for cross-cultural dialogue and understanding in Macedonia, and the work of the Young Women’s Peace Academy in the Caucasus.⁴⁶

How such efforts are perceived by governments can have a lasting impact on the peace and stability of communities, countries and regions. Unfortunately, youth activism is too often seen as a threat:

In very diverse country settings across the globe, young people described how peaceful political organization and legitimate organized political protest were frequently targeted and shut down in the name of counter-terrorism or the pretext of preventing violent extremism.⁴⁷

⁴³ Simpson, p. 18, 25, 26, 36.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁵ Andrew Winston, “[Young People Are Leading the Way on Climate Change, and Companies Need to Pay Attention](#),” *Harvard Business Review*, 26 March 2019.

⁴⁶ Simpson, p. 46.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

There is a real risk of violence when youth are stereotyped and marginalized.⁴⁸ While some youth become active in peaceful movements aimed at making the world better and bringing people together, others have been involved in more populist and xenophobic movements based on prejudice and a desire to exclude. Thus, it is important not to treat youth as a monolith and to ensure that diverse youth voices are heard and considered in policy and program development. When that is not done, there is an increased risk of youth being perceived as a security risk. As with the broader population, youth are diverse in their needs, opinions and how they express themselves:

As a microcosm of wider society, young people are diverse, sometimes divided, and anything but homogenous. Beyond just differences in age, youth are characterized by diversity based on gender, race, religion, ethnicity, caste, class, culture, context and political affiliations, to mention just a few... political divisions among youth... caste-based tensions... urban–rural divides, and significant divisions based on class-based privilege, access to education and jobs, and proximity to systems of political patronage ... These divisions are by no means unique to youth. It is nonetheless important that such differences are not underestimated in wishful assumptions about youth “unity”.⁴⁹

Feelings of exclusion and disempowerment can encourage some youth to see violence as the only option that will allow them to be heard.⁵⁰ We all have an obligation to prevent that chain of events and to integrate a broad spectrum of youth perspectives in decision-making on peace and security issues.

E. Conclusions Concerning Gender Mainstreaming and Intersectional Analysis

The Missing Peace sums up what is needed to counter stereotypes. The report integrates a nuanced and complex vision of gender and youth in policy-making within the context of peace and security. It concludes:

Gender issues were viewed by young people as central to peace. However, most youth peace work relating to gender continues to be undertaken primarily by – and revolves around the unique experiences of – young women, and sexual and gender minorities. The view of gender as synonymous with young women and of youth as synonymous with young men has contributed to the victimization of young women, and sexual and gender minorities. It has also made less visible issues related to masculinities. Global policy and programming on youth, peace and security must engage with the gendered identities of both young men and young women, to support and promote positive, gender equitable identities and roles, paying particular attention to cultivating non-violent masculinities.⁵¹

The OSCE can play a leadership role in such efforts, particularly through the work of the MenEngage Network and the Special Representatives on Youth and Security. Both can work to counter stereotypes and ensure that diverse voices are heard in debates at the OSCE. While some countries are already taking an intersectional approach to these issues, the OSCE can play a role in supporting others to do the same.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 30.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 58, 64, 68.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. xii.

The next section goes into more detail about the implications of youth and gender stereotypes and the importance of both gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis in three key areas for the OSCE: situations of conflict, migration and climate change.

III. GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES FACING OSCE PARTICIPATING STATES

A. Youth, Gender and Conflict

1. Stereotypes of Youth and Gender in Conflict

When conceptualizing youth and gender in conflict, the stereotypical images are often of young men holding guns while young women are framed as passive victims. This framing of youth and gender in conflict minimizes the peace-making role that many young men take on, as noted above, and the agency that many young women have in situations of conflict. According to *The Missing Peace*, one in four young people in the world are affected by violence or armed conflict.⁵² While young people can be perpetrators of violence, they can also be victims, witnesses and agents for peace.⁵³

The perception of young men as violent has been bolstered by the youth bulge theory, which contends that there is a causal relationship between a high proportion of young people – particularly unemployed young men – and increased probability of conflict.⁵⁴ Although multiple studies have put this assessment forward, *The Missing Peace* states, “at best, [there is] a weak correlation between large youth cohorts and high levels of violence.”⁵⁵

The legal framework in situations of conflict does not adequately recognize the many roles women may play during conflict either: “the general protections afforded to women by international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols also include special provisions that distil women’s protection needs to the value attached to their ‘honour’ and to their role as mothers.”⁵⁶ While young men are often negatively stereotyped as violent, in contrast, young women are often described as ‘vulnerable’ and ‘helpless,’ despite having the capacity to adapt, survive, and handle possible losses during conflicts.⁵⁷ Additionally, women, including young women, are often closely linked with children, with ‘women and children’ used as synonyms for civilians, further undermining their agency during conflict.⁵⁸

⁵² Ibid., p. 13.

⁵³ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, [Breaking Cycles of Violence: Key Issues in Armed Violence Reduction](#), October 2011, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Alex Sieber, [“Youth Bulge” or the question of whether young people jeopardize peace](#), Youth & Peacebuilding, Swiss Peace A Propos, No. 160, 2019.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁶ Medina Haeri and Nadine Puechguirbal, [“From helplessness to agency: examining the plurality of women’s experiences in armed conflict”](#), *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 92, Issue 877, March 2010, p. 104.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ R. Charli Carpenter, [“Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups”: Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue](#), *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 49, Issue 2, June 2005, p. 296.

The recognition of their agency does not deny the fact that, during conflicts and post-conflict, women and girls face greater risks of domestic, sexual and gender-based violence.⁵⁹ Armed conflict also increases economic vulnerability for women, especially in female-headed households.⁶⁰ Furthermore, during conflict, girls are nearly 2.5 times more likely to be out of school than boys, and young women are nearly 90% more likely to be out of secondary school in conflict zones than in young women in non-conflict zones.⁶¹ This increased vulnerability does not remove women and girls' agency entirely. It does, however, have significant impacts on their potential roles in decision-making and the likelihood of a lasting peace. Researchers note that this framing of women as passive victims is problematic, contending that when women are framed as weak and vulnerable, they are noticeably absent from decision-making bodies during and after conflict.⁶² This exclusion can have important consequences for peace since studies indicate that, when women and civil society groups participate in peace processes, including settlements, there is a higher likelihood of durable peace.⁶³ At the same time, it is important to recognize that women are not all peacemakers. Many women are active combatants in conflict. Between 1979 and 2009, women participated as combatants in 40% of civil conflicts.⁶⁴

The [2016 OSCE PA Gender Balance Report](#) highlighted how women's roles in peacekeeping and their inclusion in peace agreements have been extremely limited. Women represented only 3% of the military personnel deployed in UN missions, and they were primarily support staff. However, while 11% of peace agreements reached between 1990 and 2000 mentioned women, a 2017 report indicated that the figure in question had increased to 27%.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, while the mention of women has increased, a study from 2018 notes that, since UNSC Resolution 1325's adoption in 2000, the number of female signatories to peace agreements has decreased.⁶⁶ *The Missing Peace* recommends gender-equitable youth participation in all phases of peace processes as well.⁶⁷ Simply put, more needs to be done to ensure that diverse voices are at the table.

The lack of LGBTQ2 voices also shows in the results on the ground. Pre-existing vulnerability for LGBTQ2 community members can be exacerbated in situations of lawlessness where there may be impunity for homophobic and transphobic acts. Even in the post-conflict period, LGBTQ2 persons can be discriminated against, affecting their access to food assistance, shelter and humanitarian aid. Such individuals do not

⁵⁹ UN Women, [Facts and figures: Ending violence against women](#), November 2018.

⁶⁰ Patricia Justino, "Violent Conflict and Changes in Gender Economic Roles, in [The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict](#), ed. Fionnuala Ni Aolain et al., Oxford, U.K., Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 80.

⁶¹ Overseas Development Institute, [Education Cannot Wait](#), May 2016, p. 10; Education for All Global Monitoring Report, [Humanitarian aid for education: why it matters and why more is needed](#), Policy Paper 21, June 2015, p. 3.

⁶² Haeri and Puechguirbal, p. 103.

⁶³ Jana Krause et al., "[Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations and the Durability of Peace](#)," *International Interactions*, Vol. 44, No. 6, 2018, p. 1006; Desirée Nilsson, "[Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace](#)," *International Interactions*, Vol. 38, Issue 2, 2012, p. 243. Also see Radhika Coomaraswamy, [Preventing Conflict Transforming Justice Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325](#), UN Women, 2015.

⁶⁴ Alex Braithwaite and Luna B. Ruiz, "[Female combatants, forced recruitment, and civil conflict outcomes](#)," *Research and Politics*, April–June 2018, p. 1.

⁶⁵ Dr. Hedy Fry, [A Gender Sensitive Response to the Migrant and Refugee Influx in Europe is Needed](#), OSCE PA Gender Balance Report, June 2017, p. 12.

⁶⁶ Krause, p. 1006.

⁶⁷ Simpson, p. 120.

always benefit from the family, community and legal protections that others enjoy because of their sexuality or gender identity. Aid and reconstruction programs often neglect consideration of LGBTQ2 needs (as well as women's needs, though this is starting to change within organizations such as UNHCR).⁶⁸ LGBTQ2 rights can also be politicised, as has occurred in Ukraine to discourage closer ties with the European Union. In eastern Ukraine, the conflict has reportedly led to a de-prioritisation of LGBTQ2 issues and increases in homophobic attacks.⁶⁹

2. Better Integration of Youth and Gender in the Peace and Security Agendas

As noted above, many of the peace strategies pursued as part of the WPS agenda have focused on older women, while the agenda for youth has tended to focus on young men. For the two agendas to be effective, a more intersectional analysis is required. Accordingly, it is recommended that youth-specific programs should be integrated into National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security. For example, Georgia's National Action Plan on WPS commits to peace education in schools.⁷⁰ Policy makers should listen to the ideas put forward by youth and facilitate their participation in peace initiatives. In addition, national youth policies should take into account the gender-diverse needs of young people. When young women are mentioned in such action plans, their inclusion should not only be based on needing protection or addressing discrimination, but on a general recognition that they can be agents of transformative change.⁷¹

Generations of youth are being forgotten as conflicts continue and they do not have the opportunity to reach their full potential through education, access to healthcare and other opportunities. Child soldiers cannot continue to be used and we must provide opportunities for children and youth across the gender spectrum to reach their full potential. Additionally, as emphasized by Cora Weiss, President of The Hague Appeal for Peace and co-drafter of what became UNSC Resolution 1325, these resolutions should not normalise war by making it safer for women or youth. Instead, these agendas should both "support the demilitarisation of society and facilitate the development of anti-militarist politics of peace."⁷²

3. OSCE Initiatives on Youth, Gender and Conflict

Since 2015, the OSCE has appointed Special Representatives of the Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) on Youth and Security, who participate in sustaining the OSCE's efforts on "youth protection, and on promoting youth participation in areas like preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, intercultural and interreligious dialogue, education, tolerance and non-discrimination and political participation."⁷³ In a visit to Serbia in January 2019, Dr Samuel Goda, one of the four current Special Representatives, "stressed the importance of the OSCE's work to promote youth rights, strengthen inclusive youth policies and build capacities of young women and men in the areas of non-discrimination,

⁶⁸ Peter Laverack, [Criminalising Homosexuality and LGBT Rights in Times of Conflict, Violence and Natural Disasters](#), Human Dignity Trust, November 2015, p. 4-5; regarding women, see Mark Lowcock, ["Delivering better outcomes for women and girls in humanitarian crises,"](#) 22 February 2019.

⁶⁹ Laverack, p. 8-9.

⁷⁰ Laura J Shepherd, ["Making war safe for women? National Action Plans and the militarisation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda,"](#) *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2016, p. 331.

⁷¹ UN Women, [Young Women in Peace and Security: At the Intersection of the YPS and WPS Agendas](#), p. 6.

⁷² Shepherd, p. 332.

⁷³ OSCE, [Youth](#).

media literacy and regional co-operation.”⁷⁴ The initiative to focus on youth is a positive development at the OSCE. When future Special Representatives are appointed, it is important that the Representatives themselves reflect the diversity of youth who are living in the OSCE region, including ethnic, class and gender diversity. Integrating more gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis in their work would also be extremely beneficial, as would a focus on youth as peace-makers.

In December 2018, the OSCE’s Ministerial Council adopted the *Declaration on the Role of Youth in Contributing to Peace and Security Efforts*, which acknowledges “that youth are an important part of society and the role that they can play in supporting participating States in the implementation of commitments in all three dimensions.”⁷⁵ Although the Special Representatives of the CiO on Youth and Security called the declaration a “seismic manifestation” of developments in the youth and security agenda, an interpretative statement, led by Norway on behalf of other delegations,⁷⁶ called the declaration “short and weaker than [they] would have preferred.”⁷⁷ The interpretative statement reiterated the significance of UNSC Resolution 2250, which “calls on all relevant actors to consider instituting mechanisms to promote a culture of peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue.”⁷⁸

While it may be difficult to achieve consensus in the current context, a detailed decision (as opposed to a declaration) outlining how the OSCE plans to integrate gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis in its work on peace and security would go a long way to ensuring that the security needs of all people remain the focus of the organization. The challenges of the current context were reflected in the interpretive statement Canada made on behalf of a number of participating States, which was attached to the December 2018 OSCE Ministerial Council’s *Decision on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against Women*. It noted their “regret that it was not possible to reach consensus on language regarding preventing violence, including sexual violence against women and girls in conflict situations.”⁷⁹ This lack of consensus on such an important issue for youth and for women is very disappointing.

The OSCE PA’s 2018 Berlin Declaration states that “children and youth must be considered as a strategic long-term priority for OSCE advocacy activities in order to ensure continued awareness of, as well as respect for, the Helsinki Final Act and OSCE commitments.”⁸⁰ Given its more flexible decision-making structure, the OSCE PA is a valuable forum in which to advocate for the integration of the views of intersectional and diverse groups of youth in the OSCE’s work on conflict prevention and resolution.

⁷⁴ OSCE, “[OSCE Special Representative on Youth and Security highlights role of youth mainstreaming during his visit to Serbia](#),” 29 January 2019.

⁷⁵ OSCE Ministerial Council, [Declaration on the Role of Youth in Contributing to Peace and Security Efforts](#), MC.DOC/3/18, 7 December 2018.

⁷⁶ The interpretive statement was made by the delegation of Norway on behalf of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.

⁷⁷ OSCE Ministerial Council, [Interpretative Statement Under Paragraph IV.1\(A\)6 of the Rules of Procedure of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe](#), MC.DOC/3/18, 7 December 2018.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ OSCE Ministerial Council, [Decision No. 4/18 Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women](#), MC.DEC/4/18, 7 December 2018. Canada’s statement was made on behalf of Albania, Austria-European Union, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine and the U.S.

⁸⁰ OSCE PA, [Berlin Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty-seventh Annual Session](#), Berlin, 7-11 July 2018 [Berlin Declaration].

The OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine – the civilian mission that reports on the situation in Ukraine – continues “to invest in gender mainstreaming all its activities as well as enhancing women’s participation in the Mission.”⁸¹ The SMM has created a gender office with a network of Gender Focal Points and aimed to increase gender parity throughout the SMM. It also conducts outreach activities. The SMM’s gender report highlighted some challenges in increasing gender parity. Since 2015, the proportion of female monitors has fluctuated but remained below 20%. Among senior and field management, female representation has decreased slightly since 2017, from 28% to 25% at the Kyiv head office and from 26% to 21% in field management positions.⁸² While the SMM emphasizes gender mainstreaming, less emphasis has been given to the active role of youth in contributing to peace.

In the daily reports issued by the SMM, both the positive and negative contributions of youth are, nonetheless, acknowledged. A report from March 2019 drew attention to International Women’s Day gatherings in Kyiv, where a group of 1,100 people, mostly young women, gathered to support women’s rights and oppose violence against women. A group of 200 to 300 mostly young men held a smaller counter march.⁸³ A March 2018 update recognized that representatives of the Union of Ukrainian Youth had cleaned up a vandalised monument in Kharkiv. The same report noted that youth were involved in throwing red liquid at speakers at an International Women’s Day event in Uzhhorod.⁸⁴ By recognizing positive contributions, while acknowledging negative actions, the SMM provides a comprehensive picture of youth involvement and participation in Ukraine and recognizes the varied roles of youth.

Therefore, while the OSCE works to support the WPS and YPS agendas, greater integration between the two agendas, as well as intersectional analysis, would help us to better understand the needs of diverse groups in situations of conflict in the region and ensure that the full spectrum of perspectives is being heard.

B. Youth, Gender and Migration

The UNHCR’s Global Trends Report was published recently and notes that there were 70.8 million people who were forcibly displaced at the close of 2018.⁸⁵ That number is higher than it has ever been in the 70-year history of the UNHCR. The drivers of this displacement are complex and multi-faceted and include conflict, climate change and economic factors. It is easy to be critical of those who flee and do whatever they need to get to a safe country for not waiting their turn, but are parents doing whatever they can to keep their children safe and provide them with opportunities to thrive, to stop their children from becoming part of another generation of youth without formal education and opportunities due to conflict.

⁸¹ [“Ertugrul Apakan: Meaningful Change for Progress - Statement by Chief Monitor of OSCE SMM on International Women’s Day,”](#) OSCE, 8 March 2019.

⁸² OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, [Gender Dimensions of SMM Monitoring](#), December 2018, p. 5.

⁸³ OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, [“Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine \(SMM\), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 March 2019,”](#) Daily Report, 9 March 2018.

⁸⁴ OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, [“Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine \(SMM\), based on information received as of 19:30, 14 March 2018,”](#) Daily Report, 15 March 2018.

⁸⁵ Adrian Edwards, [“Global forced displacement tops 70 million,”](#) UNHCR, 19 June 2019.

There is growing recognition of the unique needs of migrants and refugees of different genders and ages.⁸⁶ In December 2018, 164 governments adopted the *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration* (compact on migration) and 181 governments affirmed the *Global Compact on Refugees* (compact on refugees).⁸⁷ Even though these global compacts are non-binding, some OSCE countries, including the U.S. and Hungary, opposed these historic agreements.⁸⁸

The compact on migration mainstreams a gender perspective and promotes gender equality by recognizing the independence, agency and leadership of migrant women. It also addresses the rights of the child, noting the consideration that must be given to unaccompanied and separated children.⁸⁹ The compact on refugees includes a programme of action that considers various intersectional needs of refugees.⁹⁰ The focus on gender, youth and disabilities in the compact on refugees is important, given that a significant portion of migrants and refugees are members of these groups.

A 2018 study emphasized that “reaching a fuller account and understanding of gender in the current European migration context also requires taking seriously its intersections with age.”⁹¹ In 2014, at least 2.5 million adolescents were displaced worldwide.⁹² In 2018, 79% of the first-time asylum seekers in the European Union (EU) were under 35 years of age.⁹³ These statistics and findings indicate that the unique needs of migrants and refugees of various genders and ages must be taken into account as governments create immigration laws and policies.

As will be discussed in more detail below, throughout the migration process, from the choice to leave home, to the migration journey, to the process of integrating into a new community, youth face structural vulnerabilities. According to the UN’s 2018 World Youth Report:

young migrants are particularly vulnerable to the worst risks associated with migration. In leaving their homes and social networks, they set out to secure work that is not always available or of the quality they had envisioned. Migrant youth, in particular those immigrating without the proper documentation, are often forced into the informal economy, where they are vulnerable to exploitation by

⁸⁶ Whereas migrants may leave to seek better economic and social opportunities or reunite with their families, refugees are defined as fleeing armed conflict or persecution and are protected in international law. Asylum seekers are those who have requested refugee status, but whose claims have not yet been processed. The situation of individuals fleeing the impacts of climate change is not recognized as a ground for refugee status on its own, so such individuals would be classified as migrants. As was done in the gender reports from 2016 and 2017, this migration section addresses issues affecting migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. When one group is mentioned without the other, it is because the research cited focuses specifically on that group. See Adrian Edwards, “[UNHCR viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘migrant’ – Which is right?](#),” The UN Refugee Agency, 11 July 2016; UNHCR, [Asylum-Seekers](#); and UNHCR, [Climate Change and Disaster Displacement](#).

⁸⁷ United Nations, “[UN affirms ‘historic’ global compact to support world’s refugees](#),” *UN News*, 17 December 2018.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Global Compact for Migration, [Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration](#), 13 July 2018, p. 4-5.

⁹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, [Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Part II Global compact on refugees](#), A/73/12 (Part II), 2018, p. 3.

⁹¹ Lesley Pruitt et al., “[Gender and Age in the Construction of Male Youth in the European Migration “Crisis”](#),” *Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Vol. 43, No. 3, Spring 2018, p. 688 [Pruitt].

⁹² As cited in Graeme Simpson, [The Missing Peace: Independent Progress Report on Youth, Peace and Security](#), United Nations Population Fund & United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, p. 22.

⁹³ Eurostat, [Asylum statistics](#).

unscrupulous employers... Young migrants, especially young women, also face the continued risk of human trafficking and slavery.⁹⁴

1. Drivers of Youth Migration

The stereotypes associated with youth and gender mentioned above affect migrants and refugees as well. One study notes that “public representations of young [migrants and refugees] can be deeply influenced by stereotypes and assumptions around gender and age that may – intentionally or inadvertently – lead to greater insecurity for people of diverse genders and ages.”⁹⁵ For example, young women migrants are often perceived as being vulnerable, reducing their agency. For young men, the pervasive stereotypes surrounding the “youth bulge” theory reinforces the idea that young men are a threat to stability in their origin countries. The ongoing perception of young men as an inherent risk poses real policy implications for those young men who are migrants and refugees.⁹⁶

As discussed in the 2016 OSCE PA gender report, women may leave their home country for many reasons, including sexualized violence in conflict, domestic violence, or when female genital mutilation and child marriage are practiced.⁹⁷ One recent study found that increased female migration from El Salvador and Honduras to Mexico and the U.S. is linked to targeted gender-based violence. It states that “[g]ang members coerce young women and girls into sexual relationships; resistance can lead to death. Gangs are also known to exact vengeance on rivals via the rape and murder of daughters and sisters.”⁹⁸

Economic migration has been a driver of increased migration among young women as well. Once in another country, women often work in sectors of the economy that are unregulated, such as domestic work, or low-wage jobs, putting them at higher risk for abuse, exploitation and possible violence.⁹⁹ For young men, unemployment in their home countries has also driven an uptick in migration. A report about the rise of economic migration from Senegal to Europe highlighted how many youths view migrating as a means to access economic opportunities unavailable at home. One young man stated: “the only thing we know is migration. Migration equals success.”¹⁰⁰

People with disabilities face additional challenges in their home countries, driving them to migrate for better quality of life and additional support. A recent Human Rights Watch dispatch noted how substandard medical treatment and lack of access to rehabilitation services drove one young man to leave his home country of Honduras for the U.S.¹⁰¹ Migrants with disabilities who travelled as part of what are referred to in the media as migrant “caravans” from Central America to the United States spoke of experiencing

⁹⁴ [World Youth Report: Youth and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#), p. 47.

⁹⁵ Pruitt, p. 688.

⁹⁶ Pruitt, p. 703.

⁹⁷ Rosamund Shreeves, [Gender aspects of migration and asylum in the EU: An overview](#), European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2016, p. 3 as cited in Dr. Hedy Fry, [Gender Balance Report](#), June 2016, p. 3.

⁹⁸ Jeffrey Hallock, Ariel G. Ruiz Soto and Michael Fix, [In Search of Safety, Growing Numbers of Women Flee Central America](#), Migration Policy Institute, 30 May 2018.

⁹⁹ United Nations Population Fund, [Migration](#).

¹⁰⁰ Kieran Guilbert, [No Country for Young Men: Senegal's villages deserted for dreams of Europe](#), Thomson Reuters Foundation News.

¹⁰¹ Carlos Ríos Espinosa, [Accommodating Asylum-Seekers and Migrants with Disabilities](#), Human Rights Watch, 6 February 2019.

violence and discrimination in their home countries.¹⁰² Researchers estimate that 15% of the world's population have disabilities, and that this population comprises a significant portion of migrant and refugee populations.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, according to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "there is a lack of data regarding the situation and numbers of migrants with disabilities."¹⁰⁴ The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees calls on states, "to protect and assist refugees with disabilities against all forms of discrimination and to provide sustainable and appropriate support in addressing all their needs."¹⁰⁵

The LGBTQ2 community may be driven to migrate for their safety as well. Currently, 70 UN member states and some other jurisdictions have laws that criminalize same-sex relationships and, in six UN member states, such relations are punishable by death.¹⁰⁶ Under the UN Refugee Convention, sexual orientation and gender identity are grounds to claim refugee status.¹⁰⁷ Such claims may relate to the laws in place, but also to inadequate protections "on the ground" for LGBTQ2 communities. We must be clear that LGBTQ2 rights are human rights and deserve as much protection as other rights.

2. Security Risks Faced by Migrants on their Journey

During migration, refugees and other migrants face heightened security risks and many are killed along the journey. Researchers estimate that, between 1996 and 2017, more than 60,000 men, women and children died while migrating.¹⁰⁸ The International Organization for Migration's Missing Migrants Project estimates that 4,736 migrants were killed along their journey in 2018.¹⁰⁹

Most migrants who have died in their attempt to reach Europe have drowned.¹¹⁰ The disturbing reports of fake life jackets are an indication that opportunistic individuals are willing to endanger the lives of migrants and refugees for profit. As one rescue worker stated: "you'd see families with children wearing lifejackets and parents wearing blown-up inner tubes of car tyres [*sic*]. They had no idea that their lifejackets were fake and that inflated tyre [*sic*] tubes are safer."¹¹¹

Researchers note the "significant challenges to any attempt at gathering data on migrant fatalities."¹¹² Without reliable disaggregated data, it is difficult to estimate the direct impact of migration on various

¹⁰² Carlos Ríos Espinosa, "[Life With a Disability in the Migrant Caravan](#)," Human Rights Watch, 20 December 2018.

¹⁰³ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, "[Thematic focus: Migrants with disabilities](#)."

¹⁰⁴ United Nations – Disability, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "[Refugees and migrants with disabilities](#)."

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Lucas Ramón Mendos, "[State Sponsored Homophobia](#)," International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), 2019, p. 15-16.

¹⁰⁷ Antonio Zappulla, "[Forgotten twice: the untold story of LGBT refugees](#)," World Economic Forum, 19 January 2018.

¹⁰⁸ Ann Singleton, Frank Laczko and Julia Black, "[Measuring unsafe migration: The challenge of collecting accurate data on migrant fatalities](#)," *Migration Policy Practice*, Vol. VII, No. 2, April – September 2017, p. 4 [Singleton].

¹⁰⁹ Missing Migrants Project, "[Total of Deaths Recorded from 01 January to 15 May](#)."

¹¹⁰ Niamh McIntyre and Mark Rice-Oxley, "[It's 34,361 and rising: how the List tallies Europe's migrant bodycount](#)," *The Guardian*, 20 June 2018.

¹¹¹ World Health Organization, "[Fake lifejackets play a role in drowning of refugees](#)," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, Vol. 94, No. 6, June 2016.

¹¹² Singleton, p. 7.

vulnerable groups, including youth and women. The compact on migration and the compact on refugees both call for improved collection of sex- and age-disaggregated data to allow for thorough analysis of the specific vulnerabilities faced by different groups.¹¹³

While reliable numbers may not exist, individual stories of hardship abound. In late 2017, reports circulated that, in Libya, African migrants on their journey to Europe were being sold into slavery.¹¹⁴ Libya is a main transit point for migrants on the journey from other African countries to Europe. An EU official has been quoted saying that, in Libya, migrants were subjected to “unlawful detentions, abductions, torture, forced labour and sexual and gender-based violence.”¹¹⁵ Most of the individuals who were sold were young men.¹¹⁶ In February 2019, the Canadian government announced that, over the next two years, Canada would resettle 750 refugees who were rescued from Libyan detention centres.¹¹⁷

Women face increased risks during migration as well, including high rates of sexual violence, forced prostitution and victimization by gangs and smugglers. Migrant young women and girls, many of whom have also been affected by conflict, are at greatest risk of being trafficked for sexual exploitation and experiencing sexual attacks along migration routes. While estimates vary about the number of women who are sexually assaulted during migration, researchers suggest that “the actual number of sexual assaults is almost certainly much higher than those documented by prosecutors and the police, because most attacks are never reported.”¹¹⁸

Female migrants are likely to face barriers to health care, especially sexual and reproductive health services. In the chaos of displacement, significant numbers of female migrants are likely to be or become pregnant. Lack of access to family planning, antenatal care and safe childbirth facilities endanger women and is one of the leading causes of death among displaced women and girls.¹¹⁹

Despite these risks, many women and girls believe that the potential benefits of migrating will outweigh the potential dangers during the journey. In many cases, that is an indication of the dire circumstances being left behind.

3. Unaccompanied and Separated Children and Youth

It would be remiss if this year’s report, which is focused on youth, did not address the difficulties faced by young refugees and migrants to the U.S. under its “zero-tolerance” immigration policy, which was implemented in April 2018. All adults entering the country illegally were arrested, separating them from their children.¹²⁰ Under this policy, at least 2,737 minors were separated from their parents, although a

¹¹³ Migration Data Portal, [Gender and migration](#).

¹¹⁴ Nima Elbagir et al., [“People for sale,”](#) *CNN*, 14 November 2017.

¹¹⁵ Stephanie Nebehay, [“Executions, torture and slave markets persist in Libya: U.N.,”](#) *Reuters*, 21 March 2018.

¹¹⁶ IOM UN Migration, [“IOM Learns of ‘Slave Market’ Conditions Endangering Migrants in North Africa,”](#) Press Release, 4 November 2017.

¹¹⁷ Mike Blanchfield and Stephen Cook, [“Hundreds of ex-slaves in Libya coming to Canada, immigration minister says,”](#) *CBC News*, 6 February 2019.

¹¹⁸ Manny Fernandez, [“The Hidden Nightmare of Sexual Violence on the Border,”](#) *The New York Times*, 3 March 2019.

¹¹⁹ UN Population Fund, [“Five reasons migration is a feminist issue,”](#) News release, 9 April 2018.

¹²⁰ Salvador Rizzo, [“The facts about Trump’s policy of separating families at the border,”](#) *The Washington Post*, 19 June 2018.

report indicates that these numbers are likely much higher as no formal tracking system was used.¹²¹ Data reported by the American Civil Liberties Union notes that 64.5% of the separated children were male and 39% under 10 years of age.¹²² A recent article contends that U.S. immigration policies:

can create vulnerabilities, including fear and mistrust, discrimination, limited access to services, parent-child separation, and poverty. These experiences increase risk for poor mental health outcomes and may exacerbate prior exposure to traumas in the home country (e.g., violence) and during migration (e.g., extortion).¹²³

Although the official U.S. policy to separate families at the border ended in June 2018, there are reports that it could take up to two years to reunite families that have been separated.¹²⁴ Government court filings reportedly admit that it may not be possible to reunite all the children with their families.¹²⁵

While the U.S. government framed its “zero tolerance” policy as an attempt to deter illegal immigration, reports analyzing this policy demonstrate that it was ineffective.¹²⁶ Data from the period during which “zero tolerance” was in place indicate that, although the proportion of migrants apprehended at the border decreased over that time, the reduction in migrants was less than the average from the previous seven years. Moreover, migration rates always decrease during the hot summer months.¹²⁷

OSCE participating States should consider the negative and long-term impacts that their policies could have on vulnerable migrant populations. In June 2018, the OSCE PA’s human rights committee Chair, Margareta Kiener Nellen, criticized “the U.S. government’s violation of human rights and humanitarian standards in its treatment of migrants – and especially migrant children – attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.”¹²⁸ The gender, age and specific needs of migrant youth and children cannot be overlooked.

The EU countries do not have an official policy that automatically results in child separation. Nonetheless, while the cases of U.S. family separations have been highly publicized, in 2015 it was estimated that at least 10,000 migrant children had gone missing after arriving in Europe in recent years. Most of the

¹²¹ Miriam Jordan, “[Family Separation May Have Hit Thousands More Migrant Children Than Reported](#),” *The New York Times*, 17 January 2019.

¹²² American Civil Liberties Union, [Family Separation By the Numbers](#).

¹²³ Stephanie A. Torres et al., “[Immigration policy, practices, and procedures: The impact on the mental health of Mexican and Central American youth and families](#),” *American Psychologist*, Vol. 73, No. 7, p. 843.

¹²⁴ Julia Jacobs, “[U.S. Says It Could Take 2 Years to Identify Up to Thousands of Separated Immigrant Families](#),” *The New York Times*, 6 April 2019.

¹²⁵ Jacob Soboroff and Dennis Romero, “[Finding all migrant children separated from their families may be impossible, feds say](#),” *NBC News*, 2 February 2019.

¹²⁶ Brennan Hoban, “[The state of US immigration policy and how to improve it](#),” Brookings, 6 August 2018; Tal Kopan, “[Exclusive: Trump admin thought family separations would deter immigrants. They haven’t.](#),” *CNN*, 18 June 2018.

¹²⁷ Adam Isacson, “[Southwest Border Data Shows 'Zero Tolerance' Didn't Deter Migrants After All](#),” Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas, 5 July 2018.

¹²⁸ OSCE PA, “[United States must end practice of separating children from parents, says OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's human rights and humanitarian committee Chair](#),” News Release, 19 June 2018.

children travelled as unaccompanied minors, while some became separated from their family for various reasons.¹²⁹ Many of these children are feared to be exploited for sexual or labour purposes.¹³⁰

One researcher noted that, “in news reports of children identified as ‘missing,’ gender was rarely if ever mentioned. Rather, we see a focus on refugee children as degendered and infantilized.”¹³¹ Another researcher highlighted how the media and statistics agencies, by characterizing these individuals as children, are using language that deflects from their gendered characteristics. He observed that, while 90% of unaccompanied minors from the Middle East are male and have likely been exposed to sexual exploitation, they were characterized simply as children instead of boys.¹³² In 2018, approximately two-thirds of child migrants and refugees who arrived in the EU were boys.¹³³ Using and disseminating accurate sex-disaggregated data helps us to question erroneous gender stereotypes, including the stereotype that only women are vulnerable migrants who should be prioritized for assistance.¹³⁴

4. Arrival in Host Countries and Integration

In addition to the challenges of integrating into a new host country, young migrants can face increased security risks when adapting to their new home. The media plays a significant role in how migrants and refugees are portrayed, affecting how they are perceived in their new communities.¹³⁵ *The Missing Peace* notes the gendered nature of these perceptions. Young migrant men are often perceived to be “preying” on local women, or are thought to be sexual deviants.¹³⁶ One study reported that “this politicized response [of viewing young men as a threat] is occurring not only in Europe but also in other parts of the globe, drawing on gender and age to spark division.”¹³⁷ In turn, government policies can reinforce these assumptions. At the same time, the OSCE notes that the “migration policies of participating States rarely include a gender perspective that addresses women migrants’ specific needs.”¹³⁸

Numerous academic studies point to the discrimination that youth from immigrant backgrounds are subjected to by police and people in authority positions in host countries. This discrimination can, for example, lead young immigrants to avoid reporting their experiences as victims of crime.¹³⁹ In Canada

¹²⁹ Missing Children Europe, [Missing children in migration](#).

¹³⁰ Anja Radjenovic, [At a glance: Disappearance of migrant children in Europe](#), European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2017.

¹³¹ Pruitt, p. 701.

¹³² Chris Dolan, “Victims Who are Men,” in [The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict](#), ed. Fionnuala Ni Aolain et al., Oxford, U.K., Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 90; Jessica J Steventon, “[‘Less than human’: does asylum system harm child refugees’ mental health?](#),” *Open Democracy*, 26 August 2016.

¹³³ UNHCR, UNICEF and IOM, [Refugee and Migrant Children in Europe](#), January to December 2018.

¹³⁴ Migration Data Porta, [Gender and migration](#).

¹³⁵ Alexander Caviedes, “[The Press in Europe: Covering the Migrant Crisis or Generating Crisis?](#),” in *Migration and the Crisis of the Modern Nation State*, ed. Frank Jacob and Adam Luedtke, Vernon Press, 2018; Pruitt; and Harriet Gray and Anja K Franck, “[Refugees as/at risk: The gendered and racialized underpinnings of securitization in British media narratives](#),” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 0, Issue 00, 2019.

¹³⁶ Simpson, p. 22.

¹³⁷ Pruitt, p. 700.

¹³⁸ OSCE, [Migration](#).

¹³⁹ Anna Rypi, Veronika Burcar and Malin Åkerström, “[Refraining from reporting crimes: accounts from young male crime victims with an immigrant background](#),” *Nordic Social Work Research*, 2018, p. 1.

and the U.S., and likely elsewhere, the practice of carding or stop-and-frisk by police, tends to target young people from racialized groups. The activist group No One Is Illegal–Toronto released a report that covered the period 2014-2015 and detailed how Toronto police were reporting undocumented immigrants to the Canadian Border Services Agency, even though the city had been designated a sanctuary city in 2013.¹⁴⁰ According to No One Is Illegal–Toronto, discussions of carding and racial profiling should include assessments of how undocumented immigrants are affected by these practices.¹⁴¹ Evidence indicates that these practices do not have a positive impact on crime reduction, and instead further marginalize the affected individuals.¹⁴² In January 2017, a new law in the province of Ontario in Canada banned random carding by police.¹⁴³

The negative stereotypes underlying policies such as carding overlook how migrants and refugees can positively contribute to host societies. In developing a new EU Youth Strategy, the European Commission noted the importance of supporting the integration of young migrants and refugees.¹⁴⁴ Likewise, in the OSCE's training manual on migrant integration, references to gender and youth-specific initiatives are made throughout, emphasizing the need for gender-sensitive policies to integrate migrants.¹⁴⁵

Providing education for migrants and refugees not only helps them to integrate into their host countries, but should be understood as a human right, as enshrined in Article 26 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.¹⁴⁶ As part of the 2018 OSCE PA *Berlin Declaration*, the resolution *Minors on the Move: The Role of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Building an Effective Protection Framework* recommends that OSCE participating States “provide free primary and secondary education, including instruction in the official language(s) of the host country, to all children regardless of their status.”¹⁴⁷

Migrants and refugees face integration difficulties that include learning a new language and adapting to the local education system. Many have low socioeconomic status in their new host countries.¹⁴⁸ Although first generation immigrant students tend to perform worse than students born in host countries, the gap in educational performance shrinks for the children of immigrants who are born in host countries.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁰ A sanctuary city generally allows undocumented migrants to access services without being asked about their immigration status, Nicholas Keung, “[Toronto declared ‘sanctuary city’ to non-status migrants](#),” *The Toronto Star*, 21 February 2013.

¹⁴¹ Michael Smee, “[Group claims police are improperly helping CBSA round up undocumented immigrants](#),” *CBC News*, 18 December 2018.

¹⁴² “[Little to no proof police carding has effect on crime or arrests: Ontario report](#),” *CBC News*, 31 December 2018.

¹⁴³ Ontario, [Ontario Regulation 58/16: Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances - Prohibition and Duties](#).

¹⁴⁴ European Commission, [Engaging, Connecting and Empowering young people: a new EU Youth Strategy](#).

¹⁴⁵ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, [Good Practices in Migrant Integration: Trainer's Manual](#).

¹⁴⁶ UNESCO, [Education for migrants: an inalienable human right](#), April 2018.

¹⁴⁷ Berlin Declaration (*Resolution on Minors on the Move: The Role of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Building an Effective Protection Framework*).

¹⁴⁸ Ulrich Kober, [Educational Inclusion](#), Cities of Migration.

¹⁴⁹ OECD, [Helping immigrant students to succeed at school - and beyond](#), 2015, p. 2.

Obtaining gainful employment is another challenge for young migrants, as well as women and older immigrants.¹⁵⁰ As emphasized in the 2017 OSCE PA gender balance report, female migrants and refugees tend to face greater barriers to entry in the workforce than their male counterparts. According to the European Network of Migrant Women, “migrant and refugee women struggle to integrate due to gender blind policies that do not adequately reflect their needs and experiences.”¹⁵¹ When obtaining gainful employment, migrants have been found less likely than those employees who were born in the country to actively participate in the mechanisms that can improve their working conditions and wages. An OSCE report has identified that “trade unions in some countries do not attract high levels of migrant participation due to the costs of membership, a lack of trust, and a low level of outreach to migrant women, especially in the informal and domestic sectors.”¹⁵² Additionally, immigrants of both genders are more likely to be unemployed in host countries.¹⁵³

A recent study by the UN and World Bank notes that migration, if well managed, “can offer many benefits and is an alternative to enduring the constraints felt by demographic transitions. Migrants contribute to their host countries by filling critical labor shortages, paying taxes and social security contributions, and creating jobs as entrepreneurs.”¹⁵⁴ An assessment of the economic impact of refugees in EU countries notes that for countries with aging workforces such as Germany, the arrival of young refugees helps to fill the workforce and contributes to pension funds.¹⁵⁵ Canada is a great example of the many benefits of welcoming migrants and refugees generation after generation who are integrated into our society and come obtain citizenship within a few years. Participating States, and our citizens, need to recognize the benefits and identify ways to improve employment prospects for migrants and refugees.

Other policy areas and regulations will also be relevant. Indeed, some policies that initially appear to be benign have gendered impacts upon examination. An analysis of remittances notes that women migrants tend to earn less than their male counterparts. At the same time, they tend to send remittances in smaller amounts, but more frequently. Taking a look at the cost per transaction to send remittances demonstrates that, by sending smaller amounts more often, women tend to pay higher transaction fees than males.¹⁵⁶

People with disabilities face additional constraints when integrating into their new homes. Again, this is where intersectional analysis matters so much because different identity factors interact in complex ways. For example, mental health problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder and other psychosocial disabilities, can often go unnoticed when migrants arrive in host countries.¹⁵⁷ The Swedish Migration Agency requires that health screenings for migrants “address past and present physical and mental health,

¹⁵⁰ OECD Factbook, [Migration and Unemployment](#), 2016, p. 26.

¹⁵¹ European Network of Migrant Women, [Gender-Based Dangers Facing Migrant and Refugee Women](#), p. 3.

¹⁵² OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, [Migrant political participation: a review of policies and integration results in the OSCE region](#), Research Paper, December 2017, p. 15.

¹⁵³ Eldad Davidov and Moshe Semyonov, “[Attitudes toward immigrants in European societies](#),” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 58, No. 5, p. 360.

¹⁵⁴ United Nations and World Bank, [Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict](#), Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018, p. 63.

¹⁵⁵ Philippe Legrain, [Refugees Work: A humanitarian investment that yields economic dividends](#), Tent Partnership for Refugees, May 2016, p. 8.

¹⁵⁶ UN Women, [Migration, Remittances and Financial Inclusion: Challenges and Opportunities for Women's Economic Empowerment](#), Global Migration Group, 2017, p. 7.

¹⁵⁷ European Social Network, “[Migrants with Disabilities: A Hidden Problem](#).”

plus ascertain whether the person has been a victim of assault, rape or torture.” The agency has also developed a handbook on how to assist migrants with special needs.¹⁵⁸ In April 2018, the Government of Canada changed its medical inadmissibility provision within the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, making it easier for persons with disabilities to immigrate to Canada.¹⁵⁹ Similar disability-friendly policies and practices should be implemented in all host states.

By contrast, an article published by Human Rights Watch highlighted how some young migrants that are detained in the U.S. have been forcibly medicated and held in excessively restrictive conditions for demonstrating signs of mental illness.¹⁶⁰ In Canada, health research on young immigrant and refugee men found that “social context can make it difficult for immigrant and refugee young men to seek help for mental health challenges.”¹⁶¹ This research indicates that the physical and mental health concerns of migrants and refugees must be recognized and addressed appropriately by host countries.

5. OSCE Initiatives on Youth, Gender and Migration

While not all trafficking victims are migrants or refugees, there is overlap between the two groups and anti-trafficking measures benefit many migrants and refugees. In December 2018, the OSCE Ministerial Council adopted *Decision No. 6/18, Strengthening Efforts to Prevent and Combat Child Trafficking, Including of Unaccompanied Minors*. In line with the OSCE PA’s recommendation, this decision calls on participating States to adopt measures so that the human rights of child victims of human trafficking are upheld, and to adopt approaches that take “into account the respective gender-specific concerns of girls and boys and the best interests of the child.”¹⁶² The OSCE’s Ministerial Council has adopted several other decisions on combating child trafficking. The December 2017 *Decision No. 6/17 Strengthening Efforts to Prevent Trafficking in Human Beings* and *Decision No. 7/17 Strengthening Efforts to Combat all Forms of Child Trafficking, Including for Sexual Exploitation, as well as Other Forms of Sexual Exploitation of Children* address both age and gender as well. The participating States should be applauded for considering gender dimensions in these decisions.

In February 2016, the OSCE PA established the Ad Hoc Committee on Migration, focusing on the “political and security matters, economic issues, and human rights and humanitarian questions” that surround migration.¹⁶³ In its second year, the committee focused on unaccompanied and separated children.¹⁶⁴ In July 2018, the OSCE PA adopted the *Resolution on Minors on the Move: The Role of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Building an Effective Protection Framework*, which was proposed by the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee. This youth-focused resolution called on the OSCE Ministerial Council to adopt a clear decision that addresses migration, including unaccompanied and separated children. The resolution urges participating States to “implement adapted reception frameworks for unaccompanied

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “[Government of Canada brings medical inadmissibility policy in line with inclusivity for persons with disabilities](#),” News Release, 16 April 2018.

¹⁶⁰ Lea Labaki, “[Migrant kids are being traumatized, not treated for mental health needs](#),” Human Rights Watch, 25 July 2018.

¹⁶¹ Carla Hilario, “[Let’s Talk about the mental health of young immigrant and refugee men](#),” *The Conversation*, 30 January 2018.

¹⁶² OSCE Ministerial Council, [Decision No. 6/18](#), 7 December 2018.

¹⁶³ OSCE PA, [Migration](#).

¹⁶⁴ OSCE PA, [Report by Ms. Nahima Lanjri Chair of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Migration](#), 22 February 2019.

minors which take into account their specific needs (for example, through specialized facilities for pregnant girls), their gender, their age but also their level of dependency.”¹⁶⁵ The implementation of this recommendation would be a very positive step.

We will now turn to our final thematic issue, which is perhaps the most significant issue facing humanity today: climate change.

C. Youth, Gender and Climate Change

1. Gender Mainstreaming and Climate Change

A discussion of the issues affecting today’s youth would be incomplete without analysis of the world we are leaving them to inherit. Indeed, one of the goals of the Slovak Chairmanship of the OSCE for 2019 is to provide for a safer future by engaging with youth and promoting sustainable development, among other measures. For youth, the single greatest issue affecting the future is, of course, climate change. While it was once considered an environmental issue, climate change is now recognized as a “threat multiplier,” which exacerbates existing threats to peace and security.¹⁶⁶

Climate change will have varied impacts in different places, which may include altering social and economic patterns, threatening housing, food security and infrastructure, affecting livelihoods, and exacerbating political and social tensions. Strong institutions are needed to navigate the changes to come in a peaceful manner.¹⁶⁷ Women and girls are generally disproportionately vulnerable to the effects of climate change, though it is important to examine situations at the local-level as this is not always the case. From a global perspective, given that many women and girls are the principal users and managers of natural resources, the primary caregivers and the keepers of the home, they are involved with, and depend on, the resources that are most likely to be affected by climate change.¹⁶⁸ As noted in the OSCE’s guide, *Gender and Environment*, women may face increased poverty and insecurity due to climate change. The guide goes on to explain what has occurred in communities affected by the desiccation of the Aral Sea in Central Asia as one example of the gendered results of climate change. While the health and livelihoods of all have been affected, men have migrated to find other economic opportunities. Women have been left to cope with the impacts of the drying sea and their responsibilities for the household.¹⁶⁹

In other areas, men may have more difficulty in adapting to climate change than women. Even in the same sphere of economic activity, whether men or women are more greatly impacted can vary based on local practices. For example, crop diversity is generally associated with better resilience to climate change impacts. However, men and women’s crop selection practices and the extent of diversification varies based on gendered farming traditions. In some traditions, it is men who grow a greater diversity of crops, whereas in others it is the women. Understanding local realities and integrating such considerations in

¹⁶⁵ Berlin Declaration (*Resolution on Minors on the Move: The Role of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Building an Effective Protection Framework*).

¹⁶⁶ ENVSEC, [Climate Change and Security](#), p. 3 [ENVSEC].

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁶⁸ Government of Canada, [Women and Climate Change](#).

¹⁶⁹ OSCE, [Gender and Environment: A Guide to the Integration of Gender Aspects in the OSCE’s Environmental Projects](#), 2009, p. 44 [OSCE Gender and Environment Guide].

project-development and decision-making is necessary to maximise the benefits of investments and ensure gender equality in implementation.¹⁷⁰

Gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis are essential in mitigation, adaptation and resilience measures but require disaggregated data. Climate change will exacerbate gender inequities, as recognized in the Paris Agreement, which also recognized the need for gender-responsive solutions and capacity building.¹⁷¹ The UNFCCC Gender Action Plan (GAP) is a four-page document that outlines five priority areas to achieve its objectives in very general terms.¹⁷² Youth is mentioned only once, in relation to training. While the development of the GAP is an important step, a more detailed plan for such a complex issue seems appropriate. The various climate financing funds for adaptation and mitigation projects would also benefit from greater use of gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis to ensure that the needs of all are considered when funding choices are made. Project objectives and design, consultation processes, data collection, budgeting and project implementation would all benefit from the integration of considerations related to gender, youth needs and other identity factors.¹⁷³ While most funds now have gender-related plans and policies, implementation on the ground is less consistent.¹⁷⁴ As in so many other areas, more work must be done to operationalise gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis in programs concerning climate change and to address identify factors beyond gender.

There is also a growing body of research indicating that climate change is likely to increase the risk of conflict, which will in turn lead to the conflict-related impacts on young women and girls described earlier.¹⁷⁵ Increased migration is connected to climate change and conflict, as people leave places experiencing increased scarcity. A recent study found that asylum applications to the EU accelerated as temperatures deviated from ideal agricultural conditions in source countries. It predicted that, as climate change worsens, asylum applications in the EU will increase.¹⁷⁶ Reports indicate that in Central American countries where environmental degradation associated with climate change has worsened in recent years, more migrants have fled from these countries toward the U.S.¹⁷⁷

The links between conflict and environmental degradation are well-documented by researchers. Conflict contributes to deforestation, destruction of biodiversity, pollution and water insecurity.¹⁷⁸ In addition, as

¹⁷⁰ Sam Sellers, [Gender and Climate Change: A Closer Look at Existing Evidence](#), Global Gender and Climate Alliance, November 2016, p. 9.

¹⁷¹ United Nations, [Paris Agreement](#), 2015, preamble & art. 2.

¹⁷² United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-third session, Addendum Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third session* (Annex: [Gender action plan](#)), FCCC/CP/2017/11/Add.1, Bonn, Germany, 6-18 November 2017, p. 15-18.

¹⁷³ Sellers, p. 7.

¹⁷⁴ See, for example, Independent Evaluation Office of the GEF, [Evaluation on Gender Mainstreaming in the GEF](#), 3 May 2017. Other studies of gender mainstreaming and climate change finance can be found at United Nations Climate Change, [Gender and Climate Change Finance](#).

¹⁷⁵ Richard Akresh, "[Climate Change, Conflict, and Children](#)," *The Future of Children*, Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 2016.

¹⁷⁶ Anouch Missirian and Wolfram Schlenker, "[Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations](#)," *Science*, Vol. 358, Issue 6370, December 2017.

¹⁷⁷ Lauren Markham, "[How climate change is pushing Central American migrants to the US](#)," *The Guardian*, 6 April 2019.

¹⁷⁸ Todd Westcott, "[UN Environment Exec. Director Statement on Environmental Impact of Armed Conflict](#)," Water Canada, 6 November 2018.

climate change impacts freshwater availability, population density and soil productivity, researchers foresee that environmental changes will trigger increased conflict as resources become scarcer.¹⁷⁹

The gendered impacts of climate change have been observed for nearly 20 years. Still, development policies often remain gender blind to the unique challenges faced by men and women when adapting to climate change.¹⁸⁰ We are at a critical stage and must act quickly to avert the most devastating impacts of climate change and minimize the potential for climate-related conflict. As will be discussed in the next section, youth are at the forefront of movements demanding immediate action.

2. Youth Organizing to Address Climate Change

The recent youth climate strikes were started by a young woman from Sweden. Greta Thunberg began protesting alone outside the Swedish Parliament in 2018, when she was 15. Out of these protests, she started an international movement with 1.5 million young people holding strikes in 100 countries on 22 March 2019.¹⁸¹ At the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2019, she made her now famous statement:

Adults keep saying: “We owe it to the young people to give them hope.” But I don’t want your hope. I don’t want you to be hopeful. I want you to panic. I want you to feel the fear I feel every day. And then I want you to act. I want you to act as you would in a crisis. I want you to act as if our house is on fire. Because it is.¹⁸²

Given the importance of an intersectional lens, as emphasized earlier, it is important to recognize that Greta Thunberg is on the autism spectrum. She sees this as an essential part of her identity that led her to climate activism, rather than a barrier as it might be perceived by others. She has explained that she can focus on the same issue, in this case climate change, for a very long time and that people on the autism spectrum often see things as black and white, and can be very blunt.¹⁸³

Ms. Thunberg’s promotion of action in relation to climate change has resulted in her being nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by a Norwegian parliamentarian who has explained:

If we do nothing to halt climate change, it will be the cause of wars, conflict, and refugees. Greta Thunberg has launched a mass movement which I see as a major contribution to peace.¹⁸⁴

While there may be natural leaders in the youth climate movement, such as Ms. Thunberg, there are not “official” leaders. Recent youth movements are changing how advocacy is done, with organic, self-organizing taking on a more prominent role instead of more traditional top-down organizing by non-governmental organizations. This phenomenon has been seen in other youth movements for gun control,

¹⁷⁹ Clionadh Raleigh and Henrik Urdal, “[Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict](#),” *Political Geography*, Vol. 26, 2007.

¹⁸⁰ Valerie Nelson et al., “[Uncertain predictions, invisible impacts, and the need to mainstream gender in climate change adaptations](#),” *Gender and Development*, Vol. 10, No. 2, July 2002.

¹⁸¹ Steve Silberman, “[Greta Thunberg became a climate activist not in spite of her autism but because of it](#),” *Vox*, 6 May 2019.

¹⁸² The full text of the speech can be found on the [website](#) of The Guardian newspaper.

¹⁸³ John Queally, “[Depressed and Then Diagnosed With Autism, Greta Thunberg Explains Why Hope Cannot Save Planet But Bold Climate Action Still Can](#),” *Common Dreams*, 19 December 2018.

¹⁸⁴ Silberman.

Black Lives Matter and the #MeToo movement as well, all of which have really changed the discussion on important issues affecting the safety of our communities in recent years.¹⁸⁵ There is much to be learned from young activists who are engaging in their communities, nationally and internationally. They are using information and communications technology to democratize processes and facilitate direct participation, and for ease of documentation.¹⁸⁶

At the same time, other youth are advocating within traditional political systems. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a 29-year-old Congresswoman elected in 2018, has proposed a Green New Deal, which has received a lot of media attention. In some countries, youth are also suing their governments for inaction on climate change.¹⁸⁷ Given the stakes in the climate debate and the need for urgent action, the engagement of youth and the use of diverse strategies is necessary if we are to address the climate crisis in time.

3. OSCE Initiatives on Youth, Gender and Climate Change

The OSCE Ministerial Council has not made any decisions focused on climate change since 2014, when they adopted *Decision No. 6/14 Enhancing Disaster Risk Reduction*. While that decision is not focused solely on climate change, it does recognize the exacerbating effect of climate change on the frequency and magnitude of disasters and the importance of mitigation and adaptation. The decision also calls for participating States to “develop, co-ordinate and implement, where appropriate, disaster risk reduction measures with climate change adaptation and mitigation plans at all appropriate levels.”¹⁸⁸ While not easy, given the current context, it is essential that the Ministerial Council again consider the impact of climate change, since the risks have worsened since 2014, and approve a strongly worded, detailed decision on the topic. Such a decision should recognize the different experiences of climate change based on factors such as gender and age and encourage the meaningful inclusion of diverse gender and youth perspectives in climate change policy to ensure that differential impacts for various groups are considered in all mitigation, adaptation and resilience measures so that everyone benefits from investments to address climate change.

The OSCE PA has addressed climate change, to varying extents, in all recent annual Declarations, including the supplementary item adopted in 2017, which addressed the importance of cooperation on water governance in a context of increased scarcity due to climate change, and another in 2015 concerning environmental challenges and economic opportunities in the Arctic.¹⁸⁹ This year, 2019, is the first year that a supplementary item will be debated that integrates gender and youth perspectives as essential elements in successfully addressing climate change. Given the different decision-making models at the OSCE and the OSCE PA, with the latter not requiring the same level of consensus, this is a great opportunity for the PA to lead on a critical issue for peace and security.

¹⁸⁵ Derrick Rhayn, “[Young Leaders as a Self-organizing Vanguard](#),” *Nonprofit Quarterly*, 18 March 2019.

¹⁸⁶ Simpson, p. 55.

¹⁸⁷ Andrew Winston, “[Young People Are Leading the Way on Climate Change, and Companies Need to Pay Attention](#),” *Harvard Business Review*, 26 March 2019; ENvironnement JEUnesse, [Quebec's youth are suing the Government of Canada for inaction on climate change](#).

¹⁸⁸ OSCE Ministerial Council, [Decision No. 6/14 Enhancing Disaster Risk Reduction](#), MC.DEC/6/14, 5 December 2014, p. 2-3.

¹⁸⁹ OSCE PA, [Minsk Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty-sixth Annual Session](#), Minsk, 5-9 July 2017; OSCE PA, [Helsinki Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the Twenty-fourth Annual Session](#), Helsinki, 5-9 July 2015.

The OSCE Institutions can also play important roles. The OSCE, through its Field Operations and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, includes amongst its areas of focus the promotion of “gender mainstreaming and effective engagement of women and youth in environmental activities.”¹⁹⁰ The OSCE’s gender and environment guide provides useful guidance for gender mainstreaming of OSCE Environmental projects, identifying four main questions to be asked at each stage in the project cycle:

- Who is doing what?
- Who has access to which resources?
- Who has control over which resources?
- Who needs what?¹⁹¹

To incorporate an intersectional approach, the same questions could be asked regarding youth and other groups, potentially in an updated guide (the current one is from 2009). It is essential for diverse men and women, including youth, to be involved in decision-making about adaptation, mitigation and resilience measures. OSCE activities for youth relating to the environment appear to involve training and awareness raising, both of which are needed.¹⁹² At the same time, there is a need to focus on the engagement of youth in decision-making and policy and project development as well, to ensure that their needs are understood and integrated. As noted above, however, gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis depend on the collection of disaggregated data and analysis of the different impacts of climate change based on identity factors such as gender and age.

The Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) is an innovative cooperative effort between the OSCE, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the Regional Environmental Centre for Central and Eastern Europe. ENVSEC works in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia to address the linkages between the environment and security issues, including through participatory assessments regarding the security implications of climate change in hot spots within the OSCE region, and support for transboundary climate change adaptation measures.¹⁹³ Unfortunately, gender, women and youth appear to be very rarely mentioned in the plans and documentation with respect to their projects. This important work would benefit from more active gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis to provide more complete assessments of risks and appropriate measures.

The OSCE also supports the climate change-related work of civil society, through its support of the Aarhus Centres. The 1998 UNECE *Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters* (the Aarhus Convention) and its Protocol are the only global, legally binding instruments related to “environmental democracy”. The convention acknowledges intergenerational equity and provides for the involvement of civil society in environmental decision-making.¹⁹⁴ There are 47 parties from Europe and Central Asia, with much overlap with OSCE participating

¹⁹⁰ OSCE, [Environmental Activities](#).

¹⁹¹ OSCE Gender and Environment Guide, p. 16.

¹⁹² For example, see OSCE, [Week of environmental training for youth in Tajikistan](#); OSCE, [OSCE Supports Raising Awareness on Human Rights and Environment for Ukrainian Youth](#).

¹⁹³ OSCE, [Environment and Security \(ENVSEC\) Initiative](#); ENVSEC.

¹⁹⁴ United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, [Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters](#), Aarhus, Denmark, 25 June 1998.


States.¹⁹⁵ Aarhus Centres provide a bridge between governments and civil society.¹⁹⁶ With gender mainstreaming and youth empowerment identified as priorities for the centres, they could play a crucial role in promoting gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis in environmental governance in OSCE participating States.

Finally, analysis of the gender impacts of climate change to date generally focuses on the situation in countries of the Global South, where subsistence farming is a dominant economic activity. The OSCE could play an important role in supporting and facilitating gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis of the implications of climate change for the predominantly middle- and high-income countries of the OSCE region, through ENVSEC, the Aarhus Centres and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.

IV. GENDER IN THE OSCE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES

The analysis of gender balance throughout the OSCE governmental structures – discussed in the following pages – is based on the statistics provided by the Gender Section and the Department of Human Resources of the Office of the Secretary General of the OSCE, which show the representation of women and men in the OSCE Secretariat, Institutions and Field Operations as of **1 December 2018**.

Excluding the staff members of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the OSCE maintained a staff of 2 288 members with women representing 48.1% of the total workforce, a slightly increased share from the previous year (47%)¹⁹⁷.



¹⁹⁵ UNECE, [Aarhus Convention: Parties to the Aarhus Convention and their dates of ratification](#).

¹⁹⁶ For more information, see OSCE/ENVSEC, [Aarhus Centres, Rio+20: A Brief Introduction](#).

¹⁹⁷ See Table 1 on Annexes.

The following analysis includes the staff members of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine¹⁹⁸.

As of 1 December 2018, the OSCE maintained a staff of 3,579, with women representing 41.4% of the total workforce. The overall strongest female representation in the Secretariat, Institutions and Field Operations was among the General Service staff (47.9%), followed by the Professional positions (National Professional Officers, P1 to P4 and S, S1 and S2)¹⁹⁹ where women represented 36.3% of the total workforce. They remained underrepresented in Senior Management positions (25.3%).

Within the Secretariat and Institutions, women held 11 out of the total 36 senior management positions (30.5%).²⁰⁰

From the year 2014 until the year 2018, only 12 women have served as Heads of Field Operations, in sharp contrast to the 47 men who held such a position during that period. In 2018, two Field presences were headed by women, the OSCE Center in Ashgabat and the OSCE Mission to Montenegro. The number of female Deputy Heads of Mission had doubled from one (in 2017) to two. Only the Deputy Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan and the Deputy Head of the Mission to Montenegro were women. The overall percentage of women holding Senior Management positions within Field Operations had dropped from 31% in 2017 to 21.5% in 2018.

A. OSCE Secretariat²⁰¹

In total, women's representation had increased to 58.4% of the OSCE Secretariat workforce in 2018. In S-level positions, female representation had increased from 37.5% to 49.2%. As for the P+ level positions, women held the majority with 53.4%. In 2018, there were still two D-level positions occupied by women. As in 2018, the post of the Secretary General is still held by a man, as it has always been the case since the first Secretary General of the OSCE Secretariat was appointed in 1993.

B. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)²⁰²

In 2018, women represented 57.3% of the total workforce in the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and female representation in G-level positions amounted to 68.3%. According to the data from 2018, in S-level positions, the figures had increased from 50% in 2017 to 60% in 2018. The overall number of female employees in the professional category remained the same as the last reporting period, 44.3%. The only D-level position of the Office was held by a woman, while the Head of the Institution was, and still is, also a woman.

¹⁹⁸ See Table 2 in Annexes.

¹⁹⁹ The OSCE offers fixed term contracts for positions at the Secretariat, Institutions, and to a limited extent and mainly in the area of administration, at its missions. Remuneration package and terms of employment are similar to those of the United Nations Common System: General Service (G1 to G7), Professional Staff (NPOs, S, S1, S2, P1 to P4) and Senior Management Staff (S3+, P5+, D, Heads and Deputy Heads of Field Operations and Institutions). For more information please visit the OSCE website at: <http://www.osce.org/employment/43284>.

²⁰⁰ See Table 3 in Annexes.

²⁰¹ See Table 4 in Annexes.

²⁰² See Table 5 in Annexes.

C. Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)²⁰³

In 2018, women represented 54.8% of the workforce in the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). They held 66.7% of S-level positions, a significant increase compared to the 25% of the previous year, and represented 33.3% of employees in P-level positions, also a significant increase from the 23% in 2017. The position of the Head of Institution was, and still is, held by a man.

D. Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM)²⁰⁴

In 2018, the total workforce of the Office of the RFoM remained predominantly composed by women (53.3%). They represented 80% of S-level positions, nevertheless only one female employee held a P-level position out of four. D-level positions and the Head of the Institution remained without female representation, as they were held by men.

E. Seconded Posts in the Secretariat, Institutions and Field Operations²⁰⁵

As of 31 December 2018, the OSCE had a total of 1 224 seconded staff members from 46 participating States, of whom 26.5% were women.

The seconding States with the highest number of female secondees were the United States (36 women out of 103, representing 35%), Germany (31 women out of 66, representing 47%) and Italy (26 out of 72, representing 36.1%). Armenia was the only country where parity was achieved among the seconded posts (3 female secondees and 3 male secondees). The widest gender gaps in favor of men were observed among the staff seconded by the Russian Federation (2 female secondees and 49 male secondees), Moldova (7 female secondees and 48 male secondees) and Romania (2 female secondees and 34 male secondees). There was no female representation among the seconded staff of Belgium (1 male seconded), Estonia (4 male secondees), Lithuania (2 male secondees), Slovenia (1 male seconded), Turkey (17 male secondees) and Ukraine (2 male secondees).

F. Field Operations: Gender Balance of Staff Members²⁰⁶

As of 1 December 2018, the OSCE comprised 16 Field Missions with a grand total of 2 970 staff members, out of which women represented 38.6%.

Depending on the Field Operation and its mandate, the OSCE employed a certain number of local staff members. In 2018, the largest staffed OSCE Field Operations were the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (1291 members, including 29.5% of women) and the Mission in Kosovo, employing 458 local staff, of which only 156 were women, amounting to 34% of the workforce, a slight increase from the previous year (30%). The OSCE Field Operations with the highest proportion of women were the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (65.5%), the OSCE Mission to Montenegro (61.3%), the OSCE Presence in Albania (58.5%) and the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (52.4%). Other Field Operations where women

²⁰³ See Table 6 in Annexes.


²⁰⁴ See Table 7 in Annexes.

²⁰⁵ See Table 8 in Annexes. Please note that seconded SMM members are included.

²⁰⁶ See Table 9 in Annexes.

represented the majority of the workforce included the OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan (51.8%), the OSCE Mission to Serbia (51.5%) and the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (51%). With a few exceptions such as the OSCE Mission to Kosovo (34%), the OSCE Observer Mission at the two Russian Checkpoints (23.8%), and the Personal Representative of the CiO on the Conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference (23.5%), the OSCE Field Operations appeared close to finding an equal gender balance, as most staff proportions were within 40 and 60%.

Within Field Operations, women also held a variety of staff positions.²⁰⁷ Women represented 44.1% of General Service Staff, 34.3% of Professional Staff, and 21.5% of Senior Management Staff.



V. FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN THE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION TO UKRAINE

A. Gender Equality Action Plan

The SMM Gender Focal Point (GFP) Network was introduced in 2015 to address the gender aspects of the work of the mission as well as to incorporate gender mainstreaming in the SMM agenda and activities. The Network is led by the Senior Gender Adviser residing in Kyiv and coordinating the efforts of all the GFPs on the field.

The first Gender Equality Action Plan (GEAP) of the SMM was developed in 2016 as a part of its overall strategy and had three key objectives: integration of gender equality principles into the SMM structures and working environment; gender mainstreaming in the SMM monitoring and reporting work and in the

²⁰⁷ See Table 10 in Annexes.

other mandated activities; coordination and liaising with international and national stakeholders, including civil society, on gender equality issues²⁰⁸.

The recent Gender Equality Action plan for 2018-2019 envisions *four outputs*:

1. Gender perspective mainstreamed in all SMM activities enabling the SMM to address human security challenges more effectively;
2. Coordination and liaison with national and international stakeholders, including civil society, on gender equality issues as an established practice making effective information-sharing possible;
3. Improvement of gender balance in all spheres and levels of the SMM and ensuring of equal opportunities and diversity in the working environment;
4. Ensuring of a regular evaluation process identifying progress, best practices and remaining challenges in implementing the Plan²⁰⁹.

B. Gender Balance among the SMM Staff Members

Although the implementation of the GEAP contributes to the improvement of the situation, particularly in mainstreaming the gender agenda in the current SMM activities and the security challenges, there remains a lot more to be done, especially regarding gender balance among staff members. As of 1 December 2018, the SMM comprised 1 291 staff members, of which only 29.5% were women.

According to the statistical data on recruitment and staff members provided by the SMM Chief Monitor in his recent report to the Permanent Council²¹⁰, for the reporting period 5 November 2018 - 20 January 2019, out of the total number of 939 applications received by the SMM, 169 were from women, which accounts for 18% of the total. After the selection process, 183 new personnel were recruited, of which 40% were women. From this number, 133 personnel, including 42 % women, were deployed to the Donetsk and Luhansk Monitoring Teams (see the table below).

Applicants	Applications received	%	Applications accepted	%	Deployment to Donetsk and Luhansk Monitoring Teams	%
Women	169	18%	73	40%	55	42%
Men	770	82%	110	60%	78	58%
Total	939	100%	183	100%	133	100%

Source: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Report by Chief Monitor to the OSCE PC”, 01.02.2019.

²⁰⁸ “Annual Progress Report on the Implementation of the OSCE 2004 Action Plan on the Promotion of Gender Equality”, 2016, p. 30.

²⁰⁹ “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Informal security briefing for the participating States”, 22.05.2018.


²¹⁰ “OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Report by Chief Monitor to the OSCE Permanent Council”, 1 January 2019.

This data presented in the SMM Chief Monitor's report also reflected the current gender balance situation among the SMM staff: women remained underrepresented in positions such as Chief of Technical Monitoring Centre, Security Officer, Camera/Sensor Expert and Technical ICT Experts. Out of the three Deputy Team Leaders recruited, one was female. Among all Mission members, as of 1 December 2018, women represented less than a third of employees (29.5%). They represented 49% of G-level positions, 30% of P-level positions and 21.5% of Senior Management positions.

VI. GENDER AMONG THE VIENNA BASED AMBASSADORS AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO THE OSCE PERMANENT COUNCIL

The analysis of the gender of the OSCE Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives – discussed in the following Section– shows the representation of women and men among the Ambassadors/Permanent Representatives to the OSCE Permanent Council based in Vienna as of **1 June 2019**. It comprises the Ambassadors/Permanent Representatives of the 57 participating States (plus the EU Ambassador), the Ambassadors of the eleven OSCE Partners for Co-Operation and the Ambassador of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

There are currently 69 Ambassadors/Permanent Representatives to the OSCE Permanent Council based in Vienna, with women representing 24.6% of the total workforce, which shows significant under-representation.²¹¹



VII. GENDER IN THE OSCE PA

²¹¹ See Table 11 in Annexes.

During the Vilnius Annual Session in 2009, the Standing Committee amended the OSCE PA's Rules of Procedure, agreeing to introduce a new sub-clause to Rule 1 stating that "each national Delegation should have both genders represented."

In 2011, the OSCE PA adopted a resolution on "Women's representation at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly" calling on national parliaments to improve the representation of women in the national delegations to the Assembly. The Resolution noted with concern that, as of February 2011, 17 of the 57 national delegations to the OSCE PA were comprised of men only, that only ten women were Heads of delegation and that, out of the 307 delegates, only 73 (23.7%) were women.

Since then, positive efforts have been made by the national delegations to improve gender balance within the Parliamentary Assembly, though not all countries are in compliance yet.

The OSCE participating States regularly consider ways to advance gender equality, and OSCE PA members stand ready to engage in the debates on this topic. In March 2017, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly organized the Conference titled "OSCE Female Perspectives," which took place in the Austrian Parliament. The conference focused on improving the level of engagement of women in discussions on security and included parliamentarians, representatives of the OSCE Field Operations, academics and civil society representatives.²¹² During the OSCE PA Winter Meeting at the end of February 2019, the Special Representative on Gender Issues to the OSCE PA, Dr. Hedy Fry, presented a report on the recent developments and initial ideas for the 2019 Gender Report, as she does every year.

A. Member Directory Statistics²¹³


As of June 2019, there is an overall male majority within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Regarding gender balance in the delegations, almost three quarters of both regular OSCE PA Members, including Heads of delegation and Deputy Member of Delegations, and OSCE PA Alternate Members are men (76.5%), holding a combined number of 369 out of 482 positions. Compared to the statistics provided in last year's report (362 men out of 487 positions), no major changes in female representation within the Assembly can be observed. However, it should also be noted that four OSCE PA delegations, namely **Norway, Portugal, Armenia and Liechtenstein**, have currently achieved gender parity.

Women outnumber men as delegation secretaries. Among the OSCE PA Secretaries of Delegations, 49 out of 77 are women, representing a 64% to 36% gender distribution²¹⁴.

²¹² [OSCE PA Conference on 'OSCE Security Policy - Female Perspectives'](#), on 23 March 2017, Vienna.

²¹³ The [OSCE PA Member Directory](#) is available on request from the International Secretariat.

²¹⁴ See Table 12 in Annexes. Co-Secretaries and Deputy of Delegation have also been included in this category.



B. Initiative to Boost Women's Participation


Efforts undertaken by the national delegations to comply with Article 1.4 of the OSCE PA Rules of Procedure have led to a significant decrease in the number of delegations with no female representation. The number dropped from 17 in 2011 to 10 in 2012 and 2013, and further to 9 in 2014, before rising again to 10 in 2015, and decreasing to 6 in 2016 and 2017. As of June 2019, only 2 delegations remain without female representatives, an unchanged number compared to 2018.

As of June 2019, 24 OSCE PA national delegations are currently led by women (an unchanged number compared to 2017 and 2018).

C. Gender in the Bureau

The Bureau is composed of the President, nine Vice-Presidents, the Treasurer and the President Emeritus, as well as the three Officers of each of the General Committees. As of June 2019, the Bureau comprised 21 members – 8 of whom are female – providing for a 62% to 38% ratio in favour of men. Compared to 2018 statistics of the gender balance in the Bureau, there has been an increase of 12% in the female representation. The 2019 numbers are above the targeted goal of 30% suggested in 2011²¹⁵.

²¹⁵ See Address by Dr. Hedy Fry, Special Representative on Gender Issues to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 10th Winter Meeting, 24–25 February 2011, Vienna, Austria.



1. Female Presidents and Vice-Presidents in the OSCE PA

The statistics regarding female Presidents and Vice-Presidents have changed since the previous reporting years. In May 2017, the President of the OSCE PA was a woman, Christine Muttonen (Austria), and among the eight Vice-Presidents only one, Isabel Santos (Portugal), was female. Additionally, a woman, Doris Barnett (Germany), was the Treasurer for the Bureau. Since November 2017, the OSCE PA President is a man, George Tsereteli (Georgia), however, the gender breakdown among Vice-Presidents have slightly improved with Isabel Santos (Portugal), Margareta Cederfelt (Sweden) and Kari Henriksen (Norway) currently holding the position of the Vice-President (out of 9 in total). Doris Barnett (Germany) remains the Treasurer for the Bureau²¹⁶.

2. Officers of the OSCE PA General Committees


Compared to the 2018 reporting period, the number of women in the leadership of the General Committees has increased. Women currently hold 4 out of the total 9 Committee officer posts, whereas women held 2 positions in 2018 and 4 positions in 2017. Out of this total, two women, Nilza de Sena (Portugal) and Margareta Kiener Nellen (Switzerland), hold respectively the positions of Chair of the Second and Third Committees.

D. Female Participation in the OSCE PA Annual Sessions and Winter Meetings

The charts below show the percentage of female parliamentarians who participated in the OSCE PA Annual Sessions and Winter Meetings.

²¹⁶ See Table 13 in Annexes.

The 2017 Annual Session observed a slight increase in female participation compared to the previous reporting period (from 26.8% to 27.5%) and there was an additional increase for the 2018 Annual Session with 28%. The expected female representation in the upcoming Annual Session in Luxembourg in July 2019 is of 30.2%.²¹⁷




The overall percentage of female participation in the OSCE Winter Meetings²¹⁸ has decreased since the 2014 OSCE PA Winter Meeting, which saw the highest percentage of female participants in the last ten years (30%)²¹⁹. Regarding the last two years, female participation slightly increased for the 2019 OSCE PA Winter Meeting (26.3%) compared to the 2018 data (25.3%).

²¹⁷ See Table 14 in Annexes.

²¹⁸ See Table 15 in Annexes.

²¹⁹ See OSCE PA Gender Balance Report, July 2014.




E. Female Participation in the OSCE PA Election Monitoring 2018-2019²²⁰


Women take part in election observation conducted by the OSCE PA every year. The figures concerning female participation in OSCE PA election monitoring show that, during the 2018 reporting period, the overall number of female observers was 93 (25%), a significant increase from the previous year (20%), and the number of male observers for 2018 was 280 (75%). During the first half of 2019, four election observation missions were conducted, with an overall number of 62 female observers (26%) and 178 male observers (74%).

During the 2018-2019 reporting period, women held 62.5% of election observation leadership positions, which comprises Special Coordinators designated by the Chairman-in-Office to lead short-term observers and Heads of OSCE PA observation missions. This is a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period, when women held 37% of the leadership positions in the OSCE PA election observation missions.


²²⁰ See Table 16.



Note: Diagram includes Heads of delegations, Special Co-Ordinators of delegations and Members of delegations.



Note: Diagram includes Heads of delegations, Special Co-Ordinators of delegations and Members of delegations. Diagram covers OSCE PA Election Monitoring as of 9 June 2019.



F. Permanent Staff of the OSCE PA International Secretariat

Currently, the permanent staff of the OSCE PA International Secretariat, including the Vienna Liaison Office, is comprised of 20 individuals, of whom six are women. Compared to the statistics from 2018, the posts of the OSCE PA Secretary General and two Deputies are still held by men.

G. The International Research Assistant Programme

The International Secretariat of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly conducts a Research Assistant Programme, in which it engages graduate students for a period of six months each to give them an opportunity to gain practical experience in the field of international affairs. There are currently four Research Assistants working at the International Secretariat in Copenhagen, and four in the Vienna Liaison Office – one man and seven women.

H. Female Representation in National Parliaments of OSCE Participating States

According to the data provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), overall female representation in national parliaments of OSCE countries has increased since the last reporting period. Within the OSCE participating States and since the last reporting period, **Ukraine** becomes the country with the least female representation with only 11.6%. **Malta** (11.9%), **Liechtenstein** (12.0%) and **Hungary** (12.6%) also have some of the lowest female representation within national parliaments in the OSCE region according to the 2019 data. **Sweden** (47.3%), **Finland** (41.5%) and **Spain** (41.1%) have the highest numbers of female representation in national parliaments.²²¹

²²¹ See Table 17 in Annexes.

Collectively, female representation among national Parliaments in European countries within the OSCE region is 28.5%, combining Upper House or Senate and Single or Lower House parliamentarians.²²² The number drops to 27.4% if the Nordic countries are excluded. This represents a slight increase from the last reporting period.

CONCLUSIONS

In all areas of its work, the OSCE would benefit from greater use of gender mainstreaming and intersectional analysis, as would the populations of its participating States. Engaging youth from diverse backgrounds in the work of the OSCE would allow the identification of a broader set of security needs and provide diverse perspectives on how to address them most effectively. The selection process for the core group of experts for *#Perspectives 2030: Youth Fostering Security across the OSCE area* who will “develop a vision of security and cooperation in Europe, Eurasia and North America,” is a great opportunity for the OSCE to demonstrate its commitment to engaging diverse youth voices.²²³ Amending the 2004 Gender Action Plan to better integrate youth considerations would also be beneficial, as would the development of a best practices guide to integrating intersectional analysis along with gender mainstreaming.

Most important of all, is for the OSCE and its participating States to work to address negative stereotypes about young people and harmful cultural conceptions of masculinity that lead to disillusionment with existing systems, violence and conflict. Parliamentarians are important social influencers. We must be models and advocate for programs that challenge harmful stereotypes and promote gender-equitable masculine identities. This transformational work can form the basis of our other work with the view to ensuring that the OSCE region is a region of peace and security, for all.

²²² See Table 18 in Annexes.

²²³ OSCE, [Perspectives #2030](#).

ANNEXES

Table 1

Post Distribution of Staff in the OSCE 2017 without SMM members				
Category	Men	Women	Total	% Women
General Service Staff	622	534	1156	46%
Professional Staff	416	402	818	49%
Senior Management	49	22	71	31%
Total	1087	958	2045	47%
Post Distribution of Staff in the OSCE 2018 without SMM members				
Category	Men	Women	Total	% Women
General Service Staff	670	610	1280	47.6%
Professional Staff	466	472	938	50.3%
Senior Management	51	19	70	27%
Total	1187	1101	2288	48%

Note: Figures as of 29 December 2017 and 1 December 2018 respectively.

Table 2

Post Distribution of Staff in the OSCE 2018 with SMM members				
Category	Men	Women	Total	% Women
General Service Staff	862	793	1655	47.9%
Professional Staff	1170	667	1837	36.3%
Senior Management	65	22	87	25.3%
Total	2097	1482	3579	41.4%

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018.

Table 3

Post Distribution of the OSCE Staff in the OSCE Secretariat, Institutions and Field Operations, including SMM members, 2018				
Secretariat and Institutions Staff				
Category	Men	Women	Total	% Women
General Service Staff	103	194	297	65.3%
Professional Staff	145	131	276	47.5%
Senior Management	25	11	36	30.5%
Total	273	336	609	55.2%
Field Operations Staff				
Category	Men	Women	Total	% Women
General Service Staff	759	599	1358	44.1%
Professional Staff	1025	536	1561	34.3%
Senior Management	40	11	51	21.5%
Total	1824	1146	2970	38.6%

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018.

Table 4

Post Distribution in the OSCE Staff in the OSCE Secretariat 2018												
Category	G1-G7	G in %	N P	S	S in %	P1-P5	D 1	D 2	Head of Inst.	P+ in %	Total	Total in %
Women	129	63.2%	1	31	49.2%	70	2	0	0	53.4	233	58.4%

Men	75	36.8%	0	32	50.8%	54	3	1	1	47.6	166	41.6%
Total	204	100%	1	63	100%	124	5	1	1	100%	399	100%

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018.

Table 5

Post Distribution in the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2018											
Category	G1-G7	G in %	S	S in %	P1-P5	D1	D2	Head of Inst.	P+ in %	Total	Total in %
Women	54	68.3%	9	60%	29	1	0	1	44.3%	94	57.3%
Men	25	31.6%	6	40%	39	0	0	0	55.7%	70	42.7%
Total	79	100%	15	100%	68	1	0	1	100%	164	100%

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018.

Table 6

Post Distribution in the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities 2018												
Category	G1-G7	G in %	NP	S	S in %	P1-P5	D1	D2	Head of Inst.	P+ in %	Total	Total in %
Women	8	80%	2	2	66.7%	5	0	0	0	33.3%	17	54.8%
Men	2	10%	1	1	33.3%	8	1	0	1	66.7%	14	45.2%
Total	10	100%	3	3	100%	13	1	0	1	100%	31	100%

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018.

Table 7

Post Distribution in the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media 2018											
Category	G1-G7	G in %	S	S in %	P1-P5	D1	D2	Head of Inst.	P+ in %	Total	Total in %
Women	3	75%	4	80%	1	0	0	0	16.7%	8	53.3%
Men	1	25%	1	20%	3	1	0	1	83.3%	7	46.7%
Total	4	100%	5	100%	4	1	0	1	100%	15	100%

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018.

Table 8

Seconding Country	% Women	Men	Women	Total Seconded Staff
Albania	23%	10	3	13
Germany	47%	35	31	66
The United States	35%	67	36	103
Armenia	50%	3	3	6
Austria	33.3%	16	8	24
Azerbaijan	25%	3	1	4
Belarus	10%	9	1	10
Belgium	0%	1	0	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	21.2	52	14	66
Bulgaria	24%	38	12	50
Canada	25.6%	32	11	43
Croatia	35.7%	9	5	14
Denmark	22.2%	7	2	9

Spain	47.8%	12	11	23
Estonia	0%	4	0	4
Finland	33.3%	18	9	27
France	45.8%	13	11	24
Georgia	48.4%	16	15	31
United Kingdom	18.3%	67	15	82
Greece	16%	21	4	25
Hungary	9.6%	28	3	31
Ireland	15%	17	3	20
Iceland	100%	0	2	2
Italy	36.1%	46	26	72
Kazakhstan	22.2%	7	2	9
Kyrgyzstan	17.8%	23	5	28
Latvia	25%	6	2	8
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	31.2%	33	15	48
Lithuania	0%	2	0	2
Moldova	12.7%	48	7	55
Montenegro	25%	3	1	4
Norway	43.5%	13	10	23
Netherlands	33.3%	6	3	9
Poland	22.9%	37	11	48
Portugal	25%	3	1	4
Romania	5.5%	34	2	36

Russian Federation	3.9%	49	2	51
Serbia	26.3%	14	5	19
Slovakia	16.6%	15	3	18
Slovenia	0%	1	0	1
Sweden	35%	26	14	40
Switzerland	40%	9	6	15
Tajikistan	47%	9	8	17
Czech Republic	5%	19	1	20
Turkey	0%	17	0	17
Ukraine	0%	2	0	2
Total	26.5%	900	324	1224

Note: Figures as 31 of December 2018.

Table 9

Gender Balance of Staff in OSCE Field Operations 2018					
Field Operations	Women	In %	Men	In %	Total
OSCE Presence in Albania	48	58.5%	34	41.5%	82
OSCE Centre in Ashgabat	13	44.8%	16	55.2%	29
OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan	14	51.8%	13	48.2%	27
OSCE Centre in Bishkek	44	52.4%	40	47.6%	84
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	166	51%	160	49%	326
OSCE Mission in Kosovo	156	34%	302	66%	458
OSCE Mission to Moldova	28	56%	22	44%	50
OSCE Mission to Montenegro	19	61.3%	12	38.7%	31

OSCE Mission to Serbia	70	51.5%	66	48.5%	136
OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe	66	42%	91	58%	157
OSCE Mission to Skopje	65	43.6%	84	56.4%	149
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine	55	65.5%	29	34.5%	84
OSCE Observer Mission at the two Russian Checkpoints	5	23.8%	16	76.2%	21
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan	12	42.8%	16	57.2%	28
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine	381	29.5%	910	70.5%	1291
Pers. Rep. of the CiO on the Conflict dealt with by the Minsk Conference	4	23.5%	13	76.5%	17
Grand Total	1146	38.6%	1824	61.4%	2970

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018.

Table 10

Post Distribution in Field Operations				
Category	Men	Women	Total	% of Women
General Service Staff	759	599	1358	44.1%
Professional Staff	1025	536	1561	34.3%
Senior Management Staff	40	11	51	21.5%
Total	1824	1146	2970	38.6%

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018. Please note that SMM staff members are included.

Table 11

**Gender Balance among the Vienna based Ambassadors/Permanent Representatives to the OSCE
Permanent Council by Country**

Participating State	Participating States with a male Ambassador/Permanent Representative	Participating States with a female Ambassador/Permanent Representative
Albania	1	0
Germany	1	0
The US	1	0
Armenia	1	0
Austria	1	0
Azerbaijan	1	0
Belarus	0	1
Belgium	1	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	0
Bulgaria	1	0
Canada	0	1

Cyprus	0	1
Croatia	0	1
Denmark	1	0
Spain	1	0
Finland	0	1
Estonia	0	1
France	0	1
Georgia	1	0
The UK	1	0
Greece	1	0
Hungary	1	0
Ireland	1	0
Iceland	1	0
Italy	1	0

Kazakhstan	1	0
Kyrgyzstan	1	0
Latvia	1	0
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1	0
Liechtenstein	0	1
Lithuania	1	0
Luxemburg	1	0
Malta	0	1
Moldova	1	0
Monaco	0	1
Mongolia	0	1
Montenegro	1	0
Norway	1	0

Uzbekistan	1	0
Netherlands	1	0
Poland	1	0
Portugal	1	0
Romania	1	0
The EU	1	0
Russian Federation	1	0
San Marino	0	1
Holy See	1	0
Serbia	1	0
Slovakia	1	0
Slovenia	1	0
Sweden	0	1
Switzerland	1	0

Tajikistan	1	0
Czech Republic	1	0
Turkmenistan	1	0
Turkey	1	0
Ukraine	1	0
Afghanistan (Partner for Co-operation)	0	1
Australia (Partner for Co-operation)	1	0
Japan (Partner for Co-operation)	1	0
Republic of Korea (Partner for Co-operation)	1	0
Thailand (Partner for Co-operation)	0	1
Algeria (Partner for Co-operation)	0	1
Egypt (Partner for Co-operation)	1	0

Israel (Partner for Co-operation)	0	1
Jordan (Partner for Co-operation)	1	0
Morocco (Partner for Co-operation)	1	0
Tunisia (Partner for Co-operation)	1	0
OSCE PA	1	0
Grand Total	52 (75.4%)	17 (24.6%)

Note: Figures as of 1 December 2018. Please note that the delegation of Andorra does not have an Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the OSCE Permanent Council.

Table 12

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly as of June 2019					
Category	Women	In %	Men	In %	Total
OSCE PA Members	85	27%	233	73%	318
OSCE PA Alternate Members	28	17%	136	83%	164
OSCE PA Secretaries	49	64%	28	36%	77
OSCE PA Staff	6	30%	14	70%	20
Grand Total	168	29%	411	71%	579

Table 13

Gender Balance of Bureau Members as of June 2019 (without President Emeritus)			
Category	Women	Men	Total
President	0	1	1
Vice-Presidents	3	6	9
Treasurer	1	0	1
President Emeritus	0	1	1
First Committee	1	2	3
Second Committee	2	1	3
Third Committee	1	2	3
Grand Total	8	13	21

Table 14

Parliamentarian Participation in the OSCE PA Annual Sessions (2010-2019)										
Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Women	50	55	61	67	74	63	75	60	79	88
Men	186	169	185	178	180	182	205	173	202	203
% Women	21	24.5	25	27	29	25.7	26.8	27.5	28	30.2
Grand Total	236	224	246	245	254	245	280	233	281	291

Note: Calculations include Members and Alternate members of delegations and do not include Staff of Delegations, the OSCE PA and the OSCE Secretariats, Observers, Guests, International Parliamentary Organizations and Partners for Co-operation.

Table 15

Parliamentarian Participation in the OSCE PA Winter Meeting (2010-2019)										
Category	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Women	49	58	60	50	64	61	58	53	59	62
Men	174	172	180	159	151	157	186	174	174	174
% Women	22	25	25	24	30	27.9	23.7	23.3	25.3	26.3
Grand Total	223	230	240	209	215	218	244	227	233	236

Note: Calculations include Members and Alternate members of delegations and do not include Staff of Delegations, the OSCE PA and the OSCE Secretariats, Observers, Guests, International Parliamentary Organizations and Partners for Co-operation.

Table 16

OSCE PA Election Monitoring (2018-2019)			
Elections Observed	MPs	Women	% of Women
Parliamentary elections, Italy (04.03.2018)	30	10	33.3%
Presidential elections, Russia (18.03.2018)	83	21	25.3%
Presidential elections, Azerbaijan (11.04.2018)	36	8	22.2%
Presidential and parliamentary elections, Turkey (24.06.2018)	54	17	31.5%
General elections, Bosnia and Herzegovina (07.10.2018)	19	1	5.2%
Presidential elections (1st round), Georgia (28.10.2018)	43	9	21%
Mid-term elections, United States of America (06.11.2018)	69	14	20.3%
Presidential elections (2nd round), Georgia (28.11.2018)	5	2	40%
Parliamentary elections, Armenia (09.12.2018)	34	11	32.3%
Parliamentary elections, Moldova (24.02.2019)	36	7	19.4%

Presidential elections (first round), Ukraine (31.03.2019)	86	24	27.9%
Presidential elections (second round), Ukraine (21.04.2019)	26	5	19.2%
Presidential elections (first round), North Macedonia (21.04.2019)	31	11	35.5%
Presidential elections (second round), North Macedonia (06.05.2019)	11	5	45.5%
Presidential elections, Kazakhstan (09.06.2019)	50	10	20%
Total	613	155	25.3%

Note: Figures as of June 2019; Calculations include Heads of the OSCE PA delegations, Special Co-Ordinators of the Observer Missions and Members of delegations.

Table 17
Women in Parliament in the OSCE countries

Global Rank	Country	Lower or single House			Upper House or Senate			Women OSCE PA Delegate Members		
		Seats	Women	%	Seats	Women	%	Members	Women	%
5	Sweden	349	165	47.3%	---	---	---	16	7	43.7%
12	Finland	200	83	41.5%	---	---	---	12	5	41.6%
13	Spain	350	144	41.1%	266	98	36.8%	8	2	25%
14	Norway	169	69	40.8%	---	---	---	12	6	50%
17	France	577	229	39.7%	348	112	32.2%	13	3	23%
21	North Macedonia	120	46	38.3%	---	---	---	6	1	16.6%
22	Iceland	63	24	38.1%	---	---	---	6	1	16.6%

23	Belgium	150	57	38.0%	60	26	43.3%	13	6	46.1%
25	Serbia	247	93	37.7%	---	---	---	8	3	37.5%
26	Denmark	179	67	37.4%	---	---	---	12	2	16.6%
27	Austria	183	68	37.2%	61	22	36.1%	6	2	33.3%
31	Italy	630	225	35.7%	320	110	34.4%	12	1	8.3%
"	Portugal	230	82	35.7%	---	---	---	8	4	50%
34	Belarus	110	38	34.5%	56	17	30.4%	12	3	25%
35	Monaco	24	8	33.3%	---	---	---	3	1	33,3%
37	Switzerland	200	65	32.5%	46	7	15.2%	8	1	12,5%
38	Andorra	28	9	32.1%	---	---	---	4	1	25%
39	United Kingdom	650	208	32.0%	789	208	26.4%	25	3	12%
42	Netherlands	150	47	31.3%	75	27	36.0%	14	5	35.7%
"	Latvia	100	31	31.0%	---	---	---	3	1	33.3%
47	Germany	709	219	30.9%	69	27	39.1%	26	11	42.3%
53	Albania	140	41	29.3%	---	---	---	3	1	33.3%
55	Poland	460	134	29.1%	100	14	14.0%	16	4	25%
56	Estonia	101	29	28.7%	---	---	---	6	2	33.3%
60	Kazakhstan	107	29	27.1%	47	5	10.6%	12	3	25%

61	Canada	334	90	26.9%	105	49	46.7%	10	3	30%
66	Bulgaria	240	62	25.8%	---	---	---	10	4	40%
69	Luxembourg	60	15	25.0%	---	---	---	10	1	10%
70	San Marino	60	15	25.0%	---	---	---	3	1	33.3%
71	Turkmenistan	124	31	25.0%	---	---	---	6	2	33.3%
73	Slovenia	90	22	24.4%	40	4	10.0%	6	1	16.6%
75	Armenia	132	32	24.2%	---	---	---	6	3	50%
77	United States of America	433	102	23.6%	100	25	25.0%	23	3	13%
78	Montenegro	81	19	23.5%	---	---	---	5	1	20%
82	Republic of Moldova	101	23	22.8%	---	---	---	6	0	0%
84	Czech Republic	200	45	22.5%	81	13	16.0%	8	1	12.5%
86	Ireland	158	35	22.2%	60	18	30.0%	7	1	14.3%
91	Bosnia and Herzegovina	42	9	21.4%	15	2	13.3%	3	1	33.3%
92	Lithuania	141	30	21.3%	---	---	---	5	2	40%
96	Romania	329	68	20.7%	136	19	14.0%	14	1	7.1%
97	Croatia	151	31	20.5%	---	---	---	6	1	16.6%
104	Slovakia	150	30	20.0%	---	---	---	8	2	25%

107	Kyrgyzstan	120	23	19.2%	---	---	---	6	1	16.6%
110	Tajikistan	63	12	19.0%	32	7	21.9%	6	2	33.3%
112	Greece	300	56	18.7%	---	---	---	9	4	44.4%
116	Cyprus	56	10	17.9%	---	---	---	4	1	25%
119	Turkey	596	104	17.4%	---	---	---	8	1	12.5%
120	Mongolia	76	13	17.1%	---	---	---	6	1	16.6%
123	Azerbaijan	119	20	16.8%	---	---	---	6	2	33.3%
129	Uzbekistan	150	24	16.0%	100	17	17.0%	6	2	33.3%
130	Russian Federation	450	71	15.8%	170	31	18.2%	15	2	13.3%
138	Georgia	149	22	14.8%	---	---	---	6	1	16.6%
148	Hungary	199	25	12.6%	---	---	---	6	2	33.3%
153	Liechtenstein	25	3	12.0%	---	---	---	4	2	50%
154	Malta	67	8	11.9%	---	---	---	6	1	16.6%
156	Ukraine	423	49	11.6%	---	---	---	14	5	35.7%

Note: Figures correspond to the number of seats currently filled in Parliament. The Holy See sends a delegate as a guest of honor.

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in national parliaments (situation as of 1 February 2019).

Table 18

Women in Parliament in OSCE Countries, Regional Average			
Category	Single House or Lower House	Upper House or Senate	Both Houses combined
Europe – OSCE member countries including Nordic countries	28.6%	28.0%	28.5%
Europe – OSCE member countries excluding Nordic countries	27.2%	28.0%	27.4%

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Women in National Parliaments: Regional Averages* (situation as of 1 February 2019).